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Abstract 
 
The central bank of Ghana officially adopted an explicit inflating targeting monetary 
policy in May 2007 following its operational independence in March 2002. This 
thesis firstly explores the evolution of monetary policy and inflation in Ghana, before 
characterising the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
The thesis uses time series estimations of Taylor-type reactions functions to 
characterise monetary policy conduct and uses three other approaches to evaluate 
monetary policy effectiveness. In the first approach the long-run interest rate 
response to inflation, output gap, and other inflation precursors from estimated 
reaction functions is compared with Taylor’s reference values. The second method 
analyses the responsiveness of the policy interest rate to commercial bank retail rates 
while the third approach investigates the monetary transmission mechanism to the 
wider economy using variables’ impulse responses to investigate how other 
important variables that are either the final objective of policy or the conduit through 
which the final objective of policy is attained, behave in response to monetary policy. 
The analysis uses a modified cointegration and error correction model that is robust 
to the stationary properties of the data as well as vector autoregression techniques. 
 
The results show monetary policy was largely effective in influencing the savings 
rate but not quite effective in controlling inflation. An alternative model (McCallum 
1995a) that uses monetary aggregates as a policy instrument appears to explain 
monetary policy in Ghana better. The thesis suggests possible reasons for the non 
effectiveness of monetary policy and offer policy recommendations for long-term 
inflation control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Monetary policy has the major responsibility for curbing inflation and currency 
instability and also can ensure long-term economic growth. There is little agreement 
on what constitutes an optimal rate of inflation apart from stating that it should be 
low. However, there is growing acceptance among both policymakers and 
economists that the pursuit of price stability (defined as maintaining a low and stable 
rate of inflation) is the main medium- to long-run goal of monetary policy.  
 
It is now almost universally acknowledged that inflation control is necessary for 
strong and sustained economic growth. A number of factors are responsible for this 
realisation. Prominent is the simultaneous experience of high inflation and decline in 
output growth by many countries from the 1970s to the early 1980s that brought to 
the fore the idea that even moderate levels of inflation damage real growth. While the 
literature points to varied sources of inflation, the agency responsible for its control 
is the central bank. To make central banks successful at discharging this 
responsibility, their hitherto diffused objectives have been focused, and price 
stability assigned primacy. This commitment of central banks to price stability has 
from the 1990s been shared by industrialised and developing countries alike. 
Similarly, the methods of monetary policy conduct have converged, with most 
countries adopting an explicit or implicit inflation targeting framework, implemented 
with market-oriented instruments. For countries in sub-Saharan Africa, this shift has 
occurred with varied intensity over the past two decades, usually as part of 
comprehensive reforms driven by the Bretton Woods institutions to liberalise the 
hitherto control-led approach to economic management. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the Ghanaian macro economy over the past 40 
years has been its high, and often variable, rates of inflation 1 . Inflation was 
particularly high and variable in the politically turbulent 1970s and early 1980s, but 
has persisted throughout the gradual economic recovery since 1983. Though inflation 
                                                
1
 Ghana is a small developing economy in sub-Saharan Africa with a population of 23.9million. A 
well-administered country by regional standards, Ghana, a multi-party democracy is often seen as a 
model for political and economic reform in Africa. 
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has been lower and less variable in the latter period, it still remains high in absolute 
terms and by comparison with Ghana’s trading partners. High and variable inflation 
is typically seen as a symptom or indicator of macroeconomic instability. Monetary 
policy in Ghana is aimed at reducing inflation and improving international 
competitiveness. A framework of inflation targeting was introduced in March, 2002, 
following financial reforms which started in 1992. 
 
The attainment of the price stability objective is to a large extent related to the 
efficiency with which monetary policy is implemented and policy impulses are 
transmitted to target and goal variables such as output and inflation. There has 
therefore been much interest in the last two decades, following the adoption of 
inflation targeting and price stability objectives by many countries, in investigating 
the effectiveness of monetary policy along the lines, one, from empirical estimations 
of interest rate setting by central banks and subsequent assessment of the stability 
properties of policy setting; and two, analysis of the ability of monetary policy to 
affect market interest rates and broader macroeconomic variables.  
 
Friedman (1953, 1959) proposed the first definitive rule - a constant money growth 
rule-for monetary policy conduct. The rule stipulates that the money supply be 
increased by a constant per cent (k, equal to the expected growth of potential GDP 
minus the expected rate of increase of velocity) annually, and be independent of 
subsequent economic and financial considerations. Friedman argued that given the 
long and variable lags in the transmission of monetary policy, the constant money 
growth rule would avoid the instability of discretionary monetary policy and deliver 
low inflation. On the other side of the divide, the proponents of discretionary policy 
rejected definitive rules for what they do. They stressed the importance of policy 
adaptability as a means of keeping an uncertain environment under control. In their 
view, it is precisely because the economy is subject to uncertain shocks, and policies 
can have diverse effects, that discretion in policy implementation is desirable (Guitán, 
1994). 
 
However, Kydland and Prescott (1977, hereafter KP) and subsequently Barro and 
Gordon (1983, hereafter BG) changed the focus of the rules versus discretion 
argument. Using game-theoretic approaches, they demonstrated the superiority of 
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rules over discretion for monetary policy conduct and put an end to the idea that a 
policy rule necessarily involves a fixed setting of the monetary authority’s instrument 
variable. This literature has been the reference for many other arguments for rules for 
the conduct of monetary policy. The recommendation from this literature is that 
superior results in terms of social welfare are obtained if a government, through their 
central bank, follows a re-commitment device: notably, if they follow a priori rules. 
However, unlike the rule of the Friedman-type where there is no scope for ongoing 
policy-making (i.e. excluding discretionary policy-making), rules that have ensued 
from the KP and BG literature allow for on-going decisions. 
 
However, the KP and BG solution of a rule to the inflation bias problem has been 
questioned, leading to alternative proposals. The alternative solutions have tended to 
rely on institutional arrangements that might leave the central bank free to pursue 
activist counter-cyclical stabilisation policies, while simultaneously inducing it to 
avoid the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy-making as identified by 
KP and BG. One such solution is reputation or credibility (e.g. Canzoneri, 1985; 
Rogoff (1985). For instance, Rogoff (1985) argues for the appointment of a central 
bank governor with much greater concern for price stability (relative to output) than 
society as a whole. Given that, the aggressive central banker proposed by Rogoff 
may reduce average inflation but at a cost of higher output variability. This line of 
research took the direction of examining the role of incentives contracts - e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995). Using the principal-agent 
framework, Walsh (1995) proposes a contract that directs the central banker to 
behave in a rule-like manner and not increase output variability. Blinder (1997), 
however, questions the approach because the principal (government) may not have 
the incentive to enforce the contract on the agent (central bank), being the time 
inconsistent government that necessitated the need for an incentive package in the 
first place. 
 
Another institutional solution is granting central bank independence (CBI) - a logical 
solution, as an underlying assumption for the time inconsistency literature is the 
belief that the central bank is subject to undue political pressure. However, evidence 
on whether independent central banks can avoid inflation bias has been inconclusive. 
For example, significant dis-inflation amongst many developed countries was 
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attained from the end of the 1970s to the 1980s without formal institutional changes 
(Friedman and Kuttner, 1996; Fuhrer, 1997a). Furthermore, empirical evidence also 
casts doubts on the robustness of the correlation between CBI indexes and inflation, 
real growth or unemployment. While Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers 
(1993), and Cukierman et al. (1993) find that improved inflation performance under 
CBI is not associated with slower growth; others like Fuhrer (1997a) and Campillo 
and Miron (1997), do not find such results. Moreover, even where favourable results 
(CBI vis-à-vis inflation and output growth) have been found, Fuhrer (1997a) 
observes that in general they hold only in the simplest bivariate cross-country 
regressions. Once other cross-sectional attributes are controlled for, the correlations 
disappear. In addition, for the favourable result, doubts have been raised with regards 
to causation (Leiderman and Svensson, 1995). The argument is that while evidence 
may reflect the causal effect of CBI on inflation, this could be the result of other 
factors that affect both inflation and output growth. 
 
Considering the drawbacks of the institutional solutions, it appears that the dynamic 
inconsistency problem is best solved with monetary policy feedback rules, 
supplemented by institutional arrangements. Taylor (1993) draws on the findings of 
Bryant et al. (1993) and suggests a simple interest rate feedback rule that has a price 
anchor that successively mimicked US monetary policy during 1987-92. The 
subsequent findings that the Taylor (1993) rule satisfactorily explained other 
industrialised country interest rate settings has generated much interest in the rule, as 
argued by Woodford (2001) as follows: “The rule has since been subjected to 
considerable attention, both as an account of actual policy in the United States and 
elsewhere, and as a prescription of desirable policy”. 
 
Retail banks could react speedily or sluggishly to changes in policy interest rates; and 
international evidence from the empirical literature suggests some sluggishness in the 
response of commercial bank interest rates to changes in central bank policy interest 
and/or money market rates in the short run. In the long run, however, studies find 
higher pass-through. 
 
Using error correction and VAR models, De Bondt (2002) examines the pass through 
from market to retail bank interest rates (deposit and lending rates) in the euro area. 
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Four main findings emerge from the study. First is the existence of cointegration 
between retail bank and market interest rates. Second, the lack of complete pass-
through of market interest rates to retail bank interest rates in the short run: the 
highest pass-through in a month being 50 per cent. Third, is a higher pass-through in 
the long-run with the pass-through to lending rates reaching 100 per cent. Fourth is a 
faster interest rate pass-through since the introduction of the euro. 
 
Sander and Kleimeier (2006) investigate the interest rate pass-through in the four 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of the South African Customs Union 
(SACU). They employ an empirical pass-through model that allows for thresholds, 
asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes. They show that CMA bank lending 
markets exhibit a high degree of homogenisation as the pass-through is often fast and 
complete. Deposit markets are somewhat more heterogeneous, showing differing 
degrees of interest rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment. Policy makers should 
therefore be concerned about imperfect competition which may be at the heart of the 
remaining cross-country differences in monetary transmission in the CMA. Such 
empirical work, despite the common approach to central banking now, has had only 
limited extension to developing countries. 
 
This thesis aims to fill this gap by extending the body of empirical literature to 
Ghana. 
Beyond the obvious extension of the literature that the thesis offers, the empirical 
estimation using Taylor-type reaction functions, vector autoregression and error 
correction models of monetary policy transmission has benefits for the country. It 
would help inform the extent to which monetary policy since policy reform has been 
purposeful, shifted monetary policy in the direction of genuine independence, and 
has provided a nominal anchor. The premise is that if the central bank has been 
consistent in policy making, then the policy instrument should systematically and 
significantly respond to important macroeconomic and target variables and the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks should be reasonably effective in influencing 
goal and target variables desired. 
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1.2 Inflation Overview 
Inflation has been one of Ghana’s major macroeconomic problems since the late 
1960s, though the magnitude of this problem continues to vary over time. 
Immediately after independence, the rates of inflation were low and in the single 
digit range, averaging below 10% in the period 1957 – 1972. Although the rates were 
low, they were increasing gradually over time and in most cases beyond the rates 
achieved during the late 1950s. The period 1957–1972 marks the first inflationary 
episode in Ghana, typified by active involvement of the state in economic activity. 
 
Inflation became a serious issue during the period 1973- 1982, the second inflation 
episode. This period was marked by several military interventions. Within this 
period, the various military leaders who came to power pursued expansionary 
economic management, which led to huge balance of payments deficits. The deficits 
that resulted were financed through expansionary monetary policy, which resulted in 
increases in money supply and, subsequently, effects on the economy through high 
general price levels. By 1983, inflation had reached a record high of 123 %. 
 
When inflation was out of control and the entire economy was near collapse in 1983, 
the government adopted the economic recovery programme (ERP) proposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the aim of stabilising the economy. This 
marked the beginning of the third episode of inflation in Ghana. Though the ERP 
achieved some success in terms of reducing inflation rates and creating a degree of 
stability in the economy, the rates of inflation were still high compared with those 
achieved in the immediate period after independence.  
 
Ghana still has not been able to achieve the single digit target level of inflation that it 
had achieved in the 1950s and early 1960s. Though various policies were adopted by 
successive governments to reduce the high and variable rates of inflation to a single 
and a relatively stable digit, there has not been any notable success. 
 
The monetary policy setting in Ghana is typical of a small open developing economy. 
The context may be different, in terms of the structure of the policy framework 
including the government’s overall economic strategy, the state of public finances 
and the financial system, but not so different to alter the monetary policy process in a 
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fundamental way, however, the regulatory regime and the efficiency of markets have 
a bearing on the transmission of monetary policy actions through the economy. 
 
 The Bank of Ghana’s primary objective (or mission) is “to pursue sound monetary 
and financial policies aimed at price stability so as to create an enabling 
macroeconomic environment for the promotion of sustainable economic growth”. 
Various instruments have been used in an attempt to achieve this price stability goal 
even though inflation continues to be a hindrance to economic growth in the country.  
In the early 1980’s for instance inflation rose to more than 100% with persistent 
GDP declines, which led to large fiscal deficits and overvalued exchange rate. There 
is therefore a need to determine the extent to which the Bank of Ghana (BOG) 
combats inflation with the traditional instruments of monetary policy such as the 
money supply and interest rates. 
 
It is important to elaborate on three related underlying concepts - monetary policy 
objectives, monetary policy transmission mechanism and price stability, before 
expanding on the aims and contributions of the thesis and presenting the thesis 
outline. 
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1.3 Some Concepts 
1.3.1 Monetary Policy Objectives 
Monetary policy objectives are similar across different countries. This comprises the 
rules and actions adopted by central banks to achieve their objectives. The objectives 
of monetary policy include: stable foreign exchange rates, equilibrium in the balance 
of payments, stable financial system, increased capital investments, price stability, 
enhanced economic growth, and ultimately, the improved welfare of citizens (Poole, 
1999; Friedman, 2000b; Bofinger, 2001). However, the dominant trend in the theory 
and practice of monetary policy over the last two decades has been its dedication to 
price stability (Tobin, 1998; King, 1999), with the supremacy of this objective 
prescribed in some national constitutions and central bank laws (Bofinger, 2001). 
 
1.3.2 Transmission Mechanism 
The channel by which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy is a central 
topic of debate in macroeconomics. It is also difficult to disentangle causes and 
effects of monetary policy on the inflation and real activity from their influences. 
 
These notwithstanding, monetary policy authorities need to make an effort to 
estimate the transmission mechanism in order to have an idea of how long it takes for 
their policy actions to impact on key macroeconomic variables and by what 
magnitude. For monetary policy to be effective in achieving its intended goals, it 
requires the existence of a stable and predictable mechanism through which the 
central bank’s purely financial actions are transmitted to non-financial decisions of 
household and firms, i.e. the existence of an effective monetary transmission 
mechanism. This suggests that a useful way to analyse monetary policy is to focus 
separately on central bank policy actions (via monetary policy rules), and the 
mechanisms through which the actions take their effect (the monetary transmission 
mechanism). This is the approach to empirical analysis this thesis adopts. 
 
1.3.3 Price Stability 
There are some differences in the way central banks conduct their monetary policies, 
but one thing is common across almost all central banks are the objectives of 
monetary policy. The objectives of monetary policy are usually stated as price 
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stability or to keep inflation low and stable. Alan Greenspan (1996) defines price 
stability, the overriding objective of monetary policy, as the rate of inflation that is 
sufficiently low that it does not affect economic behaviour of businesses and 
households. To put it simply: low and stable inflation. However, the literature, e.g. 
Fisher (1996), points to a subtle but important difference between inflation as a target 
on the one hand and price stability on the other. With an inflation target, the central 
bank is not required to compensate for failures in achieving its target in previous 
periods. If the target is the price level, however, the central bank has to attempt to 
compensate for missing the target in previous periods (Fisher, 1996; Bofinger, 2001). 
Fisher argues that, over the long term, price level targeting produces more certainty 
about prices than does inflation targeting, but this is at the cost of more short-run 
variability in inflation. Additionally, price level targeting is associated with risks 
because of limited knowledge of the short-run monetary transmission process 
(Bofinger, 2001). 
 
Both policymakers and academics generally accept price stability to mean low and 
stable inflation which leads to the consideration of that level of inflation that 
quantifies stable prices. Levels that have been proposed include a zero rate of 
inflation (Feldstein, 1997), a rate between 2 and 3 percent (Summers, 1991), and a 
rate between 3 to 4 per cent (Krugman, 1996). Whilst Feldstein argues that a zero 
rate of inflation implies a higher welfare than a low level of inflation, the consensus 
is for a level between 1 and 3 per cent for low-inflation countries (Fischer, 1996; 
Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). Three principal reasons advanced as support for this 
inflation range are the scope for real interest rates to be negative, the leeway for 
reductions in real wages, and the accommodation of upward bias in measured 
inflation. Revenue motives have also been given as a reason; however, this is 
unlikely to justify significant rates of inflation. For instance, in the United States, 
where the monetary base is 6 per cent of GDP, an extra 1 per cent of inflation would 
generate less than 0.05 per cent of GDP in revenue. Regarding the scope for negative 
real interest rates, the argument is that since nominal interest rates are bounded at 
zero, a small but positive rate of inflation permits real interest rates to become 
negative, enabling stimulation of aggregate demand in the face of contractionary 
shocks (Summers, 1991; Fisher, 1996; Mankiw, 2001). The argument here is that 
inflation greases the wheels of monetary policy. The serious constraints placed on 
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monetary policy in a zero inflation or deflationary environment have recently been 
evident in Japan. They constitute an important reason to target a low positive rate of 
inflation rather than zero.  
With respect to the latitude for reductions in real wages, the argument is that as firms 
are reluctant to cut workers’ nominal wages and workers reluctant to accept such 
cuts, a positive rate of inflation enables a reduction in real wages. This facilitates 
relative real wage adjustments to reflect productivity differentials, enabling better 
functioning of the labour market that helps to stimulate an economy in recession 
(Tobin, 1972; Fisher, 1996; Mankiw, 2001). Another important reason is the upward 
bias in measured inflation. This stems largely from improvements in the quality of 
existing goods and from delays in introducing new goods in the basket (Fisher, 1996; 
King, 1999; Lewis and Mizen, 2000; Clarida et al., 1999). The bias is estimated to be 
between 0.5 and 2 per cent, necessitating a small but positive inflation (about 2 per 
cent) to account for it. The impact of this bias on the optimal target rate of inflation is 
not self-evident if money illusion matters for real resource allocation. It is clear 
though that if the bias is understood in the capital markets, then the need to keep 
open the possibility of negative real interest rates would argue for a higher target rate 
of inflation. 
 
These arguments point to a target inflation rate in the 1-3 per cent range; more 
specifically, they suggest that inflation should be targeted at about 2 per cent, to stay 
within a range of 1-3 per cent per year. This, in practice, is what most central banks 
mean by price stability; it is also a target that most G-7 central banks have already 
attained. 
 
While the reasons outlined underpin the 1-3 per cent inflation range that would be a 
reasonable approximation for price stability for low-inflation countries, for emerging 
and developing economies, the inflation rate that would be synonymous with price 
stability can be argued to be slightly higher for reasons including (i) the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001), (ii) larger biases due to 
higher levels of omissions in the compilation of the consumer price index because of 
a relatively faster introduction of new products and larger improvements in the 
quality of goods (Skreb, 1998), (iii) inflation inertia arising from indexation due to 
past inflation, and (iv) the inherent adjustment costs associated with a transition to a 
 11 
more efficient market economy. This thesis proposes a 2-5 per cent inflation target 
range to symbolise price stability in emerging and developing countries. The analysis 
leading to this proposal is presented in Chapter 5. 
It is necessary to specify a range because the inflation rate is not precisely 
controllable. The width of the target band would vary across economies depending 
on their structure, especially the variance of the exogenous shocks that hit the 
economy. The lower bound would be taken as seriously as the upper bound. 
 
1.4 Aims and Contributions  
This thesis has several aims. First, it seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on 
monetary policy (monetary policy reaction functions, responsiveness of output and 
inflation to changes in policy interest rates, and to the broader literature on the 
monetary transmission mechanism and the importance of the credit channel); it also 
contributes to the literature and policy advice on inflation control in general and 
specifically for developing countries. 
 
High inflation became a major policy concern in the period under consideration. 
Thus this study hopes to provide important results geared directly towards improving 
the monetary stance and inflationary structure of the Ghanaian economy.  
 
To achieve these aims, the thesis estimates Taylor-type reaction functions to derive 
the best characterisation of monetary policy for the sample period considered. Policy 
effectiveness is then inferred by comparing long-run interest rate responses to the 
variables with theoretical specifications for sustainable inflation control. The 
complementary assessment of monetary policy effectiveness uses two other 
approaches. One is by analysing the responsiveness of commercial bank interest rates 
to changes in the policy interest rate; the other is by estimating the fuller monetary 
transmission and assessing the degree to which they facilitate the attainment of 
monetary policy goals and target. 
 
This empirical research is motivated by the fundamental role of monetary policy for 
macroeconomic stability, particularly price stability, and its subsequent implication 
for economic growth. The weight of evidence in the literature is that low inflation 
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countries experience higher growth rates (e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Fisher, 
1993; De Gregorio, 1993), a finding that makes it imperative for monetary 
authorities to achieve their price stability objective. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Chapters 
This thesis is in eight chapters. Chapter one serves as an introduction and chapter two 
provides an overview of macroeconomic and financial sector developments in sub-
Saharan Africa. Chapter three provides an overview of Ghana’s macroeconomic and 
financial sector development. The chapter highlights the country’s economic 
progress with reference to the institutional and economic structural characteristics 
following the economic recovery programme and financial sector reforms which 
started in 1983. It also provides a survey of some empirical studies undertaken on the 
monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
As the theoretical basis of the thesis, chapter four is in two parts; the first part deals 
with the general economic framework for inflation in an open economy and the 
second part of the chapter contains a theoretical framework for the particular case of 
inflation analysis in Ghana. Chapter five summarises the econometric methodology 
and estimates the monetary policy reaction functions.  
 
In Chapter six, the responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates to policy interest 
rates, the equilibrium correction methodology and vector autoregression analysis are 
undertaken. It assesses the country’s monetary policy effectiveness by evaluating the 
responsiveness of the commercial bank retail rates to changes in the policy interest 
rate. While informative, it can be argued that its usefulness is limited because of its 
focus only on the initial phase of the transmission process. A fuller assessment of 
monetary policy effectiveness, by the transmission mechanism approach, would 
require an investigation into how other important variables that are either the final 
objective of policy or the conduit through which the final objective of policy is 
attained behave in response to monetary policy impulses. This fuller assessment is 
the main objective of Chapter seven.  
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In meeting the objective in chapter seven, the chapter also provides information that 
holds promise to facilitating the design and implementation of monetary policy itself. 
In particular, it provides a view on the optimal timing of policy actions. Furthermore, 
the chapter cross-references the results it finds with those from the single equation 
models of, first, the monetary policy reaction functions of Chapter five and second, 
the responsiveness of the commercial bank retail rates to the policy interest rate 
analysis of Chapter six. A key assumption underlying the estimations in Chapters 
five and six is that the information variable(s) are weakly exogenous. Chapter seven, 
which relaxes this assumption by recognising the simultaneity amongst the variables, 
should offer a means of establishing the robustness or otherwise of the results earlier 
found. Chapter eight, ends the thesis with the research conclusions, policy 
recommendations, and suggests areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Developments in sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section has two objectives. First, it aims to provide some distinguishing features 
of sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies that may affect their monetary 
management and the transmission mechanism. Secondly, it seeks to justify the choice 
of Ghana as the most representative of SSA economies, through a review of 
macroeconomic developments and the evolution of financial sectors of SSA 
economies. 
 
2.2 Brief Overview 
 
An overview of economic development in SSA shows that, whilst most SSA 
countries have turned to market-based instruments of monetary management, many 
have under-developed systems. The literature on the macroeconomics of countries in 
the SSA indicates that many SSA economies grew appreciably after independence 
until the 1970s, when their growth stagnated or declined (e.g. Calamitsis, 1999). The 
principal factor responsible was the inward-looking and high-state-intervention 
development strategy that the countries adopted post independence. Policymakers 
adopted the view that it was possible to foster economic growth by identifying 
growth promoting sectors and providing subsidised credit to promote those sectors. 
Governments also controlled interest rates, which, in the context of high and volatile 
inflation, often resulted in negative real interest rates. 
 
To jumpstart their economies and return them to a positive growth path, many 
countries initiated reform programmes during the first half of the 1980s. In particular, 
they adopted stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes that comprised 
macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies), structural (trade, tax, 
and sectoral policies), and social inclusion policies that had the support of the IMF 
and the World Bank (Tarp, 1983). 
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Some countries (a good example being Ghana) witnessed improvements in their 
economic performance, evidenced by increasing growth rates, declining inflation, 
and narrowing financial imbalances following the reforms (Mehran et al., 1998; 
Calamitsis, 1999). Despite these improvements, SSA is still beset with features that 
distinguish it from industrialised countries. These features include higher levels of 
openness, exogenous terms of trade, higher fiscal deficits, higher levels of inflation, 
and larger informal sectors. 
 
2.2.1 Background of SSA Economies 
The region’s annual trade as a proportion of GDP averaged 54.4 per cent over the 
period 1970-2000, and 57.8 per cent over 1990-2000. The comparative statistic for 
the USA, whose monetary policy is arguably the most studied, is 18.1 per cent over 
1970-2000 and 23.3 percent during 1990-2000. SSA is more open to trade in goods 
and services than the major industrialised countries.2 Further, while SSA’s exports 
are largely agricultural, its imports are dominated by intermediate goods, accounting 
for up to 70 per cent of total imports. The region also faces exogenous terms of trade 
(Agenór and Montiel, 1999) and volatility in exchange rates sometimes resulting 
from shifts unconnected with the country itself, an example being the recent 
substantial adjustment of the US dollar and the euro and their associated impact on 
domestic monetary conditions. These suggest that trends in the exchange rate are 
more likely to be important for the stability of countries in this region than for 
industrialised economies. 
 
Saxegaard (2006) examines the pattern of excess liquidity in sub-Saharan Africa and 
its consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy. He argues that 
understanding the consequences of excess liquidity requires quantifying the extent to 
which commercial bank holdings of excess liquidity exceed the levels required for 
precautionary purposes. His paper proposes a methodology for measuring this 
quantity and uses it to estimate a nonlinear structural VAR model for the CEMAC 
region, Nigeria and Uganda.3 The study suggests that excess liquidity weakens the 
                                                
2
 Openness is measured as imports and exports of gross domestic product. 
 
3
 The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (or CEMAC from its name in French, 
Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale) is an organisation of states of Central 
Africa established by Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
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monetary policy transmission mechanism and thus the ability of monetary authorities 
to influence demand conditions in the economy. 
 
Agenór and Montiel (1999) indicate that in this region, the informal urban sector can 
account for up to 60 per cent of total employment and economic activity, compared 
to its virtual non-existence in industrialised countries. The informal sector plays a 
significant role in employment and economic activity in SSA (Agenór and Montiel, 
1999; Plenderleith, 2003). In addition, countries in SSA continue to depend on the 
agricultural sector for growth and employment. 
 
SSA countries have systematically suffered from bad fiscal policies that have 
exacerbated the effects of external shocks, resulting in chronically high fiscal deficits. 
At reasonable levels, fiscal deficits have minimal adverse effects on the financial 
system. But when fiscal deficits are chronically high, this increases the likelihood of 
monetary financing of the deficits and also forces the government to compete with 
private actors in the credit market. However, fiscal imbalances generally tend to be 
more pronounced in developing countries than in industrialised countries. Over the 
period 1990-2000, while the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio averaged 1.9 per cent per 
annum in industrialised countries, the equivalent was 3.2 per cent in SSA. In addition, 
the financing of the deficit in SSA has tended to be more inflationary, through central 
bank accommodation. It therefore comes as no surprise that inflation is higher in 
developing countries than in industrialised countries. For example during the period 
1989-98, annual inflation averaged 3.1 per cent in industrialised countries; but 
averaged 33.2 per cent in developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Gabon to promote economic integration among countries that share a common currency, the CFA 
franc. 
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2.2.2 The Financial Sector of SSA Economies 
Generally SSA financial sectors all began with the establishment of colonial banks 
dedicated to offering banking services to colonial enterprises. These banks together 
with the monetary authorities formed the financial system in most countries until 
independence. 
 
In the early post-independence era, African governments sought to use financial 
development as a tool of speeding up economic growth. Governments became the 
main players in the creation of new financial intermediaries. With the aim of 
addressing the perceived lack of national developmental objectives on the part of the 
colonial banks, many countries nationalised these banks upon independence. In 
addition, new state-owned banks were established to principally finance industry and 
government budgets and also to penetrate the rural economy through aggressive 
branching. The banks soon began to show signs of mismanagement, reflected by 
high non-performing assets. The financial system was characterised by pervasive 
default on loans, especially by state-owned enterprises, which accounted for a large 
share of domestic credit supply. This weakened financial intermediaries, forcing 
governments to inject more resources in the system in the form of subsidies to keep 
ailing institutions afloat. This, as well as the use of instruments of direct control for 
monetary management and poor banking supervision, meant that by the mid-1980’s 
the financial sector in most SSA countries had become weak and vulnerable, 
reflecting features of repression. 
 
By the mid-1980’s, the financial sector in these countries was experiencing the same 
problems of mismanagement and inefficient allocation of resources that plagued the 
public sector in the majority of African countries. The degeneration of the financial 
system prompted many countries to embark on reforms from the mid 1980s, towards 
an efficient and market-oriented financial sector that would contribute effectively to 
economic development. Key components of the reforms included: interest rate 
liberalisation, elimination of credit controls, restructuring and privatisation of banks, 
strengthening of financial infrastructure (including bank supervision, accounting, and 
auditing practices), and engendering competition in the sector. 
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Since embarking on financial sector reforms, following the trend in advanced 
economies, price stability has tended to be the overriding objective of monetary 
policy in many SSA countries, with the accepted view that long-run growth is best 
promoted through the maintenance of low inflation (Honohan and O’Connell, 1997).  
In addition, the autonomy of central banks in this region has increased and monetary 
policy conducted with indirect instruments. The indirect instruments employed, in 
line with the practice in advanced economies, are: the bank rediscount rate, lending 
facilities, open market operations (OMO), repurchase agreements, and variable 
reserve requirements. A supplementary tool in some cases has been moral suasion, 
by which the central bank tries to retrain credit growth indirectly. 
 
2.2.3 The Role of the Central Bank 
Financial systems development in African countries will necessitate the ability of 
central banks to exercise efficiently their functions to promote the stability of the 
financial system and the macroeconomy. To achieve this goal, central banks need to 
be endowed with an adequate level of autonomy. 4   In principle, central bank 
independence serves as a restraint on government policy, especially by shielding 
monetary policy from fiscal indiscipline through specific rules governing 
government borrowing from the central bank. This enables the central bank to 
exercise discretionary monetary policy rather than simply accommodating fiscal 
indiscipline by the government. Central bank independence also plays an important 
role in establishing credibility for monetary policy, which is a key ingredient for the 
stability of the macroeconomy. Credibility of the central bank facilitates decision-
making by private actors by reducing the uncertainty of the policy environment. 
 
                                                
4
 Central bank independence generally means “instrument independence”, which is the ability of the 
central bank to choose the tools in order to pursue specific ultimate goals mandated by the legislature. 
To assess the degree of central bank independence, researchers combine information on both the 
(formal) legal institutional prescriptions and actual practice. Such information includes: the rules of 
appointment and dismissal of the governor; the legal mandate of the bank to pursue price stability 
(and how important this objective is relative to others); the rules and limitations on government 
borrowing from the central bank; the length of the term in office and turnover rate of central bank 
governors. Seminal works on indicators of central bank independence and the relationship between 
these indicators and outcomes of monetary policy include Grilli, Masciandro, and Tabellini (1991), 
Cukierman (1992),  Alesina and Summers (1993), and Agbeja (2007) whose work is on sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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Central banks in SSA have not performed well in their function as a restraint on 
government policy and they have performed poorly also in their role as a regulator of 
the banking sector. Until recently, most countries lacked the basic laws that govern 
the regulatory functions of the central bank; and even when the laws existed, they 
were poorly enforced. This is true for national banks as well as supranational banks 
as in the case of the CFA zone, for instance. We highlight three main reasons for 
these weaknesses.5  
 
First, national authorities have regarded the central bank as their primary financier, 
and have therefore been reluctant to relinquish their political leverage over monetary 
policy for the purpose of deficit financing. This illustrates the short-termism that 
characterises political calculations on the part of national leaders.  
 
The second factor is the poor institutional design of central banks starting from their 
creation. For example, while countries have rules on limits for government 
borrowing from the central bank, they rarely have statutory provisions for 
conditionality and sanctions in the event that those rules are violated.6 Moreover, the 
leadership of central banks (national and regional) is generally not independent of the 
executive branch of government. Governors of national central banks in sub-Saharan 
Africa (with few exceptions, like South Africa) usually have little or no 
independence from the government. This is also the case for the regional central 
banks in the CFA zone. For instance, the members of the boards of the two regional 
central banks of the CFA zone are representatives of Finance Ministries of member 
countries and include no representatives from commercial banks. Recently, many 
countries have made significant advances in this area with the establishment or 
strengthening of banking laws to provide more independence to the central bank and 
a stronger prudential regulation base (Aryeetey and Senbet, 2000). 
 
                                                
5
 Other constraints include the lack of qualified central bank staff in the areas of supervision and 
regulation and the slow pace of adjustment of the regulatory framework to changes in the scale and 
scope of financial market operations (see Aryeetey and Senbet, 2000). 
 
6
 For example, most CFA member governments systematically exceeded their borrowing ceilings (by 
as much as 80% for the government of Côte d’Ivoire). Also governments were able to circumvent the 
limits by indirect borrowing via state-owned enterprises or by pushing commercial and development 
banks to supply credit to relieve fiscal pressures (Stasavage, 2000) 
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The third factor is the lack of a strong private financial sector lobby (Stasavage, 
2000). An active private financial sector lobby is an important factor in fostering 
central bank independence especially when the formal institutional foundation is 
weak or non-existent. The private financial sector has an advantage in central bank 
independence because it is a means to achieving greater price stability. Due to the 
inherent maturity mismatches between the assets and the liabilities of financial 
institutions, inflation volatility is highly costly for these institutions. 
 
The willingness of politicians to grant central bank independence depends on 
whether the perceived problem (or political liability) is price instability or low 
growth. If it is the former, governments are likely to be more inclined to relinquish 
control over monetary policy, whereas if it is the latter, politicians may sacrifice 
monetary policy autonomy to the short-run benefits of expansionary monetary policy. 
In the long run, however, countries benefit from the macroeconomic stability that 
arises from monetary policy autonomy. 
 
There are also alternative arrangements that can be used to restrain monetary policy. 
Examples include the adherence to a fixed exchange rate regime and membership of 
a monetary union. However, just as with the case of central bank independence7, 
these alternative arrangements are effective only if there are clear rules that prevent 
countries from failing to fulfill their obligations.  
 
2.2.4 The Financial Sector after Reforms 
SSA countries share trends as a group; however, they also have had diverse financial 
and monetary experiences and are now at different stages of financial sector 
development (Honohan and O’Connell, 1997). Some countries have progressed 
faster and further, whilst others have yet to make significant headway with reforms. 
 
Mehran et al. (1998) in their reviews of the financial sectors of some 32 SSA 
countries find that overall all 32 countries have since their political independence 
                                                
7
 The conventional assumption is that central bankers are more conservative (have a stronger 
tolerance level for the costs associated with achieving low inflation) than the society as a whole 
(Rogoff 1995). This motivates the emphasis on central bank independence as a means to achieving 
price stability. 
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developed their financial sectors. The monetary authorities have become more 
effective in the control of monetary aggregates 8 . The structure of the financial 
systems has also improved, with government ownership of banks reduced. Of the key 
areas of the financial sector considered, research finds that countries have made the 
most progress in domestic monetary operations, i.e., in establishing market-based 
monetary policy instruments and procedures9. The 32 countries, with the exception 
of only three (Angola, Ethiopia, and Lesotho), were found to have fully liberalised 
interest rate and credit policies, and relied on some form of OMO. Interbank 
operations and secondary market activities in many countries were, however, found 
to be quite embryonic. The two most advanced countries were South Africa and 
Kenya. These two countries were indicated to have well-developed secondary 
markets for government securities and active modern financial sectors that facilitate 
open market operations. The next best performers were Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe. 
 
Mehran et al. (1998) use a composite of five indicators to gauge the autonomy of the 
central banks of the countries and conclude that most SSA countries recognise the 
importance of providing a favourable legal and regulatory framework for the 
efficient conduct of monetary policy and ultimately for the attainment of the price 
stability objective10. The most autonomous central banks were deemed to be South 
                                                
8
 For example, net claims on government as a proportion of GDP fell while claims on the private 
sector rose. 
9
 The five key areas of the financial sector considered are: domestic monetary operations, external 
sector liberalisation, strengthening of banking supervision, central bank autonomy, and payments 
system. 
10
 The first indicator for autonomy is the predominance of price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy. The second is the extent to which the central bank Governor has authority to 
implement policy without reference to government. The third is the extent to which the Governor and 
other members of the bank’s governing body are isolated from short-run political influence. The 
fourth is the extent to which the banks have economic autonomy and the fifth, the extent to which 
accountability through prudent reporting is provided for. Using the first indicator, Mehran et al. (1998) 
find that all 32 countries have price, currency or monetary stability as an objective. However, only 
five countries, Kenya and South Africa included, have price stability as the explicit primary objective. 
Regarding the second indicator of autonomy - the extent to which the central bank was given 
sufficient authority to implement monetary policy - the authors find that about half of the sample 
(South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda included) had this authority by way of, for example, the 
central bank governor having terms that exceed the political business cycle. In addition, six countries 
(Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda included) have transparent means of co-ordination and conflict 
resolution, further guaranteeing autonomy. For the fourth indicator economic autonomy, it was found 
that all central banks with the exception of South Africa have provisions that explicitly limit direct 
credit to government. For the last indicator - accountability - most central banks were found to have at 
least the minimum level in place with some, including Kenya, requiring the central bank to present 
semi-annual reports. 
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Africa, Kenya, and Madagascar. Ghana and Uganda were found to have performed 
satisfactorily on this criterion as well. 
With regard to the financial market stability objective, these authors find that all the 
32 central banks seek to ensure a safe and efficient financial system. The authors also 
find that a large number of countries have made considerable progress in banking 
supervision, in line with the Basle Committee’s Core Principles. Furthermore, the 
payment system has improved and most countries have moved from pegged to 
floating exchange rate regimes. All areas considered, Mehran et al. (1998) find South 
Africa and Kenya to have the most advanced financial sectors, with Ghana, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius as the next best performers. 
 
Gelbard and Leite (1999) also investigate financial sector development in 38 African 
countries over the period 1987-97 using a set of six indices11 . Categorising the 
countries into four (largely-developed, somewhat-developed, minimally-developed, 
and underdeveloped) based on the six indices, Gelbard and Leite (1999) find that 
countries made significant progress in improving and modernising their financial 
systems over the period. The number of countries classified as having “somewhat” or 
“largely” developed financial systems increased from two countries (South Africa 
and Mauritius) in 1987 to 27 (including Ghana - largely developed; and Kenya and 
Uganda - somewhat developed) in 1997. At the same time, the number of countries 
with totally undeveloped financial systems declined from eight in 1987 to two 
(Angola and Ethiopia) in 1997. Overall, they find six countries with the most 
developed financial systems in 1997. These are South Africa, Mauritius, Ghana, 
Kenya, Zambia and Namibia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
11
 The indices comprised: market structure, availability of financial products, stage of financial 
liberalisation, institutional environment under which the financial system operates, the degree of 
integration with foreign financial markets, and the sophistication of policy instruments. 
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2.3 Summary 
The evidence discussed in this chapter indicates that financial systems are still 
relatively underdeveloped in many countries in SSA. However, recent structural and 
institutional indicators of financial sector development paint a relatively more 
optimistic picture. These indicators show that a number of countries have made 
significant progress in promoting an environment that is conducive to financial 
intermediation. This is typically the case for countries that have consistently pursued 
macroeconomic reforms, especially through fiscal discipline, which has promoted a 
stable business environment. Much progress is still needed, however, especially to 
strengthen the institutional framework for banking regulation, promote monetary 
policy autonomy, establish government and central bank credibility, develop banking 
supervision capacity (through investment in technology and human capital), which 
will create an environment that is conducive to investment and saving. Progress in 
those areas will not only promote financial market development but will also foster 
economic growth. 
 
The literature on the financial sector and monetary management in SSA have tended 
to rank South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana amongst the best performing countries in the 
region, with South Africa and Kenya found to have the most developed financial 
sector and system of monetary management. Of these countries, the financial sector 
and system of monetary management in Ghana is more representative of SSA as a 
whole than those of Kenya and South Africa; hence, its study may serve a broader 
purpose in providing a general understanding of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in SSA.  
 
The evolution of the financial sector in Ghana is discussed in Chapter 3 to provide a 
perspective for the assessment of monetary policy in the country. The Chapter briefly 
examines some of the country’s macroeconomic and financial sector policies. 
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Chapter 3 
Ghana’s Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Development 
Overview 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an overview of Ghana’s macroeconomic and economic development 
is presented, in order to provide a context and perspective for the assessment 
undertaken in the remainder of this study. This chapter highlights the country’s 
economic performance and inflation movements from independence in 1957 to 1983 
and through to 2006. It makes broad reference to the institutional and economic 
structural characteristics following the economic recovery programme and financial 
sector reforms which started in 1983. 
 
The year 1992 is used as the starting year in this thesis. A number of reasons led to 
this choice: following the introduction of the economic recovery programme (ERP) 
in 1983, there was more privatisation of state owned companies and the economy 
moved towards a free market and a free market oriented monetary policy. Policy 
reforms towards the attainment of the objectives of the ERP and structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) included the pursuit of: exchange rate and trade 
liberalisation, growth-oriented and deficit-reducing fiscal policy characterised by a 
reduction in recourse to bank financing, restrictive monetary policy, and structural 
and institutional reforms. Special emphasis was placed on pursing a flexible 
exchange rate policy, given the pressing need to improve resource allocation (Kapur 
et al., 1991). The liberalisation of the exchange rate began in April 1983, and was 
completed in April 1992 with the full operation of a truly market-determined 
exchange rate (Sowa and Acquaye, 1999). 
 
By 1992, interest rates and credit had been decontrolled and institutional 
arrangements to facilitate the system of indirect monetary management put in place. 
The system of indirect monetary management began in that year. 
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3.2 A Brief Macroeconomic Overview 
 
Agriculture accounts for the bulk of the country’s workforce, output, and export 
revenue. Cocoa and gold have historically been and still are the country’s lead 
exports. 
 
Ghana at independence in 1957 had a per capita income that put it on a par with 
some now newly industrialised countries like South Korea and Malaysia, the so 
called Asia tigers, and was more favourably placed to develop than most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Factors favourable to the country included: its position as the 
world’s leading producer and exporter of cocoa, exporter of 10 per cent of the 
world’s gold, with three years of import cover in foreign exchange reserves, and with 
one of the best infrastructure systems and educated populations in Africa (Konadu-
Adjemang, 2001). 
 
After independence, Ghana adopted a centrally-controlled development strategy. 
Some specific policies pursued included import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
and controls of prices (including of the exchange rate), external trade, and the 
financial sector. The heavy government intervention together with a fall in world 
price of cocoa in the mid-1960s adversely affected the country’s economic health. 
From respective levels of US$269 million and 4 per cent in 1957, by 1966 national 
foreign exchange reserve had fallen to –US$391 million and GDP growth dwindled 
to -4.3 per cent. The economic deterioration led to brief attempts at stabilisation in 
1967 and 1971 with loans and technical assistance from the IMF. However, in 1971, 
Ghana returned to its earlier policies. In particular, the country emphasised 
expansionary fiscal policies financed by monetary accommodation, price controls, 
and restrictive foreign exchange policies and external trade. These policies distorted 
relative prices, put upward pressure on prices, and stagnated the economy. By 1983, 
in combination with severe external shocks, the economy had contracted 
dramatically: GDP growth fell to -4.6 per cent and inflation peaked at 122.9 per cent. 
The collapse of the economy prompted the government to adopt an IMF and World 
Bank supported Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) from mid-1983 to 1986 and 
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its follow-up, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which had financial 
sector reforms as a component, over 1986-91. 
Kapur et al. (1991) outlined the key objectives of the ERP as (i) a realignment of 
relative prices, (ii) a progressive shift away from direct controls and intervention 
towards greater reliance on market forces, (iii) fiscal and monetary discipline, (iv) 
the rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure, and (v) increased 
productivity and efficiency of the economy. While having the same objectives, the 
SAP was directed more at addressing deep-seated structural bottlenecks to economic 
recovery. Policy reforms towards the attainment of the objectives of the ERP and 
SAP included the pursuance of: exchange rate and trade liberalisation, growth-
oriented and deficit-reducing fiscal policy characterised by a reduction in recourse to 
bank financing, restrictive monetary policy, and structural and institutional reforms. 
Special emphasis was placed on pursuing a flexible exchange rate policy given the 
pressing need to improve resource allocation (Kapur et al., 1991). The liberalisation 
of the exchange rate began in April 1983, and was completed in April 1992 with the 
full operation of a truly market determined exchange rate (Sowa and Acquaye, 
1999). 
 
Leechor, 1994; and Kapur et al., 1991 among others have judged the economic 
reforms over 1983-1991 as a success, with the more remarkable aspect being the re-
orientation of the economy on market principles, fiscal discipline, GDP growth, and 
inflation control. Revenue mobilisation improved from 4.6 per cent of GDP in 1983 
to 13.2 per cent in 1991, enabling government to spend as needed while at the same 
time generating budget surpluses. From a deficit of 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1983, the 
budget balance improved to a surplus of 0.1 in 1986 and further to a surplus of 1.6 
per cent of GDP in 1991. Inflation moderated to 28.3 per cent during 1984-1991 
(from an annual average of 76.5 per cent during 1976-1983) and real GDP growth 
average of 5.4 per cent over the same period. 
 
In 1992 the country had its first democratic elections in over a decade. Under 
democratic rule, the country’s economic policy orientation remained directed at 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms. However, the overall economic 
outcome during 1992-2000 was not one of distinct progress as it was in the 1983-
1991 period. Inflation was more erratic (oscillating between 59.5 per cent and 10 per 
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cent) and the budget deteriorated (with deficits in six of the nine years, reaching 8.6 
per cent in 1992). GDP growth, however, remained steady at about 4.2 per cent 
annually. 
 
3.3 The Economic Recovery Programme 
The government launched the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983 under 
the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF. The overriding purpose of the ERP 
was to reduce Ghana's debts and to improve its trading position in the global 
economy. The stated objectives of the programme focused on restoring economic 
productivity at minimum cost to the government and included the following policies: 
lowering inflation through stringent fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; increasing 
the flow of foreign exchange into Ghana and directing it to priority sectors; 
restructuring the country's economic institutions; restoring production incentives; 
rehabilitating infrastructure to enhance conditions for the production and export of 
goods; and, finally, increasing the availability of essential consumer goods. In short, 
the government hoped to create an economic climate conducive to the generation of 
capital.  
 
The ERP was carried out in roughly three phases. Beginning in 1983, the government 
focused on reducing its expenditures while creating incentives for private production. 
Initial expenditure cuts and improved tax collection brought the budget deficit down 
from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 0.1 percent by 1986, relieving government 
pressure on the banking system, while a series of cedi devaluations boosted export 
activity. During the second phase, which lasted from 1987 to 1989, the government 
moved to divest itself of many assets through privatisation and to institute radical 
foreign exchange reforms to devalue the cedi further. Although privatisation was 
sluggish, the hard-currency black market was nearly eliminated with the introduction 
of foreign exchange bureaus in 1988. In the ERP's third phase, the government 
intensified monetary reforms and reduced private corporate taxes to boost private-
sector growth.  
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By the end of 1991, ERP efforts had improved the country's international financial 
reputation because of its ability to make loan repayments (although not wipe out 
foreign debt) and its first entry onto the international capital market in almost two 
decades. Critics maintained, however, that the ERP had failed to bring about a 
fundamental transformation of the economy, which still relied on income earned 
from cocoa and other agricultural commodities. Critics also contended that many 
Ghanaians had seen few, if any, benefits from the programme.  
 
In addition to its focus on stabilising the country's financial structure, the ERP also 
aimed to promote production, especially in the export sectors. In 1986 the 
government began to rebuild infrastructure through a US$4.2 billion programme, 
more than half of which was provided by external sources. This amount was divided 
roughly equally among infrastructure repair, energy imports (oil for machinery), and 
export industries. Increased imports financed by the IMF, the World Bank, and other 
sources made possible the rehabilitation and repair of some key parts of the 
infrastructure through the supply of spare parts and inputs for industry, mining, 
utilities, and agriculture.  
 
Although the ERP was geared primarily towards restoring the country's international 
economic standing, it came under popular criticism inside Ghana for ignoring the 
plight of those not involved in the export sector. The overwhelming shift in resources 
was toward cocoa rehabilitation and other export sectors, not towards food 
production. Government employees, especially those in state enterprises, were 
actively targeted, and many lost their jobs. Farmers suffered as the percentage of the 
total budget devoted to agriculture fell from 10 per cent in 1983 to 4.2 per cent in 
1986 and to 3.5 percent in 1988, excluding foreign aid projects. Although cocoa 
contributed less to Ghana's GDP than food crops, cocoa nonetheless received 9 per 
cent of capital expenditures in the late 1980s; at the same time it received roughly 67 
per cent of recurrent agricultural expenditures because of its export value.  
 
The government, in response to criticism of its policies, initiated the US$85 million 
Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). 
Beginning in 1988, the programme sought to create 40,000 jobs over a two-year 
period. It was aimed at the poorest individuals, small-scale miners and artisans in 
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particular, and communities were to be helped to implement labour intensive self-
help projects.  
 
 In the early 1990s, the government was committed to continuing the policies of the 
ERP. New agreements were concluded with the World Bank to continue credit 
arrangements on condition that Ghana review and revise its various economic laws 
and regulations and support private sector development. In particular, the 
government agreed to revise or to repeal existing laws and regulations affecting 
private investment that undermine the spirit of deregulation, economic liberalisation, 
and exchange rate reforms. The government also agreed to develop and to strengthen 
the institutional framework that would facilitate private investment. Key priorities for 
1992 and beyond included giving new impetus to state enterprise reforms, 
broadening the scope of banking-sector reforms, liberalising the administrative 
framework, and strengthening public-sector management. Basic education and 
primary health-care services were to receive attention over the long term as well. (US 
Library of Congress http:/countrystudies.us/Ghana/65.htm 03/08/2007) 
 
3.4 Macroeconomy and Inflation 
This section is in two parts. The first part reviews the macroeconomy and inflation 
before the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983. The second reviews the 
period following the ERP.  
 
3.4.1 Period before the ERP 
In 1957 Ghana gained its independence, making it one of the first countries in Africa 
to do so. In some ways, the Ghanaian economy has changed substantially since that 
date; industry and services have increased their role, and agriculture has reduced. 
Income in total, and also per capita, rose for a few years to 1965, fluctuated around 
the highest value attained for about six years, and then fell, until very recently (2006). 
The country's population has grown very rapidly, from a figure of approximately 7 
million inhabitants at the time of independence to over 22 million in 2006.  
 The Ghanaian economy was quite well endowed in respect of natural resources, 
skills and finance at the time of independence. With a vibrant agricultural sector, not 
only feeding the population but also providing substantial volumes of cocoa for 
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export, the Ghanaian economy had a solid base from which to advance.  Industrial 
output value-added was nearly 20 per cent of GDP. Besides, before independence, 
education had flourished and capital had been accumulated. In 1957 Ghana's was, by 
developing country standards, a flourishing economy, and each inhabitant, on 
average, received an income of approximately US$600 in 1975 prices, comparable 
with incomes in South Korea and Malaysia at the time (Sowa 1993). 
The subsequent history has been one of a rapidly rising population combined with a 
much less rapidly rising output. The first estimate of Ghana's GDP covered the year 
1965 and amounted to 4.64 billion cedis, measured in constant prices of 1975  
distributed among the 8 million Ghanaians this yielded an average of 580 cedis each, 
or approximately the same number of US dollars . Sixteen years later, in 1981, GDP 
per capita had fallen to 489 cedis (again in 1975 prices); both agriculture and 
industry had suffered, the latter more dramatically, its share of the total national 
output falling from 19 per cent in 1965 to 9 per cent in 1981. 
  
From 1912 when Ghana was part of the West African Currency Board12 up to about 
1972 inflation in Ghana was quite low. For most of the period the average rate of 
inflation was below 10 percent. Indeed, during the period of the Currency Board, 
quite characteristically the rate of inflation was below 1 percent. Following 
independence in 1957, the rapid pace of modernisation, development of 
infrastructure and development of import substitution industries began to heat-up the 
economy. Accumulated reserves from which the initial development was financed 
soon run out; and with Ghana out of the Currency Board in 1958 and having 
established its own central bank in 1957, deficit financing through the printing of 
money was an obvious option. In 1964 the stock of money increased by 37.2 percent 
causing inflation to jump into double digits at 15.8 percent. Even though the growth 
in money supply slowed down substantially in the following years, the inflationary 
pressures, which had been generated in 1964, persisted for at least three years. One 
of the factors which helped to sustain the pressure on prices was a severe foreign 
exchange constraint faced by the country, following the rapid pace of modernisation 
                                                
12
 The West African Currency Board was set up in 1912 by the British to issue the West Africa pound, 
the currency of British West Africa. 
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and development of import substitution industries, which led to shortages of most 
consumer items and raw materials for the newly established industries. 
 
Nkrumah’s socialist Government was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1966, ending 
the government’s desire for rapid development of import substitution industries. The 
military Government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) signed a stabilisation 
package with the International Monetary Fund. Under the stabilisation programme 
the new administration took measures to lower the high tempo of economic activity 
which characterised the preceding period. In particular, it cut back public spending 
and the use of bank financing. The extensive state involvement in the economy was 
curtailed and investments reduced, leading to large-scale economic retrenchment. 
Meanwhile, monetary policy was tightened through interest rate increases and credit 
restrictions, among other things. The resultant effect of the new policy measures was 
deflation in 1967 followed by years of low rates of inflation but at the expense of 
economic growth. 
 
This period of stabilisation was followed, during 1969-71, by a marked boost in 
economic activity under the civilian administration of Prime Minister Busia. 
Government recurrent and investment outlays increased substantially, sustained, in 
part, by the use of foreign reserves and external borrowing. At the same time, private 
participation in the economy increased. The easing of fiscal pressure coupled with a 
tight monetary policy kept inflation in check. Other contributory factors to holding 
inflation in single digits during the 1969-71 periods were a combination of marked 
domestic output growth and improved import supplies under a cocoa price boom in 
1970 and a liberalised external trade policy. The latter policy, coupled with a 
downturn in cocoa prices in 1971, put enormous strain on Ghana's balance-of 
payments, necessitating devaluation (by 44 percent) in December 1971. This led to a 
coup d’état, which brought the military to power and set in motion the second phase 
of inflation in Ghana. 
 
The most expansionary phase in Ghana’s economic management history was over 
the period 1972-82. This period witnessed a succession of regimes, largely military, 
which pursued highly expansionary fiscal programmes buttressed by monetary 
accommodation as widening budget deficits were financed from bank loans to 
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government and parastatals. To contain the resultant inflationary pressure, extensive 
controls – of prices, exchange rates, interest rates, etc. – were instituted. This led to 
extremely distorted relative prices, economic stagnation and severe shortages of 
goods, with attendant strong upward pressure (suppressed or otherwise) on prices. A 
brief stabilisation effort under IMF sponsorship from January 1979 fizzled out in 
June that year as a victim of another military intervention. Pervasive economic 
controls and restrictions from 1972 through to 1982 bred a repertoire of malpractices, 
including smuggling, parallel market activities in goods and foreign currencies, and 
corruption. Despite the widespread regime of price controls, however, inflation 
averaged as high as 50 percent per annum during 1972- 82, with 1977 and 1981 
recording the highest ever rates of 117 percent. 
 
Ghanaian inflation, especially during the period 1972-82, reflected largely excessive 
demand pressure sustained by excessive fiscal expansion and accommodating 
monetary growth. But it is equally true that the problem was made worse by 
inadequate growth of output and supplies due to particular structural constraints 
faced by the economy. 
 
Of utmost importance among these constraints was the severe foreign exchange 
scarcity due, in large part, to over reliance on very erratic cocoa earnings. This 
severely constrained the capacity to supply essential imports for consumption and 
production, with potential inflationary consequences. 
 
Inadequate food production and supply was another important constraint. This was 
due to a catalogue of factors including: low productivity, poor storage and 
preservation facilities, unreliable weather conditions, inadequate marketing and 
distribution arrangements, fast growing population and urbanisation, and pricing 
policies aimed at keeping down food prices. Food price inflation arising from supply 
gaps had immense economy-wide inflation effects. 
 
Furthermore, the inadequate performance of the manufacturing sector also 
contributed to the worsening of the inflation problem. The problems of the sector 
included persistence of large excess capacities (due to lack of adequate imported 
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inputs), outdated technologies and inefficient management. The erratic supply of 
consumer goods added to upward pressure on prices. 
 
For most of the period under consideration, price controls and fixed exchange rates 
were used extensively in an attempt to contain inflation. But this only led to 
suppressed prices and incentives at the producer level without removing the causes 
of inflationary pressures in the economy. The price distortions accentuated structural 
constraints in the external trade sector, and domestic production. As a result, by 1981 
the economy was in very bad shape, with declining income per capita, mounting 
external deficits, and seriously run-down social and economic infrastructure. This 
second episode of inflation characterised by stagflation was at its peak in 1983. 
 
In April of 1983, faced with a near bankrupt position, Ghana adopted an International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank supported Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). 
The ERP sought to minimise both external and domestic imbalances and put the 
economy on a path of sustainable growth. To this end, far reaching measures were 
implemented over the years, including large exchange rate corrections, price-
deregulation, trade liberalisation, financial sector reforms and rehabilitation of 
economic and social infrastructure. 
 
A key objective under the ERP was inflation control. Given the role of fiscal deficit 
financing in pre-1983 inflation, efforts were made to reduce budgetary deficits and 
minimise recourse to bank financing. There was a marked improvement in revenue 
collection although government spending was also increased to start-kick the 
economy. Much of the increased expenditure however was supported by external 
donors. 
 
3.4.2 Period following the ERP 
Looking at the overall changes in the Ghanaian economy since 1984 and comparing 
the present with the trough of 1981, the Ghanaian economy has shown a remarkable 
recovery. The overall measure of economic output, GDP, rose from 270.6 billions 
cedis in 1984 to 14113.4 billion cedis in 1997, at 1995 prices, and to 79800 billion 
cedis in 2004. The increase in industrial output was even more rapid, from 0.4 billion 
cedis in 1981 to 1.1 billion cedis 10 years later. The share of industry in total GDP 
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was very nearly restored to its value at the time of independence; since total GDP 
was some 50 per cent higher than at the time of independence, total industrial output 
increased by approximately the same percentage.  
 
Total investment rose from approximately 5 per cent of GDP in 1983 to nearly 17 per 
cent in 1991. During this time, public investment remained more or less constant at 8 
per cent of GDP; the increase came about entirely through a resurgence in private 
investment, which rose from a negligible rate in 1981 to nearly 9 per cent of GDP in 
1991 (BOG 1992). 
The resurgence of industrial output, and the growth of incomes, increased the need 
for imports - of raw materials, capital goods and consumer goods - and the reduction 
of restraints on imports, through the scheme of liberalisation, has encouraged the 
increase. Financed in part by foreign borrowing, the deficit on the current account 
was contained until 1990. The figures for 1990 and 1991 particularly - suggested that 
the deficit on the current account reached a high level making debt servicing too 
expensive (BOG 1992). In 1992 Ghana was, on balance, a supplier of capital to the 
developed countries and to their financial institutions. 
The majority of Ghana's debts are to international financial agencies and to 
governments in the developed countries; the eight loans which Ghana accumulated in 
the six year period 1983-1989 amounted to US$626 million. World Bank figures 
show that Ghana's total external debt exceeded US$4 billion by 1991; this figure rose 
to nearly US$4.3 billion in 1992. The external deficit and requirements for 
repayments on principal were met through additional loans. The debt figures 
revealed a strong reliance on official creditors, who accounted for about 92 percent 
of public disbursed debt, and on concessional funding, which approached 60 percent 
of total external debt in 1992. In addition, Ghana began to borrow on international 
capital markets in 1991. Nevertheless, the country's debt service ratio fell at an 
annual average of 25 percent in 1991 and 1992, reflecting repayment of large IMF 
obligations and the ending of the government's use of IMF funding at the end of 
1991. An additional factor was debt cancellation by a number of leading bilateral 
creditors totalling over US$4 billion since 1989. Total external debt fell to US$2 
billion by the end of 2006. 
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Thus although growth in the money stock continued to be high (averaging about 40 
per cent per annum during 1983-1989, equal to the average growth rate recorded for 
1972-1982 the source of the expansion during the third episode of inflation  did not 
lead to inflationary pressures of the same magnitude as during the second phase. On 
average, inflation during the third phase has hovered around 25 per cent.  
In 1989, Ghana was allocating approximately 10 per cent of its total export earnings 
to servicing official debt13; the servicing of unofficial debt claimed another 2 per cent 
of Ghana's export earnings. (BOG 1992). The annual outflow in payments to 
creditors surpassed the annual inflow, from both official and unofficial sources. 
Therefore on the policy front Ghana’s history has been one of fiscal dominance 
where persistent fiscal deficits have been financed by monetary accommodation. 
Strong inertial inflationary expectations became embedded in the economy due to 
high inflation and exchange rate volatility. This has allowed dollarisation to take hold 
and significant foreign exchange deposits are held in the banking system. Breaking 
inflation inertia is therefore a core challenge of monetary policy. 
 
 Moreover, significant portions of government budget deficits have typically been 
financed on the domestic market through the issue of Treasury bills. Over time, the 
deficits have led to the build-up of a large stock of public debt, which reached 31 
percent of GDP in 2001 (BOG 2002). Domestic debt service payments amounted to 
45 per cent of budgetary revenue and 30 per cent of the broad money stock (M2) at 
the beginning of 2001. This means that the economy had settled into an inherently 
unfavourable debt dynamic and is prone to instability. Also, a factor in that 
instability was that, although the central government budget deficits (and the overall 
public sector borrowing requirements) have been financed in large measure by 
significant external loans and grants; these resources are normally tied to specific 
conditions and disbursements are uncertain. 
 
Finally, on the side of money balances, one special feature of the Ghanaian economy 
is that a large proportion of the money stock is held outside the banking system with 
                                                
13
 Official debt is debt owed to a bilateral government agency or a multilateral development agency. 
As well as debt arising from official development assistance and other official flows, it includes 
former private sector debt that has been rescheduled by the official sector. 
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fluctuations that are highly dependent on the cocoa season. During this season (the 
fourth quarter of the year) there is a seasonal jump in the money supply that may 
transmit expansionary impulses, accentuating underlying inflationary pressures 
(through the aggregate demand channel.) 
 
The weaknesses in the economy were exposed by commodity price shocks in 1999 
and 2000. The prices of Ghana’s major exports (cocoa and gold) plummeted on 
international markets while the price of its major import (oil) increased, in the midst 
of a surge in spending and a growing budget deficit. Fiscal and monetary policy were 
not firm, the public sector’s borrowing led to a large build up of debt, with an 
increased dependence on external donor inflows that fell short. The economy 
plunged into high inflation and exchange rate depreciation and the currency 
collapsed. 
 
When the fundamentals are not right, shifts in local investor and bank confidence, be 
these the result of an exogenous shock (e.g. a spike in oil prices) or a weakening in 
policies, could have rapid repercussions. They could induce transfers of capital 
abroad or initially at the very least, a shift into dollar-denominated deposits, and 
away from cedi currency holdings. The pressure from a significant shock to the 
economy is normally quickly felt on the currency exchange markets with the 
potential to start a depreciation and inflation spiral especially when economic 
fundamentals go wrong. The currency crisis that happened in 2000 when a sharp 
decline in cocoa and gold prices coincided with a period of fiscal expansion is very 
illustrative of this monetary dynamic. 
 
The constraints that the budget imposes on monetary policy in this setting are 
extreme, given the increases in net domestic financing (mainly by the banking sector) 
of the budget and the degree of fiscal dominance of the economy. The burden on 
monetary policy is accentuated when policy fundamentals weaken, which tends to 
trigger not only capital flight but also diminished access to external financial 
assistance normally subject to policy conditionality. On the other hand, in this setting 
and given this sort of dynamic, coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is 
important for macroeconomic stabilisation.  
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An inflationary process may have the economic purpose of restoring consistency in 
the system of economic relationships. For example, suppose money supply increases 
more than the growth in real economic activity in a given economy. Economic theory 
suggests that prices will rise in an attempt to restore some balance between aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply. As long as economic agents find themselves out of 
equilibrium, inflation may continue. 
 
However, high and variable inflation creates incentives for misallocation of resources 
and uncertainty that makes it more difficult for firms, consumers and savers to make 
decisions. Inflation leads to arbitrary and inequitable redistribution of incomes, it 
serves as a tax on incomes and hits hardest at low income groups, especially the poor 
as they are less flexible in responding to adverse conditions in the environment.  No 
lasting benefits can accrue from high inflation to an economy. Persistent high 
inflation may cause high inflationary expectations among economic agents which in 
turn increases inflationary pressures. Although the Government has been pushing for 
single digit inflation; this is yet to become a sustainable reality. 
 
3.5 The Financial Sector and Reforms 
 
The financial system in Ghana is made up of its central bank, banks, and other 
financial institutions. The country’s central bank, the Bank of Ghana, was established 
in 1957 under Bank of Ghana Ordinance (No.34). A series of amendments and 
comprehensive reviews culminated in the Bank of Ghana Law, 1992 (PNDCL 291). 
PNDCL 291 provided for a Board of Directors consisting of a Governor, two Deputy 
Governors, and eight directors to administer the bank. Functions provided under the 
law included: (i) issuance of currency, (ii) regulation of the currency, credit and 
banking system in accordance with government economic policy, (iii) management 
of external reserve, (iv) maintenance of price stability, (v) banker and financial 
advisor to government, and (vi) manager of public debt. Section 27 of PNDCL 291 
limits temporary advances to government, although this is not specific enough to 
facilitate compliance. 
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The financial system began with the opening of the first commercial bank - a branch 
of British Bank of West Africa (now Standard Chartered Bank, Ghana) in 1896. In 
1917, a second bank (now Barclays Bank, Ghana) opened its office in Accra. In 
1953, the first indigenous bank - the Bank of Gold Coast (now Ghana Commercial 
bank) was established to meet credit need of indigenes. The nation’s central bank - 
the Bank of Ghana - was then established in 1957. Thus, in the early post 
independence years, Ghana’s financial system consisted of a central bank and three 
commercial banks. With the aim of fostering economic development following 
independence, the government established more banks - beginning with the National 
Investment bank in June 1963 to finance and promote industrial enterprises. By 
1980, seven additional banks had been set up. 
 
The financial sector, as with all other sectors of the economy, was heavily controlled 
during 1957-1983 (Leite et al., 2000) and poorly supervised. The effect was an 
uncompetitive, growth-stifled sector incapable of performing its intermediation role. 
From this weak base, sizeable adjustments in the external value of the cedi from 
1983 under the ERP unavoidably exacerbated the financial difficulties of the banking 
system. With the aim of attaining a vibrant sector capable of satisfactory 
intermediation, a financial sector adjustment programme (FINSAP), a component of 
SAP, was designed with the support of the World Bank and initiated in 1988. 
FINSAP involved: (i) financial sector institutional restructuring, (ii) enhancement of 
the legal and regulatory framework for the financial sector, (iii) the creation of new 
institutions, and (iv) liberalisation of interest rates. With a sizeable proportion (40%) 
of bank credit by 1988 being non-performing, FINSAP reforms initially focused on 
the banking sector. A new banking law laying the regulatory framework for the 
banking system was enacted in 1987. By 1991, bank supervision had strengthened 
and most non-performing loans removed 14 , 15  . FINSAP reforms also involved 
reforms to monetary management. By 1992, interest rates and credit had been 
decontrolled and institutional arrangements to facilitate the system of indirect 
                                                
14
 This new law defined a new regulatory framework that included provisions for: minimum capital 
requirements, prudential lending guidelines, and stronger supervisory process. Some specifics 
included imposition of explicit safeguards against excessive risk taking, and standardising, broadening 
and strengthening reporting requirements. 
15
 FINSAP policies to foster the development of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) were 
implemented in the latter years of the programme. They mainly comprised provisions for the setting 
up of new institutions and the design of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework. 
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monetary management put in place16. The system of indirect monetary management 
began in that year. 
 
Ghana’s financial sector increased following the re-vitalisation of the sector, to a 
central bank, 16 commercial banks, 113 rural banks, and 248 non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) by the beginning of 2000. The NBFIs together accounted for 32 
per cent of total financial sector assets. Of these 16 were insurance companies, 1 
pension fund, and 1 Stock Exchange that together accounted for 28 per cent of 
financial sector assets. The remaining 230 NBFIs accounted for the remaining 4 per 
cent of financial sector assets. They comprised 8 savings and loans institutions, 13 
finance houses, 6 leasing companies, 3 discount houses, 2 building societies, 1 
mortgage finance company, 1 venture capita fund, and 196 credit unions (World 
Bank and IMF, 2000). 
 
3.6 Monetary Policy Operating Framework 
 
The monetary policy framework of the Bank of Ghana is based on the quantity 
theory that relates money growth to inflation, assuming a constant velocity of money 
and full employment. The framework embodies three targets: the final target 
(inflation), the intermediate target (broad money), and an operating target (net 
domestic assets of the central bank or reserve money) (Wampah, 1998). 
 
Monetary policy design involves the determination, in consultation with the Ministry 
of Finance, of targets for GDP growth, inflation, and the balance of payments. Based 
on these targets and an assured velocity of money, the central bank derives the 
implied money supply using the simple quantity theory relationship. Prior to 
monetary management reform in 1991, the implication for credit expansion so 
derived from the simple quantity theory relationship was distributed amongst banks 
as a credit ceiling. The credit controls were, from 1971, supplemented by controls in 
commercial bank interest rates. 
 
                                                
16
 The institutional arrangements involved: the creation of a market in government securities in 1987; 
the setting up of supporting institutions, notably discount houses; and the unification of cash reserve 
requirements on demand and time and saving deposits. 
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Controls in credit and interest rates were discontinued following reforms in monetary 
management, and the central bank from 1992 began to control the money supply 
principally through open market operations (sales and purchases of Treasury bills). 
This meant that over the period 1992-2000, the main instrument of policy was the 
interest rate on the 91-day Treasury bill. Supplementary instruments included: 
discount window operations, foreign exchange operations, reserve requirements, and 
from 1998, repurchase and reserve repurchase transactions (Wampah, 1998)17. 
 
The intermediate target has evolved to reflect the widening scope of the definition of 
money; the operating target has also been changed to reflect the need for a closer 
relationship between the operating and intermediate targets, such that the attainment 
of the operating target would to a high degree imply the attainment of the 
intermediate target (Wampah, 1998). During 1992-1996, the intermediate target was 
M2, i.e. currency plus quasi-money. In 1997, the central bank switched to a broader 
definition of the money supply, M2+: which is M2 plus foreign currency deposits. 
The change was in response to the rapidly growing foreign currency deposits in the 
balance sheets of commercial banks and the need to monitor them as a potential 
source of demand and therefore inflation. 
 
 
3.7 Monetary Policy Background 
 
Monetary policy in Ghana has changed considerably since the launch of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, in line with changes in the financial 
system. Whilst the objective aspect of monetary policy – price stability – has 
remained basically unchanged, there have been substantial changes elsewhere, 
especially with regard to the instruments used. The instruments of monetary policy 
                                                
17
 The central bank’s use of cash and liquidity ratio requirements to regulate commercial bank 
liquidity dates back to February 1969. From 1990, the cash ratio was progressively lowered until it 
reached its lowest level of 5 per cent in 1993. In 1996, the cash ratio was raised to 10 per cent, but 
lowered to 8 per cent in 1997 when foreign currency deposits were added to the total deposit base for 
the calculation of reserves. In July 2000, in response to rising inflation and a sharp depreciation of the 
cedi, the ratio was raised to 9 per cent. The discount window facility is primarily used to meet 
occasional shortages in the market, and operated at the instance of the deficit bank. The central bank 
uses a deposit standing facility at its instance to absorb liquidity from the market as well. Both 
instruments are priced relative to the Treasury bill rate. The central bank’s foreign exchange operation 
is through outright sales and purchases or through swaps; and undertakes either one of these within 
the confines of the reserve money target. 
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have been improved and more indirect and market based instruments have been 
developed. With respect to policy targets, although the intermediate target continues 
to be broad money, the definition of the money supply has been adjusted to take 
account of new financial assets that resulted from the liberalisation and innovation 
process and functioned as close substitutes for monetary assets (Wampah, 1998). 
 
One of the main constraints on monetary policy for most of the ERP/SAP review 
period has been the need to accommodate unplanned fiscal requirements. Also since 
1994, monetary management has been additionally burdened by large liquidity 
injections into the economy concentrated in the last quarter of the year, mainly 
through the foreign loan inflow earmarked for the purchase of cocoa. This is 
aggravated by fiscal pressures which make monetary management in the last quarter 
of every year very complicated. 
 
3.7.1 Objectives of monetary policy 
The overriding goal of monetary policy in Ghana is price stability, although this was 
not stated explicitly in the Bank of Ghana (BOG) law, 1992 PNDCL 291. The price 
stability objective has become explicit since 1996, when the BOG refocused its 
mission and adopted a Mission Statement as follows: "to pursue sound monetary and 
financial policies aimed at price stability so as to create an enabling macroeconomic 
environment for the promotion of sustainable economic growth.” 
 
The monetary policy setting in Ghana is typical of a small open developing 
economy. In an open economy, the conventional wisdom is that standard channels 
for the transmission of monetary policy actions are through aggregate demand, 
expectations which affect inflation via wage and price setting behaviour, the 
exchange rate, via the interest parity conditions dependent on the difference between 
domestic and foreign interest rates, and expected future changes in exchange rates. 
All these work in a complex interaction through the system into the price level. 
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A number of practical considerations specific to the economy are important for the 
conduct of monetary policy: 
 
• The first is the degree of openness of the economy to trade.  
The estimates are that commodity imports account for 50 percent of GDP and most 
payments transactions are denominated in US dollars. Cocoa and gold account for 60 
percent of export earnings; and oil imports about a third of imports. Taxes related to 
international trade account for about 23 percent of total government revenue. Trade 
liberalisation has been accompanied by a reduction in tariffs to relatively low levels 
with low dispersion across commodities. This structure of trade means that the 
economy is very exposed to shocks in international commodity markets (BOG 2005). 
 
• Second, the exchange rate is freely floating on the forex markets and interest 
rates are fully liberalised. The interbank exchange rate for the cedi is freely 
determined on exchange markets. There is no intervention by the central bank except 
to safeguard a minimum reserve target. The rate coexists with daily quotations for 
bank notes in an atomistic retail market of foreign exchange bureaux operators. Total 
recorded transactions on this market account for some 10 percent of the daily volume 
of trade, and these are based on firm, but somewhat more volatile exchange rate 
expectations which tend to feed into general market expectations. 
 
• Third, the exchange and payments system is a liberal one. There are no 
restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions (Ghana 
has accepted the obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund). The freedom of payments transactions makes 
domestic prices of traded goods and the exchange rate highly responsive to market 
forces and demand pressures. 
 
• Fourth, prices of goods and services are market determined. With the exception 
of key public utilities and petroleum products which are regulated under a market-
based pricing mechanism, all other prices are market determined. Public utilities 
were heavily subsidised before the review programme of 1983. Adjustments have 
been discrete, large and episodic rather than systematic and flexible over time, with a 
significant impact on pricing and wage-setting behaviour and shifts in the price level. 
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• Finally, the economy is surrounded by countries in the CFA franc zone. These 
countries have an established record of low inflation and currency stability. Their 
currency, managed by a common central bank, had been, de facto, irrevocably 
pegged to the French Franc (under the guarantee of the French Treasury) and now to 
the euro. Many of these countries produce the same primary commodities for export 
based on similarly designed producer pricing systems. Unrecorded cross-border trade 
is active, with the potential for price-related diversion of export products, taking 
advantage of any arbitrage, including trading on the foreign exchange (especially) 
bureaux market.  
 
3.7.2 Strategy for monetary management 
3.7.2.1 Monetary targeting 
The central bank’s strategy for inflation control is based on the Monetarist view that 
inflation is mainly a monetary phenomenon. Several studies of the Ghanaian 
economy have established that a significant proportion of the variation in prices is 
explained by movements in monetary aggregates (see Ewusi 1997; Kwakye and 
Lawson, 1996; Wampah, 1998 ). Targeting money supply growth is therefore an 
appropriate method of targeting inflation in the Ghanaian economy. The 
programming framework used by the Bank is derived from the quantity theory 
equation that relates the rate of monetary growth to inflation given a constant 
velocity of money and full employment. 
 
The growth and inflation targets for a particular year are based on financial 
programming determined in consultation with the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The 
quantity theory of money adopts a demand management approach where prices 
adjust to movements in money supply. It is assumed that velocity (v) is stable and 
can be reliably predicted (outside the model). 
 
3.7.2.2 Types of target 
The Bank of Ghana’s monetary management framework basically has three targets; 
the ultimate or final target, the intermediate target and the operating target. 
 
The ultimate goal of the central bank is to maintain price stability and thus the target 
is usually set in terms of inflation rates. The intermediate target is money supply, 
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which is derived from the quantity theory identity. The particular monetary aggregate 
used varies from country to country, and in Ghana has evolved over the years. In 
Ghana, M1 was used as the intermediate target for the greater part of the period prior 
to 1983. However, as quasi money (Time and Savings Deposits) grew and became 
increasingly a near-perfect substitute for demand deposits, BOG switched to using 
M2 as the intermediate target. Finally, in 1997, the central bank started using the 
broader target of M2+, defined as the sum of M2 and foreign currency deposits. This 
was in response to the rapid growth of foreign currency deposits on the balance 
sheets of commercial banks and the need to monitor them as a potential source of 
demand and therefore inflation. 
 
During the period of direct controls, the central bank was able to control money 
supply directly. The BOG was able to limit commercial banks to specific credit 
ceilings, thus ensuring that the money supply target was met. In a liberalised system 
of indirect controls, however, the central bank must operate through another variable 
over which it has greater control. This variable, called the operating target, must be 
closely related to the intermediate target, such that attaining this target would 
translate into achieving the intermediate target. 
 
The main operating targets used by central banks are the net domestic assets of the 
central bank (NDACB) and Reserve Money (RM). In Ghana, NDACB was initially 
used. In the financial programming framework, a floor is usually set for the Net 
Foreign Assets of the central bank (NFACB). Earlier in the reform period, NFACB 
was considered a major source of liquidity injection since, during this period, export 
earnings and bilateral/multilateral flows were low. The major source of injection was 
net claims on Government and the private sector. Thus, targeting (NDACB) was 
considered appropriate in restraining Government as well as commercial bank credit 
to the private sector. When exports recovered and the international community’s 
confidence in Ghana was restored, foreign inflows became a major source of 
injection and the sole concentration on NDACB became inadequate. To deal with the 
situation, the central bank shifted to the use of RM as its operating target. RM is 
related to the intermediate target (M2) through the money multiplier (m) as follows: 
M2 = m*(RM) 
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Thus, if m can be projected fairly accurately or is stable, the M2 target can be 
achieved by keeping to the corresponding RM level. RM can be influenced through 
open market operations (OMO) or foreign exchange reserve management (FEMO). 
The relationship can be written as follows: 
 
M2 = NFACB + NDACB and NDACB = NCGCB + OINCB 
Where NFACB is the net foreign assets of the central bank 
NDACB is the net domestic assets for the central bank 
NCGCB is net credit to government by the central bank 
OINCB is other items (net) of the central bank. 
NIBPCB is net indebtedness of the central bank to commercial banks and the public 
 
Open market sales (or primary issues) of government paper or central bank bills will 
have contractionary effects on NCGCB and NIBPCB, while purchases will have the 
opposite effect. Similarly, central bank sales of foreign exchange will reduce 
NFACB, while purchases will expand it. Thus OMO and FEMO can be used by the 
central bank to achieve a desired level of reserve money. As is clear from above, the 
assumption of a stable multiplier forms the basis of the central bank’s monetary 
management strategy, since m is the link between reserve money and money supply. 
If m is unstable or cannot be predicted reliably, then the M2 target cannot be 
achieved even if the RM target is achieved. 
 
Under the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) agreed upon with the IMF 
in June 2001, the performance criterion for the monetary sector has been shifted from 
reserve money to the NDACB. This stems from the fact that inflationary pressures in 
the Ghanaian economy in 2000 emanated mainly from domestic credit creation, 
hence the need to monitor the net domestic assets of the central bank. 
 
3.7.3 Instruments of monetary management 
In a system of direct controls, which was the system until 1987, the main instruments 
of monetary management were direct controls in the form of ceilings on commercial 
bank credit to the private sector and regulation of interest rates. The ceilings on 
commercial bank credit were both bank and sector specific. The central bank also 
regulated interest rates by stipulating floors and ceilings for deposit and lending rates 
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respectively. High reserve requirements were also imposed during this period. These 
controls had their own attractions, the most obvious one being ease of 
implementation. 
 
Under this system all the central bank had to do was determine the money supply 
growth for the year, based on economic growth and inflation objectives; determine 
the credit growth that would be consistent with the money supply growth figure; 
distribute this credit growth among banks based on certain criteria, and sit back to 
monitor compliance of the banks to the guidelines. Thus, at the beginning of each 
year, BOG sent out general policy guidelines as well as bank-specific ones. The 
general guidelines included interest rate regulations and distribution of credit by 
economic sectors (agriculture, industry, etc.) The specific guidelines stipulated 
ceilings for the total credit allowed each bank. Penalties were applied by the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD) on non-conforming banks. Monetary management 
was therefore simple and straightforward. 
 
Despite its simplicity this system of monetary management had several 
disadvantages. First, high unremunerated reserve requirements, coupled with credit 
ceilings, led to the accumulation of a large pool of excess liquidity in the banking 
system. Since there was no avenue for investing these funds, the banks had no 
incentives for mobilisation of savings. Furthermore, the ceilings on lending rates 
were often kept low to keep the cost of borrowing low, especially to Government. 
Thus, interest rates were generally negative in real terms, a further disincentive to 
savings. The system of direct controls, therefore, contributed to the deterioration in 
the banking system by increasing transaction costs and discouraging financial 
intermediation, leading to a misallocation of resources. 
 
A variety of instruments used by the central bank in the conduct of monetary policy 
include reserve requirements, open market operations (OMO), repurchase and 
reverse repurchase agreements (repo, foreign exchange reserve management and 
foreign exchange swaps or sale and buy back), and auctions of government debt 
instruments of various maturities and more recently, in March 2002, the Bank of 
Ghana Prime Rate. These are traditional market-based, non intrusive ways to absorb 
liquidity from the system as well as inject it into the system. The Bank has the 
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capacity to use these instruments to influence the cost of borrowing and returns on 
assets and to shape the incentives for market participants to hold more cedi balances 
in the banks and fewer foreign exchange deposits domestically or abroad. 
 
Reserve money is the operational target used in the monetary policy framework in 
Ghana supported by a set of broad economic indicators. The central bank regulates 
reserve money to achieve a desired growth rate of broad money supply consistent 
with the programmed inflation and real GDP growth rates. There is in principle no 
intervention in the exchange market except to safeguard a minimum reserve target 
and, as indicated above, the exchange rate normally floats freely. 
 
3.7.3.1 Primary Reserve requirements 
Ghana has a long history of using reserve requirements for both prudential and 
monetary management purposes. During the period of direct controls, they were used 
as a supplement to credit controls. The central bank continued to use reserve 
requirements after the introduction of indirect monetary control. However, the ratio, 
base and method of calculation have evolved over the years. 
 
The ratios applied for demand deposits were higher than those for savings and time 
deposits (quasi money). The ratios discriminated between types of deposit prior to 
March 1990. The idea was to encourage commercial banks to mobilise long-term 
funds, which could be channeled into long term lending. After 1990, the two ratios 
were merged into a single ratio on total deposits (demand, time and savings deposits). 
Finally in 1997, the coverage was extended to foreign exchange deposits. This was in 
response to the central bank’s decision to target the broader definition of money 
supply, M2+, which also includes foreign currency deposits. Thus, the central bank 
would have better control over the money supply, while at the same time leveling the 
playing field for the mobilisation of both domestic and foreign currency deposits. 
 
The level of the ratio itself fluctuated over the years, reflecting liquidity conditions in 
the banking system, and reached its highest level of 27 per cent in 1990. After 1990, 
the ratio was progressively lowered until it reached its lowest point of 5 per cent in 
1993. The reserve ratio was again raised to 10 per cent in 1996 and lowered to 8 per 
cent in 1997 when foreign currency deposits were included in the total deposit base 
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for the calculation of reserves. In July 2000 in response to rising inflation and the 
sharp depreciation of the cedi, the ratio was raised to 9 per cent. In August 2006, the 
secondary reserve was abolished but the primary reserve ratio remains at 9 per cent. 
 
3.7.3.2 Reserves against foreign currency deposits 
Two main issues frequently come up with foreign currency deposits: whether the 
reserves against these deposits should be held in foreign or domestic currency; and 
whether foreign currency deposits should be included in the monetary target. 
Generally, when reserves against foreign currency deposits are held in domestic 
currency, banks may be exposed to foreign currency risks. However, Hardy (1997) 
points out that denominating some reserves in foreign currency can complicate 
monetary policy implementation by removing some of the central bank’s control 
over base money. The second issue of whether foreign currency deposits should be 
included in the monetary target is an empirical one, depending on the substitutability 
of foreign and domestic currencies. 
 
The central bank introduced reserve requirements against foreign currency deposits 
in 1997 with the main aim of leveling the playing field for the mobilisation of 
domestic and foreign currency deposits. As in the case of cedi (local currency) 
deposits, requirements against foreign currency deposits are presently fixed at 9 per 
cent, and are not remunerated. However, BOG requires banks to keep reserves in 
foreign currency deposits in cedis for a number of reasons. First, keeping reserves in 
foreign currency would be operationally difficult because the central bank would 
have to monitor the banks’ several nostro accounts in different currencies. Also, 
there was a need at the time to tighten liquidity further in order to sustain the 
downward trend in inflation. This measure apparently provided an avenue for the 
central bank to tighten liquidity conditions without appearing to increase overall 
reserve requirements. 
In the application of this policy, banks with large foreign currency deposits have 
found themselves increasingly having to augment their reserve requirements at the 
Bank of Ghana as a result of the depreciation of the domestic currency.  
 
The Bank of Ghana (BOG) has used reserve requirements extensively to support its 
monetary management. The methodology the BOG follows generally conforms to 
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acceptable norms in terms of base, method of computation and conformity in the 
treatment of all types of reserves. However, the level of the ratio is still considered to 
be high at 9 per cent. It is generally accepted that the optimal level should be close to 
the level of reserves kept by banks for clearing purposes, which in Ghana is 
estimated at between 2 per cent and 3 per cent. Because of the continued existence of 
excess liquidity in the system, it is unlikely the ratio will be reduced immediately. 
 
3.7.4 Measurement of reserve requirements 
For monetary targeting and prudential purposes, reserve requirements are more 
effective if they are observed contemporaneously. However, for developing countries 
where significant lags exist in reporting, it may be necessary to have lags between 
the base and maintenance period. 
 
Hardy (1997) argues that an averaging method is preferable to a day-to-day 
maintenance method, since the latter compels banks to hold excess reserves and thus 
affects the stability of the multiplier and further complicates the conduct of monetary 
policy. In Ghana, the contemporaneous observance and daily maintenance of reserve 
requirements was used until 1994, when it was replaced by a one-week lagged 
observance. The seven-day week averaging method also replaced the daily 
observance at the same time. 
 
Two items are usually included in the definition of reserves, namely cash in the tills 
of banks (vault cash) and balances with the central bank. A third item which is 
sometimes included is call money in the interbank market.  In 1986, the Bank of 
Ghana included all three items in the definition. In 1989, call money was dropped 
and finally in 1996 the definition was narrowed to include only balances with the 
central bank. This was done to avoid the difficulty of monitoring compliance when 
cash in the tills of banks is included in the definition. 
 
3.7.5 Open market-type operations 
The Bank of Ghana intervenes mainly through the primary auction of Treasury bills 
and BOG bills in implementing monetary policy, a process also referred to as open 
market-type operations. The system has undergone several transformations. 
Originally, weekly auctions of Treasury bills and BOG bills were held on Fridays, 
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with the amount offered based on the difference between projected and targeted 
reserve money, maturing bills as well as public sector borrowing requirements 
(PSBR). 
 
Initially the weekly auctions were open to banks and to the non-bank public, 
although the non-bank public had to submit their bids through their bankers. Pricing 
at the auction is based on the multiple price auction system, where bids are arranged 
in descending order and the higher prices are allotted first until the offer is exhausted. 
Each bidder pays the price he quotes. Investors could also purchase on tap directly 
from BOG between tenders (auctions) at the weighted average price declared at the 
preceding auction. The tap was supposed to be open only when targets had not been 
met, but were, in practice, always open in view of the large liquidity overhang. The 
tap between tenders was closed to all banks in March 1996, but remained open to the 
non-bank sector. 
 
This situation discouraged the development of the secondary market, and therefore in 
1997, BOG abolished the tap for the non-bank sector as well in Accra, the nation’s 
capital. Tap sales, however, continue to operate at BOG’s regional branches. 
 
3.7.5.1 The Primary dealer system 
BOG introduced the wholesale auction system in March 1996. Tenders for Treasury 
bills became restricted only to primary dealers comprising commercial banks, 
discount houses and four brokerage firms. A well-functioning primary dealer system 
should help develop the secondary market. The primary dealers should be able to 
underwrite the whole issue at the tender. They should also be leaders in the market 
and act as market makers in government and central bank securities, subject to 
compliance with an established code of conduct and standard best practice. In this 
regard, primary dealers should stand ready to give firm price quotations. In return, 
the dealers are granted certain privileges such as access to special financing 
arrangements. 
 
The system has not worked well in the country. The auctions are often under-
subscribed and the primary dealers make no effort to promote secondary market 
activity. BOG has in a way contributed to the problems by continuing to maintain a 
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window for the discount of government securities. The tap continues to be open to 
the non-bank sector in parts of the country.  
 
3.7.5.2 Money market instruments 
There has been a recent shift in composition from BOG bills to Treasury bills, which 
is the Government of Ghana (GOG) Instrument, although the main instruments over 
the years have not changed significantly. Table 3.7.5.2, below, shows that the 
proportion of BOG bills in the total stock (in billions of cedis) increased from 34 per 
cent in 1990 to a peak of 80 per cent in 1994 and then fell sharply to less than 4 per 
cent in March 1998. This followed a deliberate central bank policy of replacing BOG 
bills with Treasury bills, apparently because of the Government’s increasing 
concerns over interest payments on these instruments. Thus, from 1996 Treasury 
bills became the main instrument of intervention while at the same time serving the 
purpose of Government’s debt management. The process of conversion was largely 
completed by March 1998 as shown in Table 3.7.5.2 below, with the remaining stock 
comprising 30-day bills, 3-year and 5-year bonds, and the last two of which are not 
actively traded on the market.     
 
Table 3.7.5.2                        
Money market Instrument:1990-1998 
Year GOG Instrument BOG Instrument Total 
 Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Amount 
1990 73.6 66.5 37.0 33.5 110.6 
1991 58.2 32.2 122.7 67.8 180.9 
1992 92.2 38.4 148.1 61.6 240.3 
1993 113.1 25.3 334.5 74.7 447.6 
1994 119.7 20.0 479.5 80.0 599.2 
1995 221.2 25.0 656.8 74.8 878.0 
1996 665.8 56.2 518.2 43.8 1184.0 
1997 1490.2 88.4 194.9 11.6 1685.1 
1998* 1982.4 96.4 73.9 3.6 2056.3 
*March 1998         GOG- Government of Ghana            BOG- Bank of Ghana 
Source Bank of Ghana 
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The phasing out of the BOG bills brought into focus the issue of over-financing of 
the deficit, with the difference between the deficit and the actual issue representing 
the central bank’s monetary intervention. BOG has addressed this issue by opening a 
separate account called OMO-Treasury bills, into which the proceeds from 
intervention are put and sterilised. This procedure, however, raises the problem of 
reconciliation between the stock of bills in the register and what actually goes to 
finance the budget, a situation which may raise questions about transparency. In spite 
of the problems, BOG’s decision to switch to Treasury bills appears justified in view 
of the Government’s increasing concerns about the interest bill. There was therefore 
the danger that in future the Government might decide to stop paying the interest cost 
on BOG bills, an action that might affect the profitability of the central bank and 
potentially compromise the conduct of monetary policy. The central bank may 
address this issue by introducing secondary instruments, such as repos for its 
monetary policy intervention. This would require prior actions by the central bank to 
develop the secondary market by putting in place the framework and instruments, 
establishing a book entry system, and acquiring a portfolio of assets for use on the 
market. This system would ultimately eliminate the cost to the Government of 
BOG’s monetary intervention. 
 
3.7.6 Trends in broad money supply growth 
Trends in the rate of growth of money supply in Ghana display the distinctive 
characteristics of a last-quarter hump, largely as a result of the external pre-financing 
of cocoa purchases. Whereas the cumulative rate of growth of money in the first 
three quarters of the year falls generally below 25 per cent, the nature of financing 
the cocoa purchases brings this figure to an average of 40 per cent each year for the 
period 1994-1997 (BOG 1999). 
 
The disbursement of foreign exchange for crop purchases coincides with the 
purchase of the bulk of the major cocoa crop in the last quarter of the year. The net 
foreign asset (NFA) of the Bank of Ghana increases significantly in the last quarter 
of the year and the Bank has been unsuccessful in sterilising this increase in many 
years. In 1998 however there was an improvement as less pressure from the fiscal 
side allowed better monetary management in the last quarter of the year. This was 
due to an improvement in government finances, partly as a result of better day-to-day 
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monitoring of the government’s position with the central bank. This resulted in a 
shift in government deficit financing from the central bank to the commercial banks 
and the public (BOG 1999). The table below shows trends in money supply and its 
growth rate (year-on-year) from 2002 to 2006. 
 
Table 3.7.6 
Year Month M2Plus M2PlusGROWTH 
2002 Q1: 10745.2000 4.8500 
2002 Q2: 11259.8000 9.8200 
2002 Q3: 12135.7000 18.4200 
2002 Q4: 15368.1000 49.9600 
2003 Q1: 15209.8000 41.5000 
2003 Q2: 16042.7000 42.5000 
2003 Q3: 16445.9000 35.5200 
2003 Q4: 21137.9000 35.8000 
2004 Q1: 21248.0000 39.7000 
2004 Q2: 22490.3000 40.2000 
2004 Q3: 23285.1000 41.6000 
2004 Q4: 26667.2000 26.0000 
2005 Q1: 26336.7000 23.9000 
2005 Q2: 27108.1000 20.5000 
2005 Q3: 27005.6000 16.0000 
2005 Q4: 30417.5000 14.1000 
2006 Q1: 31500.8000 19.6000 
2006 Q2: 34079.4000 25.7000 
2006 Q3: 36079.5000 33.6000 
2006 Q4: 42219.5000 38.8000 
2007 Q1: 42809.6000 35.9000 
2007 Q2: 44350.0000 30.1000 
2007 Q3: 4826.3000 33.9000 
2007 Q4: 5750.6000 36.3000 
2008 Q1: 5959.4000 39.2000 
2008 Q2: 6197.8000 37.0000 
2008 Q3: 6940.2000 43.8000 
2008 Q4: 8062.3000 40.2000 
 
Source: (BOG Website on 02/06/2009) 
 
3.7.7 Money market rates 
Although a lot has been achieved in laying down the infrastructure for market 
intervention, there has not been much success in achieving money supply and 
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inflation targets. Again, the main problem has been the continued presence of the 
Government on the market, as well as the inability of the central bank to vary rates to 
achieve the desired targets. Figure 3.7.7 below shows 91-day Treasury bills rates, the 
Bank Rate and the inflation rate from January 1995 to December 2006. As is evident 
from this, the Bank Rate has remained stable over most of the period, although 
market conditions (as measured by the inflation rate) fluctuated during the period. 
For the whole of 1997, the monthly average Bank Rate remained at 42.8 per cent in 
spite of a declining inflation rate. In 1995 and 1996, the real Treasury bill rate was 
negative for long periods. 
 
The Ghanaian experience has revealed that market participants respond only to the 
central bank’s actions, which come either through movements in the Bank Rate or 
the results of preceding auctions. Thus, even if all other indicators (inflation, growth, 
etc.) point to a change in rates, the market participants appear to wait for signals from 
the central bank before reacting themselves.  
 
Figure 3.7.7 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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A possible explanation of such inertia on the part of market participants is that the 
long history of controls (especially regulated interest rates) has rendered them 
dependent on the central bank to develop their own expertise in this area. It appears 
therefore that the central bank has a major role to play in removing this inertia, and 
encouraging banks to follow market trends. In particular, the central bank should use 
the Bank Rate (or other indicators) actively in signaling its policy stance, rather than 
allowing the rate to remain stable for long periods while underlying macroeconomic 
conditions change. 
 
BOG is however limited in its ability to use the Bank Rate effectively due to cost 
considerations. Since in Ghana the cost of intervention is financed by the 
Government, it (the Government) may resist interest rate increases to levels that are 
necessary to clear the market. A necessary condition for improvements in money 
market performance, therefore, is that the Government’s borrowing requirement 
should decline significantly. Secondly, the BOG should intensify the use of 
secondary instruments instead of primary issues for monetary intervention, thus 
reducing the financial burden on the Government. 
 
3.7.8 Central Bank Independence 
“The agency theory of Central Bank Independence (CBI) and virtually all other theories on CBI postulate that a 
negative relationship between CBI and inflation is robust. For inflation targeting, an independent Central Bank 
(ICB) is an obvious pre-requisite. Sub-Saharan Africa can also inflation target by suitably embracing the 
prescribed monetary policy framework”- Oyedokun Agbeja (2007) 
 
Ghana’s parliament passed into law a Bank of Ghana Act at the end of 2001 to 
strengthen the central bank in the conduct of monetary policy. This Act gives 
operational independence to the BOG. This historic Act specifies among other 
provisions that: 
 
• The primary objective of the Bank is to maintain price stability “independent of 
instructions from Government or any other authority”. This has refocused the central 
bank on the major task of inflation control and away from the developmental 
activities which characterised the Bank’s operations in the past. 
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• A Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for formulating monetary policy, 
which should bring transparency to the central bank’s operations and its 
communications with the public. 
 
• Government borrowing from the central bank in any year shall be limited to 10 
percent of its revenue, which ties the hands of government and the central bank in a 
way that is much stricter than the 20 percent ceiling which prevails in the CFA zone 
countries, for example. 
 
The new statutory mandate of the central bank is seen as firmly rooted in a 
resurgence of public interest in economic policy and a heightened aversion for 
inflation and awareness of how much stability contributes to raising the standard of 
living of its people. The Bank of Ghana Act sought to address the prevailing concern 
that instability and weaknesses in the regulatory framework have accounted for the 
poor economic performance and stifled the private sector. 
 
 The central bank in the midst of fiscal dominance was thought to be responsible, to 
some extent, for a situation in which inflation and exchange rate losses had not only 
eroded the capital of many enterprises but also inhibited their ability to take 
advantage of business opportunities. Also constrained was the economy’s ability to 
attract and retain domestic and foreign capital and investment on the scale needed to 
sustain rapid productivity and income growth. In short, inflation was seen as the root 
cause of the economic difficulties, and a justification for an independent central bank 
(BOG 2002). 
 
3.7.9 Bank of Ghana Prime Rate 
The central bank introduced a “Prime Rate” in March 2002 to tighten the link with 
liquidity management and inflationary expectations and the transmission of monetary 
policy actions. It is the rate at which the central bank would provide overnight funds 
to banks and thus should influence the interbank market rate and interest rates 
generally consistent with its monetary policy stance. 
 
The Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), modelled after that of the Bank of 
England, sets interest rates every other month, and communicates its decision to the 
 57 
public. In its work, it has established a commitment to an anti-inflation strategy using 
inflation targeting (Bank of Ghana Act 2002). 
 
The MPC meets over three days to examine and analyse a considerable amount of 
data on the economy, including the fiscal outlook, monetary and inflation 
developments, external sector, financial stability, and the real sector of the economy 
in reaching its decision on the Bank of Ghana Prime rate. Such information is 
required to give context to the decision and to provide a basis for the market 
participants also to formulate a view. There is a popular notion that with its eye on 
inflation, the MPC does not give a lot of attention to the real sector of the economy. 
 
The MPC argues it analyses a lot of data on real sector developments and undertakes 
surveys of 45 companies covering all sectors of the economy every two months. The 
objective of creating a low inflation environment is to allow sustained economic 
growth to take place, although low inflation is good for its own sake and essential for 
growth. 
 
BOG introduced a new economic indicator, the Composite Indicator of Economic 
Activity (CIEA) to address the existing gap in information about developments in the 
real sector of the economy. CIEA measures real sector activity including output of 
selected key enterprises, industrial electricity consumption, domestic VAT, port 
activity, imports, exports, and employment contributions. BOG also undertakes 
consumer confidence surveys across all ten regions of the country, as well as regular 
surveys of business to complement the CIEA. The business sector surveys cover all 
sectors of the economy, including agriculture. In addition, surveys of consumer 
confidence are undertaken every other month across all ten regions. The MPC 
considers these and other developments in the real sector when reaching its decision 
on the interest rate. 
 
A Press Conference is held by the Committee at the end of each bi-monthly meeting, 
and a lot of statistical information in the form of reports is released to the general 
public. This process of communication is a novel departure from past practice and 
seeks to provide as much information on the economy and the stance of monetary 
 58 
policy for the press/public to take a stake in its objectives. This process helps in 
shaping expectations. 
 
3.8 Summary  
The literature on monetary policy in Ghana indicates that the central bank bases its 
monetary policy on the quantity theory, relating money growth to inflation assuming 
a constant velocity of money and full employment. 
 
Prior to monetary management reform in 1991, the implication for credit expansion 
so derived from the simple quantity theory relationship was distributed amongst 
banks as a credit ceiling. The credit controls were, from 1971, supplemented by 
controls in commercial bank interest rates. 
 
Following the ERP and reforms in monetary management, controls in credit and 
interest rates were discontinued and the central bank from 1992 has relied on a 
variety of instruments in the conduct of monetary policy, including reserve 
requirements, open market operations (OMO), repurchase and reverse repurchase 
agreements (repo, foreign exchange reserve management and foreign exchange 
swaps or sale and buy back), and auctions of government debt instruments of various 
maturities and more recently, in March 2002, the Bank of Ghana Prime Rate. 
 
These are traditional market-based, non intrusive ways to absorb liquidity from the 
system as well as inject it into the system. The Bank has the capacity to use these 
instruments to influence the cost of borrowing and returns on assets and to shape the 
incentives for market participants to hold more cedi balances in the banks and fewer 
foreign exchange deposits domestically or abroad. 
 
The Bank of Ghana’s ability to use the Bank Rate effectively is however limited due 
to cost considerations. Since in Ghana the cost of intervention is financed by the 
Government, it (the Government) may resist interest rate increases to levels that are 
necessary to clear the market, which can influence monetary policy effectiveness.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Theory and Literature on Monetary Policy 
 
 
The chapter provides the theory and literature on: first, monetary policy rules; second, 
the responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates to changes in the policy interest 
rate; and third, the monetary transmission mechanism. It presents a three-part review 
of the relevant theory and literature that underpins the empirical analysis in this 
thesis (in Chapters, 5, 6, and 7).  
 
Section 4.1 presents the theory and literature on monetary policy rules and evaluates 
the issues in the following sub-sections: the dynamic inconsistency problem and 
proposed solutions (4.1.2), the definition and formulation of monetary policy rules 
(4.1.3), interest rate rules (4.1.4), and issues relating to the design of interest rates 
rules and estimates of interest rate responses from the empirical literature (4.1.5). 
Section 4.2 turns to the literature, (mainly empirical), on the responsiveness of 
commercial bank retail rates to policy interest rates. Section 4.3 then discusses the 
transmission of monetary policy, focusing on the channels of monetary transmission 
(4.3.2) and the empirical literature (4.3.5). Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.1 Monetary Policy Rules - Theory and Literature 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Poole (1999) argued that human behaviour is better organised by rules 18 . This 
assertion, according to the current literature on monetary policy, applies to monetary 
policy conduct. This realisation emerged, however, only after a considerable period 
of pro and counter argument dating back to Simons (1936). Simons, an early 
enthusiast of rules for the conduct of policy, advocated clear and firm rules for 
monetary policy conduct in his paper “Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy”. 
                                                
18
 All aspect of our behaviour, economic and otherwise, are governed and organised by various rules. The most 
routine aspects of our lives becomes unpredictable and even chaotic when not governed by well defined and 
generally accepted rules – William Poole (1999) 
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Two decades after Simons, Friedman (1953, 1959) proposed the first definitive rule - 
a constant money growth rule - for monetary policy conduct. The rule stipulates that 
the money supply be increased by a constant per cent (k, equal to the expected 
growth of potential GDP minus the expected rate of increase of velocity) annually, 
and be independent of subsequent economic and financial considerations. Friedman 
argued that given the long and variable lags in the transmission of monetary policy, 
the constant money growth rule would avoid the instability of discretionary monetary 
policy and deliver low inflation. On the other side of the divide, the proponents of 
discretionary policy rejected definitive rules for what they do. They stressed the 
importance of policy adaptability as a means of keeping an uncertain environment 
under control. In their view, it is precisely because the economy is subject to 
uncertain shocks, and policies can have diverse effects, that discretion in policy 
implementation is desirable (Guitán, 1994). 
 
Using game-theoretic approaches, Kydland and Prescott (1977, hereafter KP) and 
subsequently Barro and Gordon (1983, hereafter BG) however, changed the focus of 
the rules versus discretion argument. They demonstrated the superiority of rules over 
discretion for monetary policy conduct and put an end to the idea that a policy rule 
necessarily involves a fixed setting of the monetary authority’s instrument variable. 
This literature has been the reference for all other arguments over rules for the 
conduct of monetary policy. The recommendation from this literature is that superior 
results in terms of social welfare are obtained if a government, through their central 
bank, follows a re-commitment device: notably, if they follow a priori rules. 
However, unlike the rule of the Friedman-type where there is no scope for ongoing 
policy-making (i.e. excluding discretionary policy-making), rules that have ensued 
from the KP and BG literature allow for on-going decisions. 
 
4.1.2 The Problem and Proposed Solutions to Dynamic Inconsistency   
4.1.2.1 The Dynamic Inconsistency Problem 
Theoretical and empirical research has substantially demonstrated the absence of a 
long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment (Friedman, 1968; 
Leiderman and Svensson, 1995; Taylor, 1999d; Khan, 2003). However, most 
monetary theories of the business cycle show a short-run trade-off in the sense that 
changes in inflation are associated with changes in the unemployment rate (Taylor, 
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1999d; Khan, 2003). In particular, inflation tends to fall when unemployment is 
above the natural rate or GDP is below potential; and inflation tends to rise in the 
opposite scenario. The existence of this short-run trade-off is widely believed to be 
associated with the presence of sticky wages and prices. The likelihood that an 
expansionary monetary policy, while it may increase output and employment in the 
short-run, could raise inflation is the essence of the dynamic inconsistency problem, 
developed principally by KP19. 
 
4.1.2.2. Solutions to the Dynamic Inconsistency Problem 
KP propose its solution, that is for the monetary authority to follow a rule. As 
architects of the dynamic inconsistency problem, KP demonstrated that even when 
there was agreement on the social objective function, optimal control theory or 
discretionary policy, namely the period-by-period re-optimisation on the part of the 
monetary authority, though consistent, is sub-optimal. That is, it does not result in the 
social objective function being maximised. This is because current decisions of 
economic agents depend in part upon their expectations of future policy. As such, it 
is only when these expectations are invariant to future policy that control theory 
would be appropriate. Thus, by relying on some policy rules, economic performance 
will be improved. Using an inflation-employment example, KP demonstrated that 
control theory only results in inflation with no reduction in unemployment, thus 
failing to achieve optimal equilibrium. 
 
BG confirmed the need for rules as a solution to the dynamic inconsistency problem 
of discretionary policy. They developed the argument of KP by including a theory of 
expectations formation. BG argued that governments, through their central banks, are 
often (rationally) tempted to violate their own pre-announced inflation targets in 
order to reduce unemployment. However, because agents form expectations 
rationally, they will generally deduce that inflation targets will not be met and hence 
raise their inflation expectations accordingly before any policy is implemented. This 
makes discretionary/activist policy ineffective in increasing employment and output, 
while at the same time leading to a rise in inflation. The public policy implication of 
                                                
19
 Khan (2003) gives budgetary concerns as another reason for the dynamic inconsistency problem. 
The argument is that where the budget is monetarily financed, a government may choose to inflate to 
maximise revenue from money creation. 
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the KP and BG research is that, to control inflation, central banks should be bound by 
rules in order to build public confidence in announced inflation targets. This helps to 
reduce inflation and unemployment. 
 
Alternative proposals have however, questioned the KP and BG solution of a rule to 
the inflation bias problem 20 . The alternative solutions have tended to rely on 
institutional arrangements that might leave the central bank free to pursue activist 
counter-cyclical stabilisation policies, while simultaneously inducing it to avoid the 
inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy making as identified by KP and 
BG. One such solution is reputation or credibility (e.g. Canzoneri, 1985; Rogoff, 
1985). For instance, Rogoff (1985) argues for the appointment of a central bank 
governor with much greater concern for price stability (relative to output) than 
society as a whole. Given that, the aggressive central banker proposed by Rogoff 
may reduce average inflation but at a cost of higher output variability. This line of 
research took the direction of examining the role of incentives contracts - e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995). Using the principal-agent 
framework, Walsh (1995) proposes a contract that directs the central banker to 
behave in a rule-like manner and not increase output variability. Blinder (1997), 
however, questions the approach because the principal (government) may not have 
the incentive to enforce the contract on the agent (central bank), being the time 
inconsistent government that necessitated the need for an incentive package in the 
first place. 
 
Another institutional solution is granting central bank independence (CBI) - a logical 
solution, as an underlying assumption for the time inconsistency literature is the 
belief that the central bank is subject to undue political pressure. However, evidence 
on whether independent central banks can avoid inflationary bias has been 
inconclusive. For example, significant dis-inflation amongst many developed 
                                                
20
 Some criticisms of the rule solution, as noted in Bofinger (2001 p.185), include the following. First, 
whether it is realistic to assume that a central bank will pursue an employment objective that implies 
lower unemployment than the natural rate. Second, whether it can be assumed that the social welfare 
function is identical with the preferences of private individuals. Third, whether the phenomenon of 
time inconsistency can be observed despite identical preferences of private individuals and the central 
bank. McCallum (1995) also considers the time inconsistency argument and its recommendation that 
rules are necessary to remove the inflation bias to be flawed, in the sense that the monetary policy 
maker, aware of the implications of judgement for inflation, can just “do the right thing” and respond 
to inflation shocks so as to deliver the desired outcome. 
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countries was attained from the end of the 1970s to the 1980s without formal 
institutional changes (Friedman and Kuttner, 1996; Fuhrer, 1997a). Furthermore, 
empirical evidence also casts doubts on the robustness of the correlation between 
CBI indexes and inflation, real growth or unemployment. While Grilli et al (1991), 
Alesina and Summers (1993), and Cukierman et al. (1993) find that improved 
inflation performance under CBI is not associated with slower growth; others like 
Fuhrer (1997a) and Campillo and Miron (1997) do not find such results. Moreover, 
even where favourable results (CBI vis-à-vis inflation and output growth) have been 
found, Fuhrer (1997a) observes that in general they hold only in the simplest 
bivariate cross-country regressions. Once other cross-sectional attributes are 
controlled for, the correlations disappear. In addition, for the favourable result, 
doubts have been raised with regards to causation (Leiderman and Svensson, 1995). 
The argument is that while evidence may reflect the causal effect of CBI on inflation, 
this could be the result of other factors that affect both inflation and output growth. 
 
Considering the drawbacks of the institutional solutions, it appears that the dynamic 
inconsistency problem is best solved with monetary policy feedback rules, 
supplemented by institutional arrangements. At this point, it suffices to define 
“monetary policy feedback rule” or simply “monetary policy rule” and the two broad 
approaches to formulating a rule for monetary policy. 
 
4.1.3 Monetary Policy Rule 
4.1.3.1 The Definition Monetary Policy Rule 
A monetary policy rule has been defined as  a plan that states as clearly as possible 
the circumstances under which a central bank should change the instrument of policy 
(Taylor, 1993, 2000) or as a formula that specifies instrument settings designed to 
keep target variables close to their specified path (McCallum, 1999a). It is expected 
that the policy rule would be applicable for an indefinitely large number of decision 
periods. This long term view for a policy rule has brought a further dimension to the 
concept of monetary policy rules. This is the idea that the policy rule should have a 
“timeless perspective” (Woodford, 1999; McCallum, 2000; Jensen and McCallum, 
2002). 
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Woodford (1999) explains that with forward-looking price adjustment, even if the 
central bank’s target for output does not exceed the natural rate, there would still be 
inefficiency unless the optimisation is conducted in a timeless perspective. That is, 
there would be inefficiency unless monetary policy is conducted as if current 
macroeconomic conditions were not known and optimisation had been made in the 
distant past as far as the state of the economy was concerned. The importance of 
Woodford’s “timeless perspective” exposition is that it allows the possibility of 
alterations to the monetary policy rule when new information suggests that the 
central bank’s outlook of the economy needs revision. Thus, current data can be used 
in model estimation and can be responded to by the rule. It is only the optimisation 
process of deriving the rule that needs to be independent of current conditions. 
 
Furthermore, there is another perspective on the concept of monetary policy rules by 
Svensson (2003). Defining a monetary policy rule as systematic policy, Svensson 
argues that it encompasses two types of rules: instrument rules and target(ing) rules. 
In the language of Svensson, an instrument rule expresses the instrument of policy as 
a prescribed function of pre-determined or forward-looking variables or both. 
McCallum and Taylor’s definitions of policy rule would be considered as instrument 
rules by Svensson. In contrast, but again in the language of Svensson, a targeting rule 
is a commitment to a particular loss function or particular target variable(s). Thus, 
the essential difference between a targeting rule and an instrument rule is that while 
the targeting rule amounts logically to the selection by the analyst of a model and an 
objective function, an instrument rule reflects the analyst’s hypothesis that the central 
banker, whatever his model or objective function, would achieve satisfactory results 
if he were to implement the rule. 
 
4.1.3.2 The Formulation Monetary Policy Rule 
Monetary policy rule definitions follow logically from the two main approaches to 
formulating the rule: the optimal control approach and the robustness approach. The 
optimal control approach to formulating monetary policy rules involves developing 
an appropriate macroeconomic model of the economy and then conducting optimal 
control analysis to determine, once and for all, the best policy rule for the economy 
in question. Naturally, the resulting optimal policy rule depends on the precise model 
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structure. The resulting rule would be classified as a targeting rule by the Svensson 
concept; examples are Feldstein and Stock (1994) and Svensson (1997). 
 
However, there is an absence of professional agreement on the appropriate 
specification of the macroeconomic model suitable for monetary policy issues, 
because different macroeconomic models give different implications for monetary 
policy, and the optimal control approach boils down to a decision on the appropriate 
model of the economy. Some economists argue that the better approach to 
formulating a policy rule is to search for one that possesses robustness, in the sense 
of yielding desirable outcomes in policy simulation experiments conducted with a 
wide variety of models, but not necessarily optimal in any given model. An example 
of such an approach is Bryant et al. (1993). These authors, employing varied 
assumptions about the structure of the economy (eight different large scale 
macroeconomic models of the US economy), perform a series of simulations in 
which the instrument of policy is adjusted in response to deviations from 
predetermined targets in: (i) the exchange rate, (ii) money supply, (iii) nominal 
output, and (iv) a combination of inflation and real output. The research shows that 
rules that target inflation and output are most successful in terms of reducing and 
stabilising output and price variability. Rules emanating from such a robustness 
exercise would be instrument rules according to the Svensson classification. 
 
There is the need to specify the goals of monetary policy for either the optimal 
control or robustness approach (McCallum, 1999a). In that regard, important issues 
include whether a central bank should keep inflation close to some normative value, 
what the normative value should be, whether the central bank should react to the 
output gap, whether the central bank should react to other variables, what the 
nominal anchor should be, and what the instrument of policy should be. 
 
Monetary policy is acknowledged to be most effective in the presence of a firmly 
established nominal anchor, the extent of effectiveness dependent on the degree to 
which the nominal anchor is understood by the public (Bernanke et al., 1999). 
 
Generally nominal anchors are either price or quantity based. While price anchors 
include the exchange rate, the price of gold, the composite price of a basket of 
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relevant commodities for a country and the inflation rate, the principal quantities are 
monetary aggregates and nominal income. Regarding the policy instrument, two 
have been considered - money stock and interest rate - leading to two types of policy 
rules: money stock feedback rules and interest rate feedback rules. Money stock 
feedback rules are extensions of the Friedman proposal to include feedback elements 
as a way to correct past mistakes or gradually adjust to permanent shifts in velocity. 
 
Many countries turned to the short term interest rate as the instrument of policy, 
following the finding in many countries that the relationship between monetary stock 
and inflation and output was unreliable (the velocity instability problem). As such, 
the emphasis in modern monetary policy and policy literature and analysis is interest 
rate rules (Bali and Thurston, 2002; McKibbin, 1997; McCallum, 1999a). 
 
4.1.4 Interest Rate Rules 
Taylor (1993) suggests a simple interest rate feedback rule drawing on the findings 
of Bryant et al. (1993) that has a price anchor of the form shown in Equation (4.1) 
that successively mimicked US monetary policy during 1987-92. The subsequent 
findings that the Taylor (1993) rule satisfactorily explained other industrialised 
country interest rate settings has generated much interest in the rule, as argued by 
Woodford (2001) that the rule has since been subjected to considerable attention, 
both as an account of actual policy in the United States and elsewhere, and as a 
prescription of desirable policy. 
 
4.1.4.1 The Taylor Rule 
The Taylor (1993) rule can be specified in a general form as: 
 
it = П*+ r +α (Пt - П*)+ β(yt- ỹt)                                   (4.1) 
 
where it denotes the central bank’s operating interest rate target (or instrument of 
policy), r is the equilibrium real interest rate, П* is the long run target inflation rate, 
Пt  is the inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator, yt is the log of real GDP, ỹ is 
the log of potential output (identified empirically with a linear trend). 
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This rule recommended adjusting the level of the policy instrument in response to 
four factors. The first is the long-run inflation target, the inflation rate that would 
prevail on average over time although the actual inflation rate may differ. The second 
factor is the equilibrium real interest rate, r. Added together, the two factors provide 
the benchmark long-run nominal interest rate. 
 
The other two factors in the Taylor rule address the way policy should respond in the 
short run to changing circumstances - namely to changes in inflation and output. The 
first of these is the inflation gap (Пt-П*) adjustment factor, α, (α>0). Since α is 
greater than zero, the rule recommends raising the interest rate above the nominal 
rate if inflation is above its target. The second factor is the output gap (y-ỹ) 
adjustment factor, β, (β>0). Similarly, β larger than zero implies raising the interest 
rate above the long–run nominal interest rate if GDP is above potential. The sizes of 
α and β determine the vigour with which monetary policy responds to deviations of 
inflation from its target and output from potential. 
 
 
In his specific formulation of the rule, Taylor set α = 1.5, β =0.5, r = 2 per cent, and 
Π
*
 = 2 per cent. He uses judgment rather than econometric investigation. The Taylor 
rule with the interest rate in nominal terms is: 
 
 
it = 0.04 + 1.5 (Πt -0.02) + 0.5(yt-ỹt)                            (4.2) 
 
and the rule with the instrument in real terms is: 
 
 
it –Π = 0.02 + 0.5 (Πt -0.02) + 0.5(yt-ỹt)                       (4.3) 
 
 
The Taylor rule implies that in the event of a sustained increase in inflation by k per 
cent, the nominal interest rate will eventually be raised by more than k percent as 
specified in Equation (4.2): specifically, one-and-a-half times k. That the interest rate 
response to inflation should exceed a factor of one has been referred to as the Taylor 
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principle by many (e.g. Woodford, 2001; McCallum, 2001a; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 
2003). 
 
Taylor’s principle therefore explains that a rise in inflation above target should lead 
to an increase in real interest rates (one-half of a percentage point for every 
percentage point that inflation is above target). This would reduce aggregate demand 
and inflation pressures and bring the economy back towards targeted equilibrium. 
These features of the Taylor rule ensure determinacy21. A policy rule that does not 
obey this principle would reduce the real interest rate and add to inflationary 
pressures. The end result would be that inflation has no anchor that will pull it to its 
long-run target and, as such, the economy is further pushed away from targeted 
equilibrium (Woodford, 2001; Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997) also argue that indeterminacy is equally present if a rule calls for an 
aggressive response of interest rates to information variables. In this instance, there is 
a policy “overkill” effect that may result in an oscillating equilibrium. 
 
A number of other researchers have considered rules of the Taylor type; among them 
were Henderson and McKibbin (1993) who proposed a rule of the form: 
 
it = i + α [Π +y – (Π* + ỹ)]                                            (4.4) 
 
However, Taylor’s important contribution was to spell out the normative and positive 
implications of his rule. On the normative side, the rule is consistent with the main 
principles of optimal monetary policy. First is a gradual adjustment of inflation to 
target. Second, the interest rate responds to the output gap as opposed to the level of 
output. As such, the rule calls for a countercyclical response to demand shocks and 
accommodates shocks to potential GDP that do not affect the output gap. On the 
positive side Taylor showed that, with certain parameter values, the rule provides a 
reasonably good description of US monetary policy over the period considered.  
 
Whilst Taylor’s rule in the general form shown in Equation (4.1) agreed that the 
coefficient on the inflation term should be greater than one for determinacy, the 
                                                
21
 That is, the Taylor rule, by virtue of its being a feedback rule from endogenous state variables, and 
with a coefficient on the inflation term obeying the Taylor principle, assures determinacy. 
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optimal coefficient size is unknown. Likewise, whilst there is agreement that the 
coefficient on the GDP gap should be positive, the optimal size is not known (Poole, 
1999; Taylor, 1993). Other issues of the rule also remain. These include the 
appropriate definition of inflation, i.e. the index to use and the time period over 
which to measure it22, and the appropriate measurement of potential GDP. 
 
4.1.5 Formulation of Interest Rate Rules 
A number of macroeconomists argue that inadequate knowledge about the way the 
economy works limits the benefits of model-specific policy rules e.g. McCallum, 
1999a; Christiano and Gust, 1999; and Clarida et al., 1999. In response, some 
research has examined varied policy rules in varied models of the economy to 
identify rules that are likely to be both efficient and robust when used as a guide for 
the conduct of monetary policy (Christiano and Gust, 1999; Romer, 2001). Such 
research includes the NBER sponsored study in Taylor (1999b), the Riksbank-IIES 
(1998) policy rule research, Levin et al. (1999), and Bryant et al. (1993). These 
studies investigated issues including: the optimal size of the parameter associated 
with inflation and output gaps, measurements of inflation and the economy’s 
productive potential, whether the rule should be extended by other variables, 
robustness of simple rules against complex rules, and whether the rules should be 
forward-looking. The concept of inflating targeting relates to issues of whether the 
rule should be forward-looking. 
 
4.1.5.1 Optimal Size of the Parameters  
Optimal inflation and output gap coefficients issues have received considerable 
research time. For example, Stock (1999), Sargent (1999), and Williams (1997) 
quoted in Taylor (1999a) as well as Ball (1999a) have all argued that the optimal 
weights chosen to minimise the variance of inflation and output might be higher than 
the weights of the Taylor rule. However some other work, e.g. the NBER policy rule 
research, has argued otherwise. This finds that the benefit of larger weights is not 
robust to varied model specifications, judged by the variability of inflation, output 
gap, and interest rate. 
                                                
22
 Using inflation over a short period like a month introduces random noise into the interest rate; but 
using inflation over a long period, like five years, would yield a rule that responds too slowly to 
changing conditions (Poole, 1999). 
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4.1.5.2 The Economy’s Productive Capacity 
It has been observed (e.g. Woodford, 2001) that in theory, a wide variety of real 
shocks (e.g. technology shocks, variable productivity of investment opportunities, 
and changes in attitudes towards labour supply) would affect the growth rate of 
potential output, and would do so not necessarily following smooth trends. As such, 
the output gap measure that is relevant for welfare may be quite different from 
simple detrended output commonly employed in monetary policy rules. Taylor (1993) 
measured the output gap as the deviation of output from linear trend, with trend 
output use as a proxy for potential output. McCallum (2001b) adds that in addition to 
the weaknesses associated with the measurement of potential output, many other 
competing concepts like “natural rate”, “NAIRU”, ”market-clearing”, and “flexible-
price” output exist in the literature, which only confuse even more the issue of 
measuring the gap in output. He is of the view that from the perspective of dynamic 
optimisation analysis, the flexible-price concept (i.e. the output level that would 
prevail in the absence of nominal stickiness), a concept that has hardly been used, is 
the most appropriate. 
 
Measurement of the output gap is important as uncertainties have been found to 
result in poor rule outcomes. An example is Orphanides et al. (2000), who find that 
errors in the measurement of output gaps led to a substantial deterioration in 
economic performance. In their view, such a problem could be mitigated with a 
reduced coefficient on the gap in output in the rule. Along the same line of argument, 
Orphanides (1999) finds that misperceptions about the economy’s productive 
capacity, rather than the stance of monetary policy in the 1970s as is generally 
claimed, was the primary cause of US inflation in the 1970s. Similarly, Kozicki 
(1999) finds that the Taylor rule produces different results depending on the measure 
of potential GDP used. 
 
4.1.5.3 Inflation and Output Measurement  
Should inflation and output be entered in the rule in lagged form, as 
contemporaneous values, or as expectations? Taylor proposed measuring inflation as 
average inflation over the four quarters ending in the current quarter and output as 
the current quarter’s value, but the use of contemporaneous values has been 
questioned given that current inflation and output are unknown when the central 
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bank sets interest rates. Given this, the rule implications for using lagged data as 
opposed to current data has been investigated in some research, e.g. the NBER (1999) 
policy rule research reported in Taylor (1999b). The finding, in line with Romer 
(2001), is that lagged variables do not perform better than variables in 
contemporaneous form. 
 
Some economists have also suggested that inflation and output are best measured as 
expected values to better reflect the practice of central banks forming policy based on 
their expectations of these variables. On this as well, there are diverging views. For 
example, Taylor (1999a) argues that these forecasts, based on current and lagged 
data, are no more forward-looking than “backward-looking rules”. Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003) develop a variant of the IMF’s Global Economic Model suitable to 
analyse macroeconomic dynamics in open economies, and use it to assess the 
effectiveness of Taylor rules and inflation-forecast-based (IFB) rules in stabilising 
variability in output and inflation in the Czech Republic. Their findings suggest that 
a simple IFB rule that does not rely upon any direct estimates of the equilibrium real 
interest rate and places a relatively high weight on the inflation forecast may perform 
better in small open economies than conventional Taylor rules. In support of Taylor’s 
line of argument, Levin et al. (1999) find from their robustness study that rules that 
incorporate forecasts of output gap and inflation yield, at most, small improvements 
over optimal rules based on contemporaneous and lagged variables. 
 
In addition to whether inflation should be used in the rule as forecast or 
contemporaneous inflation, is the availability of varied measures of inflation. The 
Taylor rule uses the percentage change in the price deflator for GDP; alternatives, 
however, includes consumer price inflation (CPI) inflation and core inflation. 
Empirically, different measures have been found to yield different outcomes (e.g. 
Kozicki, 1999). 
 
4.1.5.4 Taylor Rule Extension 
The Taylor rule is a stable, simple feedback rule. The issue is whether the 
equilibrium determined by such a policy rule is a desirable one. For one, there may 
be the need to consider additional stabilisation goals (Woodford, 1999, 2001). To 
investigate if more desirable results of the Taylor rule ensue when extended, the 
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literature has either subjected some extended rules to robustness analysis or has 
discussed the merits and demerits of extending the Taylor rule by these variables. 
Variables that have been considered include: money stock, lagged interest rate, 
exchange rate, fiscal stance, and stock prices. Each of the proposed extensions is 
discussed in turn. 
 
Role of Money 
Since a monetary aggregate has usually been used either as an intermediate or 
operating target of monetary policy, it has logically been claimed (e.g. Dotsey and 
Hornstein, 2003; and Friedman, 2006b) that optimal monetary policy may respond to 
the behaviour of money if it contains useful information about the underlying state of 
the economy23. Some empirical estimates of the Taylor rule have thus included a 
monetary aggregate. Clarida et al. (1998)’s extension of the Taylor rule by a money 
supply term finds the variable significant for: Germany (coefficient size of 0.7), 
Japan (0.07), and the US (0.53), with the coefficients associated with inflation and 
output gap remaining unchanged for Germany and Japan. For the US, however, the 
significance of the money supply term is associated with a decline in the coefficient 
on the inflation gap. Friedman and Kuttner (1996) also find a significant central bank 
response to money growth for the US. Schächter and Stokman (1995), however, find 
weak central bank response to the variable in Germany. 
 
Lagged Interest Rate 
 
Central banks in practice, adjust the interest rate much more cautiously than optimal 
polices derived under an environment of certainty predict (Clarida et al., 1999). This 
tendency of central bankers to adjust interest rates cautiously (i.e., to adjust interest 
rates mainly in sequences of small steps in the same direction and with relatively few 
reversals of direction) is referred to as interest rate smoothing. A number of 
researchers have shown that a policy rule that includes the lagged interest rate of the 
form shown in Equation (4.5) captures the last twenty years’ data well. 
 
it =(1-  ρ)[α +βpit+ γxt ]+ρit-1 + εt                                               (4.5) 
                                                
23
 Friedman extends this role to credit as well. 
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Where pi = П-П*,   x = y-ỹ, α is a constant, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the interest rate 
smoothing parameter that reflects the degree of lagged dependence on the interest 
rate. Clarida et al., (1999) further argue that interest rate smoothing is also present 
through smaller coefficients on inflation and output gap. Reasons for central bank 
interest rate smoothing include: data and model uncertainty, errors associated with 
the measurement of key macroeconomic variables (Sack and Weiland, 2000; and 
Clarida et al., 1999) to achieve leverage over long term interest rates24 (Rotemberg 
and Woodford, 1997; Goodfriend, 1991); and to avoid financial market disruption 
(Goodfriend, 1991). 
Rudebusch (1995), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), and 
Bleaney and Lisenda (2001) for US, UK, Germany, and Botswana, all have empirical 
estimates that strongly support the phenomenon of interest rate smoothing. These 
papers found inertial coefficients between 0.7 and 0.95. Analysing the direction of 
interest rate changes, the studies showed that central bank interest rate changes were 
more likely to be followed by another change in the same direction than by a change 
in the opposite direction. Rudebusch (1995), however, qualified this for the USA. He 
observed that the hazard rate for another change in the same sign fell as the length of 
time since the last change increased. 
The Exchange Rate 
Exchange rate is an important variable in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Taylor’s exclusion of an exchange rate variable in his rule appears justified for the 
large and comparatively closed economy it was designed for. However, this 
exclusion may not necessarily be appropriate for small open economies, the reason 
being the acknowledged importance of the variable in the monetary transmission 
mechanism of such economies (e.g. Lewis and Mizen, 2000). 
Explaining exchange rate response as an information variable for future inflation on 
the one hand and directly targeting the exchange rate on the other, Clarida (2001) 
argues that both require the policy maker to raise interest rates in response to a 
depreciating currency. That is, even if a country does not target the exchange rate 
                                                
24
 It is argued that the dependence of the current interest rate on the lagged interest rate permits the 
central bank to manipulate long-term interest rates and hence aggregate demand with more modest 
movements in short-term interest rates than would otherwise be required. 
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directly, the monetary authority’s desire to stabilise inflation forecasts should lead it 
to raise nominal and real interest rates when a currency is weakening and lower the 
same when a currency is strengthening. Similarly, Lewis and Mizen (2000) argue 
that the indirect effect of the exchange rate for inflation must be considered in some 
form in designing interest rate rules. 
Ball (1999b) proposes a modification to the Taylor rule to do just that. He replaces 
the interest rate instrument with the weighted average of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate and secondly includes lagged exchange rate as an additional right hand 
side variable. This modification of the Taylor rule is referred to in the literature as 
the monetary conditions index (MCI). The MCI effect is argued by Taylor (1999a, 
1999c) to be equally achieved by adding the current and lagged exchange rate to the 
right hand side of the Taylor rule that has the interest rate as the instrument. Ball 
(1999b) finds support for the MCI: holding inflation variability constant, output 
variability is reduced by about 17 per cent relative to the simple Taylor rule. Guender 
(2001), however, is an example of research that does not find support for the MCI. 
Some empirical estimates of Taylor-type rules that have investigated the importance 
of the exchange rate include Bleaney and Lisenda (2001), Clarida et al. (1998), and 
Schächter and Stokman (1995). Bleaney and Lisenda (2001), using Botswana data, 
find the exchange rate (measured as the deviation of the log of the real rand-pula 
exchange rate from trend wrongly-signed and insignificant. Extending their baseline 
policy reaction function for the Bundesbank by the real DM/US dollar exchange rate, 
Clarida et al. (1998) find the exchange rate correctly-signed and significant, but with 
a minute coefficient (0.05) while the coefficients on the baseline variable remain 
unchanged. Additionally, Clarida et al. (1998)’s estimate of an analogous 
specification for Japan similarly finds the real yen/US dollar exchange rate to be 
correctly-signed, significant, and of a small quantitative effect (0.09). 
Schächter and Stokman (1995) find the nominal DM/US dollar exchange rate 
insignificant in their estimated reaction function for the country in contrast to the 
finding for Germany in Clarida et al. (1998). However, the authors argue that their 
finding could be due to the inclusion of the US short-term interest rate in the 
regression: a variable that is highly correlated with the exchange rate. Dennis (2003) 
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also finds that the optimal policy rule for the Australian economy includes the real 
exchange rate. 
Fiscal Policy 
Economists have argued that an economy’s monetary authority cannot prevent 
inflation by its control of base money creation if faced with an uncooperative fiscal 
authority that generates a continuum of primary deficits e.g. Sargent and Wallace 
(1981). Assuming the fiscal authority is the dominant party, Sargent and Wallace 
deduced that even a determined central banker would be forced to create a monetary 
base along the path that is inflationary when a non-inflationary path is intended. 
Despite challenging arguments e.g. McCallum (1999a), there is now the appreciation 
that there is hardly hope of establishing a credible monetary policy if fiscal policy is 
out of control in the sense of an exploding debt/GDP ratio (Allsopp, 2002). Similarly, 
Taylor (1996) argues that the theoretical literature is clear that greater fiscal 
discipline which reduces government debt and lowers deficits should be associated 
with lower inflation. Further, Lønning (1997) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) 
indicate that a stabilising fiscal policy is needed for an attempt at disinflation through 
strict monetary policy. These arguments seem to suggest that it is necessary, or at 
least desirable, for the monetary authority to take account of fiscal behaviour when 
designing its monetary rule. Empirical estimates of Taylor-type rules, however, do 
not show much extension by a fiscal variable. Schächter and Stokman (1995), who 
estimate such an extension, found the Bundesbank to have responded insignificantly 
to the fiscal stance of the federal governement. 
Stock Prices 
There have been arguments to suggest that the central bank, at least, observes 
movements in stock prices because of their potential impact on the macroeconomy 
(e.g. Rigobon and Sack, 2003). Bernanke and Gertler (2000) contribute to this 
argument with a suggestion that the central bank should respond to movements in 
stock prices only to the extent that they affect expected inflation. However, others 
(e.g. Cecchetti et. al., 2000) have advocated a more direct response, where monetary 
policy corrects any perceived misalignment in asset prices to reduce the likelihood of 
asset price bubbles. This direct reaction to stock prices is questioned by Mishkin and 
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Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) on the grounds of the doubtful presumption that the central 
bank is better placed to know the appropriate asset values compared with the private 
market. But the argument for stock prices as an information variable in the policy 
rule can be analysed from a broader perspective. This has to do with the index 
underlying the compilation of inflation itself. Bofinger (2001, based on Edey 1994 
p.122) argues that from a theoretical perspective, it is preferable to measure price 
stability using an index that is representative of all monetary transactions. This 
argument seems to suggest that the central bank should at least consider trends in the 
share price when setting interest rates. 
Inflation targeting  
Inflation targeting25 is defined in some parts of the literature as a monetary policy 
rule (e.g. Bolinger, 2001). Others disagree (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999) and argue it is 
not a rule. Bernanke et al. (1999) explain that as inflation targeting does not provide 
simple mechanical operating instructions to the central bank, but requires the central 
bank to use structural and judgmental models of the economy in addition to whatever 
information it deems relevant to pursue its price stability objective, it is not a rule. 
Inflation-targeters also put some weight on other important macroeconomic 
objectives, thus, are not “inflation nutters” in the language of King (1997). The most 
visible other objective is stabilising the output gap. However, the constrained 
discretion of the inflation targeting framework does not lead to the problem of 
inflation bias, as inflation targeting central banks do not normally have output targets 
that exceed potential output (Svensson, 2002). 
Whether inflation targeting is a rule or framework, relative to the standard-type rules, 
the three strongest arguments for inflation targeting put forward in the literature are 
                                                
25
 Inflation–targeting was first introduced in New Zealand in 1990, spreading quickly to Canada in 
1991, the UK in 1992, Sweden, Finland, Australia in 1993, and Spain in 1994. Finland and Spain 
stopped using inflation-targeting in 1999 when they relinquished monetary policy with the adoption of 
the euro. Amongst emerging market economies, the earliest adopter of inflation targeting is Chile in 
1990, with inflation in excess of 20% (Mishkin, 2000). South Africa adopted the framework in 2000. 
The regimes were introduced as a way of reducing inflation from previous high levels after 
disappointing monetary targeting (e.g. New Zealand and Canada) or as a way of providing a new 
nominal anchor after having been forced off a fixed exchange rate (e.g.  UK, Sweden, and Finland). 
The inflation targets are usually set within a 2-3 percentage point band, reflecting the imprecision of 
monetary control of inflation, while giving the authorities a well-defined goal. Some countries have 
gone for point estimates e.g. the UK with 2.5% for Retail Price Index (RPI) and 2% for Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).  
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that it (i) explicitly acknowledges that low and stable inflation is monetary policy’s 
primary goal and publicly announces explicit quantitative inflation targets that are to 
be achieved over some time horizon, (ii) provides monetary policy with a clear and 
easily understood nominal anchor, (iii) relative to simple Taylor-type rules that 
respond to a small subset of information about the economy and call for judgment as 
and when required, inflation targeting uses comprehensive information to forecast 
inflation and output before interest rate decisions are made. Other positive features of 
inflation targeting are its high degrees of transparency and accountability. (Bernanke 
et al., 1999; Svensson, 1997, 1999, 2002). 
In an attempt at formalising the idea that in practice inflation targeting central banks 
aim to stabilise inflation around some targets and put some weight on stabilising 
output relative to potential, Batini and Haldane (1999) extend the Taylor rule to 
include forward-looking dimensions that mimic monetary policy behaviour among 
inflation targeting central banks. The specified rule is: 
 
rt =γrt-1 +(1- γ)r *+ϑ (EtПt+j -  П*)                                (4.6) 
 
where rt ≡ it - EtПt+1 is the short-term ex-ante real rate of interest, it is the nominal 
interest rate, r *t is the equilibrium real interest rate, E the mathematical expectations 
operator, and П* is the inflation target. According to this rule, the monetary 
authorities control nominal interest rates so as to hit a path for the short-term real 
interest rate (rt) and by implication the path of those variables that would affect the 
attainment of the final inflation objective. As such, deviations of expected inflation 
from target elicit remedial policy actions: the authority’s policy choice variables 
being the parameter triplet {j, ϑ , γ}.The parameter γ reflects the degree of interest 
rate smoothing; the parameter ϑ is a feedback parameter, with higher values 
reflecting a more aggressive policy response for a given deviation of the inflation 
forecast from its target. Finally, j is the targeting horizon of the central bank when 
forming its forecast. Batini and Haldane (1999) argue that the size of these three 
parameters together determine the speed with which inflation is brought back to 
target following inflationary disturbances. Because they influence inflationary 
transition paths, these policy parameters affect the dynamics of output. Specifically, 
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the targeting horizon, j, and the feedback parameter,ϑ , principally help secure a 
degree of output smoothing. Thus, the parameters can be chosen to ensure that an 
inflation-forecast based rule better reflects the authority’s preferences where they 
care about output as well as inflation. This makes inflation forecast targeting and 
forward-looking Taylor rules closely related concepts. 
Some estimates of forward-looking Taylor rules (which include interest rate 
smoothing) e.g. Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) and Nelson (2000) have been found to 
conform to a priori notions of monetary policy conduct in the countries investigated. 
Nelson (2000), using UK data, estimates a near-zero nominal interest rate response to 
inflation for the period of relaxed monetary policy (1972-76) while for the period of 
astute conduct of policy (1992-97), as expected, an inflation coefficient above unity 
is found together with a coefficient on output of 0.5. Clarida et al.(1998)’s estimation 
for Germany, Japan, USA, UK, and Italy also find inflation coefficients that are 
largely in excess of unity while the coefficients on output gap, although positive, are 
lower than the 0.5 assumed in the Taylor rule. 
Clarida et al. (1998) augment the forward-looking Taylor rule with lagged inflation. 
They find this variable to be insignificant, while the coefficients on the forward-
looking term are largely unchanged. This finding, they suggest, signifies the need to 
reject backward-looking Taylor rule specifications in favour of forward-looking ones. 
However, the finding could be due to multicollinearity problems as it includes both 
lagged and forward-looking inflation terms. 
Simple rules against complex model-specific rules 
Levin et al. (1999) explain that even with the incorporation of all state variables, 
complex rules perform only slightly better than simple ones and the optimality of the 
complex rule is due to the rule exploiting model-specific properties. Thus, when the 
optimal rule is simulated in another model, the properties of the new model, likely to 
be different, may cause the optimal rule to work poorly. The likely superiority of 
simple rules over complex model-specific rules has been the subject of many 
robustness studies. These studies find that simple rules of the general Taylor-type are 
superior: they perform nearly as well as complex optimal rules and are more robust 
across models. 
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4.1.6 Summary  
Analysis of strategic behaviour provides the principal economic argument for policy 
rules or frameworks. It is proposed that the less dominant player in a game has much 
to gain from the pre-commitment of the more dominant. In the absence of such 
commitment, the dominant player may not credibly take a later course of action that 
will not be in his interest when the time comes to take that action. 
Economists such as  Kydland and Prescott (1977) and later Barro and Gordon (1983) 
and others applied this principle to monetary policy, assuming that it is feasible to 
exploit the short-term inflation output trade-off by creating some inflation with the 
view to raising output. Such analysis found that attempted monetary surprises would 
lead to higher expected and actual inflation with no gain in output. However, by 
committing in advance not to create inflation, the policy maker can lower expected 
and actual inflation. Building on the benefits of pre-commitment the time 
inconsistency literature advances, Taylor (1993) proposed a simple monetary policy 
rule, that when followed could eliminate this problem. The Taylor rule, when applied 
to industrialised country data, was found to be an adequate description of monetary 
policy during periods when inflation control was the primary objective of policy. The 
rule has subsequently been subjected to substantial research to investigate the 
benefits of various modifications to it. What can be deemed the representative 
finding is that non-model-specific simple rules, responding to few variables, produce 
superior results compared with complex model-specific rules. 
This thesis extends the Taylor rule to Ghana where inflation control is now the 
primary objective of monetary policy. It uses simple rules to assess the effectiveness 
of monetary policy conduct following the financial sector adjustment programme 
initiated in 1988 by investigating inflation targeting in the strictest sense, by the 
baseline variables (inflation and output gap) and finally by broader information set. 
Following this section, is a review of the empirical literature on the responsiveness of 
commercial bank retail interest rates to changes in the policy interest rate: the first 
phase of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the real economy.  
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4.2 Responsiveness of Commercial Bank Interest Rates to the Policy 
Interest Rate 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
The use of the policy interest rate to influence commercial bank retail interest rates 
and, in turn, the spending behaviour of economic agents is the central tenet in the 
conduct of monetary policy. In this regard, an implicit assumption is that a change in 
the policy interest rate would lead retail banks to reflect immediately the magnitude 
of change in their interest rates, particularly in their lending rates. However, this 
assumption may not necessarily hold. Retail banks could react speedily or sluggishly 
to changes in policy interest rates; and international evidence from the empirical 
literature suggests some sluggishness in the response of commercial bank interest 
rates to changes in central bank policy interest and/or money market rates in the short 
run. In the long run, however, the studies find higher pass-through. Examples of the 
empirical literature in this area include: Hannan and Berger (1991), Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995), Mester and Saunders (1995), Heffernan 
(1996), Scholnick (1996), Sander and Kleimeier (2002), Mojon (2000), Greenidge 
and McClean (2000), Donnay and Degryse (2001), De Bondt (2002), and Burgstaller 
(2003). The literature largely uses monthly data, and estimation is predominantly by 
single-equation cointegration and error correction modelling, but sometimes by 
estimating a vector autoregression (VAR). What follows this introduction is an 
elaboration of the cited literature. Unless otherwise indicated, the estimation method 
adopted is single equation cointegration and error correction modelling. 
 
4.2.2 The Empirical Literature 
Using monthly data for 31 developed and developing countries, Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994) estimate a distributed lag model. They provide one of the first 
comprehensive empirical studies on policy interest rate pass-through to retail bank 
lending: 
 
it= δ + Σmj=1βj it-j + Σnk=0 αkmt-k + Σpl=0 γt ∆MPRt  (4.7) 
 
where i represents the retail bank lending rate, m is the money market interest rate, 
and MPR, the monetary policy interest rate. 
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They find important differences in the impact coefficients across countries. While the 
impact multiplier is fairly high for some countries, it is low, even zero in others. 
Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, and the UK showed the highest pass-through, of 
more than 50 per cent, while Belgium, Finland, and Italy showed the least pass-
through. The study also finds differences in the pass-through amongst countries 
persisting six months after changes in the money market rate. The long-run 
coefficients, however, tended to one for most countries. Next, the authors sought to 
explain cross-country differences. They did this by correlating the different 
coefficients with explanatory variables that could explain the differences. Their main 
finding was that the impact coefficient is highly correlated with the structure of the 
financial sector, particularly: the state of development of the sector, the extent of 
competition, constraints on capital movements, and the ownership structure of banks. 
Specifically, the authors find that the lending rate is more flexible when barriers to 
entry to the banking industry are low, the share of private ownership in the banking 
system is high, there are no constraints to international capital movement, and 
markets for negotiable short-term instruments exist. The research also finds that 
movements in the administered monetary policy rate speed up adjustments in lending 
rates; i.e. the stickiness of commercial bank interest rates is reduced by movements 
in the policy interest rate. 
 
Investigating the relationship between short-term commercial bank lending rates and 
the policy and money market interest rates in twelve industrial countries26 over the 
period 1984 to mid-1994, Borio and Fritz (1995) find that policy interest rates are 
significant determinants of commercial bank lending rates in the short and long run 
for ten of the twelve countries. For the remaining two countries (Sweden and the 
USA), the money market rate is the more significant rate. The research also finds that 
by the end of three months, the lending rate responded fully to the change in the 
policy interest rate in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and the UK, with the full 
adjustment observed in the first month for the Netherlands and the UK. For Australia 
and the USA, the pass-through is found to be between 70 and 80 per cent in the first 
quarter. For Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, on the other hand, 
the adjustment is slower, ranging between 20 and 70 per cent within the first quarter. 
                                                
26
 These countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. 
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In the long run, however, the authors find that the pass-through is homogenous and 
closer to one (the coefficient ranging between 0.8 and 1.1). 
 
Sander and Kleimeier (2002), similarly, study the transmission of central banks 
policy innovations to commercial bank leading rates27 using data on twelve European 
countries. The authors find interest rates in nine of the twelve countries to be 
cointegrated, confirming the existence of the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
in these countries. Of the nine countries, the authors find five adjust their lending 
rates symmetrically and four asymmetrically. Three of the symmetric adjusting 
countries (Finland, Italy, and Spain) are found to have infinitely long adjustment 
periods, whilst the remaining two (the UK and Portugal) have six to eight months 
adjustment period. The countries with asymmetric adjustment (Belgium, Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands), were all found to adjust interest rates faster when 
rates were above the equilibrium level. 
 
Mojon (2000), in the line with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995), 
Sander and Kleimeier (2002), find differences in pass-through amongst for six 
European countries over the period 1979-98; with the policy interest rate measured 
by the money market rate28. He estimates the average pass-through three months 
after a monetary shock to be 0.35 for Belgium, 0.61 for Germany, 0.15 for Spain, 
0.83 for France, 0.67 for Italy, and 0.77 for the Netherlands. Over the sub-period 
1992-98, however, the pass-through showed increased convergence to 0.55, 0.54, 
0.22, 0.42, 0.58, and 0.86 respectively. Mojon attributes the convergence to increased 
integration (single monetary policy, money market integration, and development of 
debt market securities). Mojon also observes that for both deposit and lending rates, 
the pass–through is negatively affected by volatility in money market rates but 
positively affected by competition in the financial sector. Donnay and Degryse 
(2001), similarly, estimate the pass-through from the money market rate (as a proxy 
for policy interest rates) to the bank lending rates for twelve European countries, 
using both bivariate and multivariate VAR estimation. The multivariate analysis 
performed for seven countries involved including the pass-through established from 
                                                
27
 The twelve countries studied are: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. 
28
 The six countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
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the bivariate analysis in a larger system, to simulate the intermediation role of banks 
in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. The research finds 
Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy having the highest pass-through. 
In contrast, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal had the least pass-through. From the 
simulation, the authors find that the role of the banking sector in the real economy 
reflects the magnitudes of pass-through found from the bivariate analysis. 
 
Using error correction and VAR models, De Bondt (2002) examines the pass-
through from market to retail bank interest rates (deposit and lending rates) in the 
euro area. Four main findings, which follow those of the previously reviewed 
research, emerge from the study. First, is the existence of cointegration between 
retail bank and market interest rates. Second, the lack of complete pass-through of 
market interest rates to retail bank interest rates in the short run: the highest pass-
through in a month being 50 per cent. Third, is a higher pass-through in the long-run 
with the pass-through to lending rates reaching 100 per cent. Fourth, is a faster 
interest rate pass-through since the introduction of the euro. 
 
There are also country-specific studies of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995) explore the 
transmission of the policy interest rate to a group of 63 banks operating in locally 
different financial environments in Italy. The authors work with monthly data, and 
find that high bank interest rate stickiness is explained by constraints to competition 
in the banking and financial system. In accordance with this, the authors find that the 
financial liberalisation process of the early 1990s led to a reduction in interest rate 
stickiness and to a faster transmission of monetary policy; further, banks that operate 
in markets that are more competitive tend to translate movements in money market 
rates to lending rates faster. 
 
Mester and Saunders (1995) study prime rate changes in the USA using weekly data 
from May 1977 to December 1978. Assuming that banks would change the prime 
rate when desirable29, with a log-likelihood model where the probability of prime 
                                                
29
 Desirability is defined here to be the situation where the optimal prime rate so differs from the 
existing rate that revenues accruing from the change exceed the costs of the change. 
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rate change is a function of adjustment costs and exogenous variables30, they find 
that adjustment costs have a significant negative effect on the probability of a rate 
change. Also, the authors find that changes in the exogenous variable trigger a 
significantly larger probability of a prime rate increase than a decrease. 
 
Heffernan (1996) also considers the dynamics of UK retail deposit and loan rate 
responses to changes in the bank’s base rate, for four banking products from several 
banks and building societies over 1986-93. Across all banks and products, the study 
finds that the percentage error correction within a month of the base rate change is 
36.48 per cent. The corresponding product error correction averages are: personal 
loans, 29.8%; chequeing, 37.3%; saving, 38.1%; and mortgage accounts, 40.8%. The 
study also finds that with the exception of mortgages, there are wide variations in the 
percentage error correction within a product category by individual banks and 
building societies. On the long-run coefficient, the research finds them significantly 
less than unity for chequeing, savings, and personal loans accounts for both banks 
and building societies. For mortgage accounts, on the other hand, it is unity. 
 
Using single equation cointegration and VAR techniques over 1995-2000, 
Burgstaller (2003) studies the transmission of the policy interest rate to bank lending 
rates in Austria. He finds sluggishness and asymmetry in the lending rate response to 
changes in the policy rate. The maximum instantaneous lending rate adjustment to 
increases in the policy is found to be 32 per cent, and after three months 62 per cent. 
Following a reduction on the other hand, the accumulated lending-rate adjustment 
after three months is comparatively lower. With the establishment of EMU, however, 
the author finds a decline in asymmetry, i.e. lending rates fell faster following 
decreases in the policy rate but rose slower with rising policy rates. 
 
Greenidge and McClean (2000) and Scholnick (1996) extend this literature to 
developing countries. Greenidge and McClean (2000) study the impact of regulatory 
measures on commercial bank interest rates in Barbados. A 13-equation system 
including five policy variables is estimated iteratively using a seemingly unrelated 
regression procedure. The data set consists of monthly observations from six 
                                                
30
 The exogenous variables considered are cost of funds, inflation, loan demand, and size of the last 
prime rate change. 
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commercial banks from 1976-1996. A key finding is the unresponsiveness of 
commercial bank loan rates to the central bank policy interest rate. The authors 
attribute this result to the minimal patronage of the central bank’s rediscount window, 
making the central bank interest rate “inconsequential” to the banks. 
 
Using Singapore and Malaysian data, Scholnick (1996) examines whether there are 
long-run relationships and asymmetries in the retail interest rate response to 
increasing and decreasing policy interest rates. Scholnick finds that retail and policy 
interest rates in Malaysia and Singapore have a long-run relationship, and deposit 
rates exhibit asymmetry - they are more rigid when they are below their equilibrium 
than when they are above it. Furthermore, Scholnick finds that, though administered, 
Malaysian lending rates exhibit asymmetry. The authorities tend to keep the rate 
above its equilibrium in the short run, and adjust it more when below equilibrium. 
 
Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003), in their study of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Thailand, examine the degree of pass-through from money market 
rates to retail rates, attempt to quantify the lags associated with monetary policy 
shocks, and investigate the channels through which these shocks are propagated. The 
empirical results point to a transmission mechanism in which investment is 
particularly sensitive to monetary shocks and banks act as an important conduit for 
monetary policy to real activity. They also suggest, however, that problems in the 
corporate and banking sectors may have undermined the monetary transmission 
mechanism over the last few years. 
 
Also Sander and Kleimeier (2006) investigate the interest rate pass-through in the 
four Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of the South African Customs Union 
(SACU). They employ an empirical pass-through model that allows for thresholds, 
asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes. They show that CMA bank lending 
markets exhibit quite some degree of homogenisation as the pass-through is often 
fast and complete. Deposit markets are somewhat more heterogeneous, showing 
differing degrees of interest rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment. Policy-
makers should therefore be concerned about imperfect competition which may be at 
the heart of the remaining cross-country differences in monetary transmission in the 
CMA. 
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4.2.3 Summary  
Economic theory holds that monetary policy should have its strongest effect on 
short-term commercial bank interest rates, particularly the lending rate. In fact the 
use of the policy interest rate to influence commercial bank retail interest rates and, 
in turn, the spending behaviour of economic agents is the central tenet in the conduct 
of monetary policy. The empirical literature has sought to investigate the 
responsiveness of commercial bank lending rates to changes in the policy interest 
rate and has found a sluggish response. However in the long run, for many countries, 
there is full or near-full transmission of policy interest rate changes to the lending 
rate.  
 
The literature largely uses monthly data, and estimation is predominantly by single-
equation cointegration and error correction modelling but sometimes by estimating a 
vector autoregression (VAR). 
 
Following empirical literature, this thesis analyses monetary policy effectiveness, 
measured by the responsiveness of commercial bank savings rate changes to policy 
interest rate. It uses monthly data and employs three techniques – graphical analysis, 
the PSS modified single equation cointegration and error correction method, and 
bivariate VAR/VECM model. 
 
The survey of the empirical literature also revealed the limited extension of such 
analysis to developing-country data. Thus, the estimations in Chapter 6 of the 
responsiveness of the commercial bank retail interest rate to changes in the policy 
interest rate in Ghana will broaden this literature. Following this section, the theory 
and literature on the monetary transmission mechanism is examined. 
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4.3 The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section considers some of the theory and empirical evidence on the fuller 
transmission of monetary policy, following a presentation of empirical evidence on 
the responsiveness of commercial bank retail interest rates to changes in monetary 
policy - the initial phase of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
4.3.2 The Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission 
Central banks use their leverage over short-term interest rates to influence the cost of 
capital and consequently spending, aggregate output, and employment, according to 
conventional textbook views on how monetary policy works. The mechanics of this 
channel are that a contraction of monetary policy raises short-term nominal interest 
rates and then, given stickiness in prices and rational expectations, the real long-term 
interest rate increases, at least for a while. Higher real interest rates lead to a fall in 
investment and spending on consumer durable goods, and hence in output.  
 
The traditional approach, “the money view”, is based on the Keynesian IS-LM model. 
According to this view, monetary policy affects the real economy through changes in 
interest rates. This essentially works through the liability side of the banking sector’s 
balance sheet. This is because, according to the view, there are only two financial 
assets, money and bonds, where the latter represents the whole capital market. 
Moreover, the assumption of perfect financial markets means that there is no place 
for financial intermediaries. Since banks do not play any essential role, the only 
relevant transmission variable is the capital market interest rate. The basic 
mechanism is that a monetary tightening will lead to excess demand for money 
balances, inducing action to substitute money for bonds, which in turn bids up 
nominal capital market interest rates. Subsequently, these translate into increases in 
real interest rates, because of the assumption of imperfect price adjustments. The 
increase in the cost of capital in turn discourages investment and consumption. 
Schematically, 
 
↓⇒↓⇒↑⇒↓ YIiM  
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Where ( ↓M ) indicates monetary tightening leading to a rise in real interest rates 
( ↑i ), which in turn raises the cost of capital and thus discourages both business and 
consumer spending, causing a decline in investment ( ↓I ), thereby leading to a 
decline in aggregate demand and a fall in output (Taylor, 1995; Mishkin, 1995). 
Since the interest rate is the only transmission variable, this channel is labelled the 
interest rate channel. 
 
In the Ghanaian context, changes in the central bank’s prime rate influence the 
interest rates of domestic commercial banks, which adjust their retail rates but not 
necessarily by the same amount. According to economic theory, it is generally 
expected that a change in the discount rate would lead to a change in retail rates of 
commercial banks almost instantaneously and lead further to a change in the overall 
liquidity position within the financial system.  
 
As liquidity within the financial markets is drained by a decrease in the prime rate 
followed by market interest rates, firms and individuals respond by changing their 
spending and investment behaviour, which eventually affects inflation. This would 
suggest that commercial banks or financial intermediaries play only a passive role, 
responding to the demand for credit resulting from the changes in interest rates. 
 
In countries with relatively high inflation such as Ghana, the interest rate channel is 
weakened by the volatility of inflation. In other words, when inflation is high, a tight 
monetary policy does not necessarily imply a high real interest rate, since the 
volatility premium would be equally high. Accordingly if the inflation rate were low, 
implying less volatility, this would enhance the objective of the interest rate channel 
as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
  
The increased interdependence of world economies and advances in financial 
technology have broadened the menu of financial market prices through which 
monetary impulses are propagated through the economy. These other asset prices 
include the exchange rate, real-estate and equity prices. The representation of the 
monetary transmission mechanism is the traditional Keynesian paradigm for 
analysing monetary policy effects on the economy. A key feature of this channel and 
also the primary source of criticism is its focus on one relative price, the interest rate 
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-   the issue being what the right interest rate is for investments (e.g. Eichenbaum, 
1994). Thus, rather than focus on one interest rate, monetarists have argued, it is 
better to look at how monetary policy affects the universe of relative asset prices and 
wealth. Although they do not commit to specific transmission mechanisms because 
they see the mechanism as changing over the business cycle, monetarists emphasise 
two channels: Tobin’s q theory of investments and wealth effects of consumption 
(Mishkin, 1995). 
 
Tobin’s q theory provides a mechanism through which monetary policy affects the 
economy through changes in equity value. Under Tobin’s q theory, monetary policy 
affects the economy through its effects on the valuation of equities. If q, defined as 
the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital, is high, the 
value of the firm is high compared to the replacement cost of capital, implying that 
new plant and capital equipment is cheap relative to the market value of business 
firms. Firms will issue equity and get a high price for it relative to the cost of the 
plant and equipment they are buying. Firms will therefore buy a lot of new 
investment goods with a small issue of equity. A monetary tightening would lower 
the price of equity by reducing the amount of money in public hands. Monetarists 
argue that when money supply falls, economic agents respond by reducing spending, 
including in the stock market. If demand for equities falls, their price relative to the 
replacement cost of capital reduces. This lowers the q, investment spending, and 
output. Thus, lower equity prices ( ↓eP ) will lead to a fall in q ( ↓q ), which will in 
turn lower investment spending ( ↓I ) and output. Schematically; 
 
↓⇒↓⇒↓⇒↓⇒↓ YIqPM e  
 
Mishkin (1995) argues that the traditional Keynesian interest rate channel leads to 
similar conclusions because the higher interest rates that come from a contractionary 
monetary policy makes bonds more attractive relative to equities, and lowers equity 
prices and hence investment and output. Thus, the argument is that even if bank loan 
rates react little to policy tightening, monetary policy can still affect Tobin’s q and 
hence investment spending. 
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Closely related to Tobin’s q is the wealth effect on consumption, advocated by 
Modigliani (1971). Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis states that consumption is 
determined by the life-time resources of consumers; and an important component of 
consumers’ life-time resources is their financial wealth, a major component of which 
is stocks. The consumption-wealth channel of monetary policy emanating from this 
hypothesis is that a contractionary monetary policy lowers stock prices, reduces 
household wealth and consumer spending and then output. 
 
When monetary policy is relaxed, agents have more disposable income for spending. 
One possible place to spend this money is stock markets. Higher spending in stock 
markets leads to a rise in stock prices. The ultimate effect would be increased wealth 
of households through increase property and equity prices and therefore an 
improvement in the lifetime resources and eventually consumption. 
 
Metzler (1995) argued that the asset price effect extends beyond those operating 
through interest rates, exchange rates and equity prices. He cited an example of the 
Japanese experience in the 1980s where monetary policy had an important impact on 
the economy through its impact on land and property values. This can be illustrated 
by the fact that monetary policy tightening can lead to a decline in land and property 
values, which in turn leads to a decline in household wealth and thus a decline in 
consumption and aggregate output. 
 
A second criticism of the traditional interest rate channel is the difficulty in 
identifying statistically significant effects of interest rates through the cost of capital 
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This has led to the propagation of another channel 
of monetary policy transmission that is distinguished by its emphasis on the role of 
credit. Advocates of this channel attribute its strengths to agency problems in the 
credit market.  
 
In contrast with the money view, the credit view assumes that capital markets are 
imperfect and segmented. It emphasises asymmetric information as the main cause of 
credit market imperfections. Moreover, while the money view focuses on the 
aggregate level, the credit view allows for the distributional consequences of 
monetary policy to be assessed. This view highlights heterogeneity among borrowers 
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and stresses that it may be more difficult or expensive for some borrowers to obtain 
external funds than others. For example, households and small firms cannot readily 
obtain funds from capital markets and thus have to rely on intermediated loans and 
internal finance. Therefore, unlike the money view, the credit view admits the role of 
financial intermediaries (banks). 
 
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), imperfect information or costly 
enforcement of contracts may interfere with the smooth functioning of financial 
markets, thereby creating a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally 
(borrowed) and the opportunity cost of internal funds. They argue that this wedge, 
which they call the external finance premium, is a reflection of the deadweight loss 
associated with the principal-agent problem that normally exists between borrowers 
and lenders. This view stresses that monetary policy changes that disrupt the flow of 
bank credit will affect the external finance premium and thus potentially have non-
negligible real effects. The size of an external finance premium reflects 
imperfections in credit markets that drive a wedge between the expected return 
received by lenders and the costs faced by potential borrowers. Monetary policy, 
which alters the interest rate, tends to affect the external finance premium in the same 
direction. Thus, the direct effects of monetary policy on the interest rate are 
amplified by changes in the external finance premium. This complementary 
movement in the external finance premium may help explain the strength, timing and 
composition of the monetary policy effects better than reference to interest rates 
alone. 
 
The credit channel is usually described as working through two main routes: bank 
lending and the balance sheet. The bank lending channel follows directly from the 
fact that banks have a specific function as financial intermediaries. This is because 
banks can specialise in acquiring information about default risks and can thus easily 
distinguish between good and bad borrowers. They can therefore devise non-price 
mechanisms, such as credit rationing to screen out untrustworthy borrowers (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, banks are considered to be particularly well-suited to 
dealing with certain types of borrowers, especially small firms and individual 
households who, because of the problems of asymmetric information, cannot easily 
access non-bank forms of credit. An important implication of this is that any kind of 
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disruption in the flow of credit potentially has real effects. For instance, if banks 
cannot substitute deposits with other sources of funds, then a contractionary 
monetary policy that decreases bank reserves and bank deposits (D) is likely to 
reduce the quantity of loans (L) that banks can supply. Thus a monetary policy that 
operates through a bank lending channel can be represented as: 
 
↓⇒↓⇒↓⇒↓⇒↓ YILDM  
 
The question though is whether monetary policy can significantly affect the supply 
(or relative pricing) of loans. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) develop a model that 
suggests open market sales by the central bank can drain reserves and hence deposits 
from the banking system and in that way limit the supply of bank loans, by reducing 
banks’ access to loanable funds. According to their model, there are three necessary 
conditions that must hold for the lending channel of monetary policy transmission to 
work: 
• Commercial bank loans are important and nearly the only sources of funds 
for companies, and bonds and loans must be imperfect substitutes. In this way 
firms would be unable to offset the decline in the supply of loans by 
borrowing directly from the market. 
• The Central Bank must be able to play the role of a lender of last resort by 
being able to influence the liquidity of financial intermediaries/commercial 
banks (Kashyap et al 1993, 1994) and Cecchetti (1995). 
• There should be some price rigidities (slow adjustment of prices but not full) 
so that monetary policy actions are not neutral. If prices adjust smoothly, this 
will mean that changes in nominal reserves will be followed by changes in 
prices of the same magnitude which will leave bank balances and company 
balance sheets unchanged and ultimately monetary policy will have no real 
effects. 
 
However, as Bernanke and Blinder (1992) point out, this depends on the institutional 
setting in the financial sector. The assumption of the Bernanke-Blinder model, that 
banks cannot easily replace lost deposits with other sources of funds, might not be 
valid because banks can issue certificates of deposit (CDs) or new equity (Romer and 
Romer, 1990). However, the proponents of the bank lending channel argue that its 
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existence does not require banks to be totally incapable of replacing lost deposits 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). As long as banks do not face perfectly elastic demand 
for open market securities, an increased reliance on the securities would increase 
banks’ relative cost of funds. This would shift the supply of loans inward, thereby 
squeezing out bank-dependent borrowers. 
 
The importance of the bank lending channel of monetary policy has, however, been 
questioned. Edwards and Mishkin (1995), for example, argue that with the financial 
innovations of recent decades, banks play a less important role in the credit market 
than they did in earlier decades. 
 
The theoretical proposition of the balance sheet channel is that the external finance 
premium facing a borrower should depend on the borrower’s financial position or net 
worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Firms with higher net worth, which can be 
derived from their balance sheets, are likely to face a lower external finance premium. 
Since borrowers' financial positions affect the external finance premium and thus the 
overall terms of credit that they face, fluctuations in the quality of borrowers' balance 
sheets similarly should affect their investment and spending decisions. 
 
A balance sheet channel of monetary policy arises because a monetary tightening 
will not only affect the interest rate, but will also lower the net worth of borrowers. A 
tight monetary policy therefore directly weakens borrowers' balance sheets in at least 
two ways. First, rising interest rates directly increase interest expenses, reducing net 
cash flows and weakening the borrower's financial position. Second, rising interest 
rates are also typically associated with declining asset prices, which among other 
things shrink the value of the borrower's collateral. The indirect effect of tight 
monetary policy on net cash flows and collateral values is a deterioration in 
consumer expenditure. The firm's revenues will decline while its various fixed or 
quasi-fixed costs do not adjust in the short run. The financing gap, therefore, erodes 
the firm's net worth and creditworthiness over time. Lower net worth implies that 
borrowers, in effect, have less collateral for their loans and are therefore of higher 
risk. This raises the adverse selection problem as banks cannot distinguish 
borrowers’ risk types. Lower net worth of firms may also increase the moral hazard 
problem because it means that owners’ equity stakes in businesses fall and thus give 
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them more incentive to engage in risky investment projects. In response to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, banks may reduce the amount of loans 
extended. Thus in addition to a cost effect due to the increased interest rate, the 
availability of funds may be reduced, thus leading to a decline in investment and 
ultimately output. Schematically: 
 
↓⇒↓⇒↓⇒↑↑⇒↓⇒↓ YIlendinghazardmoralselectionadversePM e &  
 
Similarly, a monetary tightening that raises interest rates may weaken firms’ balance 
sheets by raising interest expenses on their outstanding short-term debt, thus 
reducing their cash flows. A fall in cash flows implies a decline in net worth. The 
transmission schema is similar to the one above. 
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) find that the effect of a cash flow squeeze on 
economic behaviour depends largely on firms' ability to smooth the drop in cash 
flows by borrowing. Large firms are at least temporarily able to maintain their levels 
of production and employment in the face of higher interest costs and declining 
revenues through other sources of short-term credit, such as commercial paper. The 
inventories of large firms grow following a tightening of monetary policy. However, 
small firms, who have more limited access to short-term credit markets, tend to 
reduce inventories by cutting work-hours and production.  
 
While the credit channel is usually presented as an alternative to the traditional 
interest rate channel, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue otherwise. They contend 
that this channel is not a distinct freestanding alternative to the traditional monetary 
transmission mechanism but, rather, a set of factors that propagate conventional 
interest rate effects. They describe the credit channel as one that amplifies the direct 
effects of monetary policy on interest rates through endogenous increases in the 
external finance premium following a rise in the policy interest rate31 . This effect of 
                                                
31
 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) define the external finance premium as the difference in cost between 
funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining 
earnings). They argue that the size of the  premium reflects imperfections in the credit market that 
drive a wedge between the expected return received by lenders and cost financed by potential 
borrowers. 
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policy on the external finance premium accentuates the impact of monetary policy on 
the cost of borrowing and consequently on spending. 
 
4.3.3 Motivation for the Credit Channel 
The credit view on the monetary transmission mechanism is based on the notion that 
the link between monetary policy and economic activity is based on its power to 
influence changes in banks’ assets (total credit extension), rather than in banks’ 
liabilities (money balances in the economy). This is precisely contrary to the money 
view. The credit view is further supported by the following puzzles not properly 
explained by any other channels: (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995): 
 
1. The fact that investment expenditure responds more strongly to short term 
interest rates rather than of long-term interest rates, as implied by the 
traditional interest rate channel. 
2. The fact that internal funds of firms determine their investment decisions and 
capacity more than fluctuations in market interest rates. 
 
If the credit view is important, the next question is to explain what implications it 
could hold for the formulation and understanding of monetary policy. First, if the 
credit view is correct, it implies that monetary policy can affect the real economy 
without much variation in the open-market interest rate. It calls for focusing on 
alternative indicators (such as total bank credit extension) in trying to understand the 
stance of monetary policy at a particular point in time. More importantly, if there was 
more information available about the particular transmission mechanism at play, 
Central Bankers would be able to design and adopt the correct targets and thereby 
improve on the choice of targets. 
 
Second, the view can explain how monetary contraction influences investment and 
inventory behaviour. This is because empirical work on the interest rate channel fails 
to explain the responsiveness of inventories to interest rate changes and hence 
concludes that monetary policy cannot have a direct influence on inventory 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995). According to the credit view, firms’ investment 
decisions are determined by the availability of internal funds. In addition, 
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understanding the credit channel will offer insights on how innovations in financial 
institutions might affect the potency of monetary policy. 
 
Furthermore, the credit channel can explain the distributional effects of monetary 
policy on both lenders and borrowers, while the conventional money view cannot. 
Specifically, the cost of tight monetary policy might affect smaller firms/borrowers 
who might not have easy access to public capital markets, more than it affects 
borrowers who have access to these markets. 
 
Finally, the credit view also implies that the impact of monetary policy on economic 
activity is not always the same, as it depends on the access of borrowers to capital 
markets. Thus, it is sensitive to the state of firms' balance sheets and health of the 
banking sector and has obvious implications for the ability of monetary policy to 
offset particular sorts of adverse shocks. 
 
In addition to the interest rate, Tobin’s q, wealth, and credit channels of monetary 
policy, is the exchange rate channel whose effect is particularly important for small 
open economies with flexible exchange rate regimes, such as Ghana. The exchange 
rate effect is primarily through net exports and balance sheets as follows. An 
expansionary monetary policy which depreciates the exchange rate boosts net 
exports and hence aggregate spending. Currency depreciation could also affect 
spending through the balance-sheet effect if households and firms hold significant 
foreign currency debt. Unless such debts are fully offset by foreign currency assets, 
the depreciation will increase firms’ debt burden, and reduce net worth, lending, 
investment, aggregate demand and hence economic activity. Thus, the balance-sheet 
effect of depreciation implies that expansionary monetary policy could actually be 
contractionary in emerging/developing economies. 
 
With the growing integration of the world economy, monetary authorities need to 
pay close attention to monetary policy transmission operating through the exchange 
rate effects on net exports. In small open developing economies with flexible 
exchange rates, like Ghana, the exchange rate channel plays a particularly important 
role because, unlike the other channels discussed above, it affects not only aggregate 
demand but aggregate supply as well. A policy-induced increase in the domestic real 
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interest rate will make domestic assets more attractive relative to assets denominated 
in foreign currencies. In the presence of a high degree of international financial 
capital mobility across borders, there will then be net capital inflows. Under a 
flexible exchange rate regime this leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency 
( ↓E )32, which in turn: (1) affects the domestic price level directly by lowering the 
domestic currency price of imports. According to Walsh (1998) this exchange-rate-
to-inflation channel speeds up the impact of monetary policy on domestic inflation 
because exchange rates respond quickly to interest-rate changes; (2) induces 
substitution effects between domestic and foreign goods, thereby influencing 
aggregate demand and supply.  
4.3.4 Summary  
The monetary transmission mechanism is concerned with the endogenous behaviour 
of macroeconomic variables in response to exogenous policy impulses (Dale and 
Haldane, 1995). Theory on the monetary transmission mechanism can be divided 
into two broad views, depending on the assumptions made about the nature of 
financial markets. One view, the money view, is based on the assumptions that 
financial markets are homogenous and perfect. Under these assumptions, monetary 
disturbances have real effects only if there are nominal rigidities. The other view – 
the credit view – is premised on the assumption that capital markets are imperfect 
 
In summary, the money view predicts that a monetary tightening would lead to the 
following chain of events. First interest rates would rise and monetary aggregates fall. 
Then output and price levels would decline in the short-to-medium term. This arises 
because an increase in the interest rate leads to declines in interest-sensitive 
components (consumption and investment) of aggregate demand – the interest rate 
channel. Variations in interest rates also affect the prices of other assets – equity and 
the exchange rate. A policy induced increase in interest rates lowers equity prices, 
which may in turn affect both investments negatively by raising the cost of capital 
and consumption by making consumers poorer. As for the exchange rate, an 
unexpected increase in domestic policy rate, all else being equal, would lead to an 
appreciation of the domestic currency on impact. The appreciation of the domestic 
                                                
32
 The exchange rate, E, is measured as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. 
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currency would lower the relative cost of imports and raise that of exports. The direct 
effect of this would be to lower inflation, while the indirect effect comes through its 
impact on net exports. 
In the credit view the contractionary monetary impulses are transmitted to a large 
extent through declines in bank lending. One way through which monetary 
tightening depresses activity is by squeezing bank reserves and hence reducing bank 
deposits. The decline in bank deposits implies a fall in the supply of loanable funds, 
thus leading to a reduction in the credit extended by those banks that do not have 
alternative sources of funds. The fall in credit would limit the activities of bank-
dependent firms, which would in turn limit economic activity. Policy-induced 
increases in interest rates may also reduce the value of collateral offered by potential 
borrowers and thus increase the adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
leading banks to reduce the amount of credit they extend. Thus, according to the 
credit view, contractionary monetary policy depresses economic activity through its 
effect on bank-dependent borrowers. The operation of this channel gives rise to a 
potentially differential impact of monetary policy where some sectors bear a 
disproportionate share of the policy-induced changes. However, the credit channel is 
not regarded as a free standing alternative to the money view, but as “a set of factors 
that amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects” (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995, pp. 28).  
 
Although commonly presented as four distinct channels of policy transmission, the 
discussion suggests that the exchange rate, credit, Tobin’s q, and wealth channels all 
amplify the conventional interest rate effects. Thus, rather than be seen as 
independent and free-standing channels of monetary policy transmission, they must 
be rightfully viewed as enhancing the traditional interest rate channel. The exchange 
rate is particularly important for a small open developing economy like Ghana. 
Chapter 7 adopts this approach in analysing the monetary transmission mechanism. 
This thesis now provides some empirical evidence on the monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
 
4.3.5 The Empirical Literature 
Given that comprehensive surveys of this literature already exist, e.g. Christiano et al. 
(1999), this section aims to present only a sample of the literature to indicate: (i) the 
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preponderant estimation technique adopted for such analysis - VARs, (ii) variables 
that are included in the VARs, (iii) identification assumptions, and (iv) the dynamic 
effects of monetary policy shocks found to serve as reference for comparing our 
results. The literature surveyed here includes Romer and Romer (1989), Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), Dale and Haldane (1995), and Christiano et al. (1997). The near 
consensus of the literature is that after a contractionary monetary policy shock, the 
short term interest rate rises and after varied lags, monetary aggregates, aggregate 
output, employment, and profits fall. The aggregate price level, distinctly, responds 
very slowly, usually rising for up to two years before falling. Various measures of 
wages also fall, albeit by modest amounts. 
The empirical literature on monetary policy transmission is large, much of it using 
US data. Using post-war US data, Romer and Romer (1989) test whether there are 
any identifiable relationships between monetary contractions not caused by output 
disturbances and real output. For this, they estimate two forecasting models for two 
measures of real activity: industrial production index (IPI) and unemployment. The 
models include monthly dummies and dummies for periods of contractionary 
monetary shocks. Romer and Romer find that following monetary contractions, real 
activity, after a six-month lag during which it rises, then falls: the maximum impact 
occurs 33 months after the shock. At this time, when measured by IPI, real activity is 
approximately 12 per cent below the pre-shock level; and when measured by 
unemployment, unemployment is 2 per cent above the base level. For both measures 
of activity, the effect of the shock does not dissipate over the 36-month forecast 
horizon. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) investigate the effect of monetary policy on the 
economy and the channel of transmission with monthly US data over 1959-78. Their 
measure of monetary policy is the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). For this purpose, a 
VAR that includes the FFR, unemployment rate, log of the CPI, and log levels of 
three bank balance-sheet variables (deposits, securities, and loans) in that order is 
estimated. From the estimated impulse response functions, Bernanke and Blinder 
find that a positive innovation in the FFR reduces the volume of deposits held by 
depository institutions immediately, and maximally after twelve months. Although 
there is some recovery, the dip in deposits appears to be permanent. The authors find 
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that bank assets fall along with deposits but the pattern of fall varies amongst the 
different assets. In the first six months after a policy shock, the fall in assets is 
concentrated almost entirely in securities; loans hardly move. Shortly after, however, 
security holdings begin to be rebuilt, while loans start to fall. After two years, 
securities holdings return almost to their original value and the entire decline in 
deposits is reflected in loans. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) also observe that there is no effect on unemployment in 
the first eight months after the innovation to the policy variable. Unemployment from 
the ninth month, however, begins to rise, building gradually to a peak in about two 
years, before declining back to zero. The authors also find good correspondence of 
the estimated timing of the unemployment response and loan response. They give 
two interpretations to the coincidence of timing. One, it signifies consistency with 
the view that bank loans are an important component of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, even though loans do not lead real variables. Two, monetary policy 
works through the conventional money demand mechanism and the observed 
behaviour of loans reflects a purely passive response to a falling demand for credit. 
Using monthly UK data from 1974:6 to 1992:10, Dale and Haldane (1995) analyse 
the effects of policy shocks on asset prices, bank balance sheet variables, GDP, and 
prices. The measure of monetary policy is the Bank of England’s stop rate: the 
minimum rate at which the Bank supplies marginal funds to the discount market. The 
variables in the VAR are ordered as follows: policy interest rate, exchange rate, stock 
market prices, lending, deposits, real economic activity, and price. Their estimated 
impulse responses showed that following a rise in the interest rate, the exchange rate 
appreciates up to the third year; share price declines and remains low for four years; 
lending, after a 15-month lag, falls and stays depressed over the remaining months of 
the five-year horizon. Deposits fall, but only after two years. The shock also 
depresses real economic activity and inflation but these effects are seen over the 
medium term. For real economic activity, the lag is six months and the maximum dip 
occurs between months 18 and 24, after which the effect of the shock moderates. For 
prices, the lag or the period of puzzle is in the initial three and half years, after which 
it falls in the remaining 18-month forecast period. 
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The effects of a contractionary shock to monetary policy (measured by FFR) on 
measures of real wages and profits in the US are analysed by Christiano et al. 
(henceforth CEE, 1997). CEE adopt both non-recursive and recursive identification 
assumptions, where the policy interest rate is ordered last under the recursive 
assumption. Regarding the general effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock, 
under both identification assumptions the authors find, initially, a persistent rise in 
the FFR, and persistent drops in nonborrowed reserves and the growth rates of broad 
money. After a quarter, real GDP declines. The shock also generates a persistent 
decline in the index of commodity prices. Furthermore, the authors find the GDP 
deflator unresponsive to the shock for about eighteen months before it declines, and 
monetary policy not to have an effect on real balances in the long run. 
CEE also analyse the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock on five 
measures of real wages (including economy-wide wages, private sector non-
agricultural sector wages, and manufacturing wages) and find that in all cases real 
wages decline after a contractionary FFR shock, albeit by modest amounts. 
Manufacturing real wages fall more sharply than the economy-wide measures. 
Within manufacturing, wages fall more rapidly in durable goods industries relative to 
nondurable goods industries. These findings lead CEE to doubt the finding from 
models of the monetary transmission mechanism that find nominal wage stickiness, 
predicting a real wage rise, not a fall after a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
To study the response of real profits to a contractionary monetary policy shock, CEE 
consider measures of aggregate profits in five sectors of the US economy: 
manufacturing, durables, nondurables, retail, and transportation and utilities. In three 
sectors, they find that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to sharp 
persistent drops in profits. For the nondurables, and transport and utility sectors 
where profits rise, CEE find the rise insignificant. 
Examining the monetary transmission mechanism in Japan with VAR models 
Morsink and Bayoumi (2001) employ quarterly data. The measure of monetary 
policy stance is the uncollaterised overnight call rate - the operating target for 
monetary policy. Morsink and Bayoumi first estimate a four-variable VAR with the 
ordering as: economic activity (real private demand), prices, interest rates, and broad 
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money33. Four main results emanate. First, interest rate shocks appear to depress 
economic activity significantly, after a six-quarter period of puzzle. Second, broad 
money shocks have significant effects on output, even with interest rates in the 
model. This they interpret as being consistent with the idea that non-policy monetary 
shocks are important for determining economic activity. Third, much of the effect of 
interest rate shocks on output is transmitted through broad money. Finally, there is a 
price puzzle in the initial quarters. Next, Morsink and Bayoumi (2001) extend the 
VAR in different directions to examine alternative aspects of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Extending the base VAR by base money, with the variable 
ordered after the interest rate but before broad money; the authors find that base 
money has no significant impact on output. 
 The authors then disaggregate private demand into private consumption, business 
consumption, housing investment, and net exports and include one of these 
components at a time, plus the rest of private demand in the VAR. This is to examine 
the sensitivity of the different components of private demand to monetary shocks. 
For each component added, the VAR was ordered as follows: total private demand 
less the component of interest, the demand component of interest, prices, the 
overnight call rate, and broad money. They find that monetary policy operates on the 
real economy largely through its impact on business investment, with the maximum 
impact of over 0.2 percentage points fall occurring after two and a half years. 
They extend the VAR to include the main components of private sector funding-bank 
loans, public loans, and money raised in the securities market. Securities are ordered 
last to reflect the relative ease with which they can be adjusted, to investigate the role 
of financial intermediation in the monetary transmission mechanism. The results of 
the analysis point to a transmission mechanism that is dominated by banks, in which 
lending is both an important independent source of shocks and important conduit for 
the transmission of interest rate and broad money shocks to real activity. They find 
that after two years, about two-thirds of the direct impact of a change in the 
overnight call rate on private demand comes through bank loans and, of this change, 
about two-thirds comes through business investments. They also find that 
                                                
33
 Economic activity is measured by real private demand as it is argued that government spending is 
exogenous. Private demand and real broad money are scaled by potential output, and the price level is 
the natural logarithm of the CPI. 
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innovations to bank loans elicit no significant response from securities markets or 
public loans, suggesting that there is no effective substitute for bank loans. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) also study the relative effects of monetary policy on 
small and large borrowers using three firm variables: sales, inventories, and short-
term debt in a VAR analysis. This is under the assumption that firm size is a 
reasonable proxy for capital market access. The measures of monetary policy stance 
are the Romer and Romer (1989) episodes and the FFR. The authors first estimate 
bivariate VARs for each size class of firms and dummies for tight money. When 
inventories and short-term debt are used as firm size measures, sales are kept in the 
regression. This is to investigate if monetary policy has an effect on the two variables 
independently of their influence on sales. They also estimate a multivariate system 
that adds macroeconomic variables (real GNP growth and inflation) to each of the 
three equations. Gertler and Gilchrist find that small firms account for a 
disproportionate share in the decline in sales following a contractionary monetary 
policy shock. In addition, they find that small firms’ inventories fall immediately 
after the shock, while those of large firms rise before falling in response to the shock. 
Based on these results, they conclude that credit market imperfections play an 
important role in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) estimate a VAR that contains: real GDP, real GDP 
deflator, the index of commodity prices34, and the FFR in that order (the FFR being 
the measure of policy) to investigate the dynamic responses of the variables to 
monetary policy shocks using monthly US data for 1965-93. The impulse response 
functions showed GDP rising in the initial four months after a monetary policy 
tightening, after which it falls. The fall is to its lowest in the 24th month and the 
effect of the shock dissipates by the 48th month after the initial shock. Regarding 
price level, Bernanke and Gertler find it shows a marginal rise above its base for 
about a year, before beginning to decline (well after the drop in GDP begins). There 
appear to be long-run effects, as prices appear to have some momentum to fall after 
the forecast horizon. Finally, the authors observe that the interest rate spike 
associated with an unanticipated monetary tightening is largely transitory: interest 
rates return to trend by about the 24th month. 
                                                
34
 As the exclusion of commodity prices tends to lead to the price puzzle, following Sims (1992), the 
commodity price index was included in the VAR to capture the future course of inflation. 
 104 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) replace real GDP with two of its key components - final 
demand and inventory investment to investigate in detail the economy’s response to 
a monetary shock. The authors find that final demand drops quickly following an 
unanticipated tightening of monetary policy. In contrast, inventories build up for a 
period of several months before beginning to decrease, implying that a fall in real 
GDP is led by final demand. 
Bernanke and Gertler also explore the responses of the components of a further 
disaggregated GDP to an unanticipated shock in monetary policy. They find that 
residential investment drops sharply following a monetary tightening and accounts 
for a large part of the initial fall in the final demand. The next fastest and steepest fall 
is non-durable consumption, followed by consumer durables. Last to decline is 
business investment. However, Bernanke and Gertler take issue with the magnitudes 
and timing of the responses, as well as with the composition of spending effects. 
First, they argue that relative to small movements in the policy interest rate, the 
magnitude of response of the economy is large. Second, the components of spending 
react only when the interest rate is back to trend. Third, the authors argue that 
because monetary policy has its most direct effect on short-term rates, it would stand 
to reason that monetary policy would have its most significant influence on assets 
with shorter lives; but this is not found. Rather, a long-lived asset (residential 
housing) responds most speedily while another long-lived asset (business structures 
investments) is not much affected by monetary policy actions. The authors describe 
these outlined patterns of response as puzzling, but find that introducing the credit 
channel helps rationalise them. 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) consider variants of the benchmark FFR and non-
borrowed policy measures in which some foreign variables appear in the Federal 
Reserve’s reaction function. Assuming that the Federal Reserve does not respond 
contemporaneously to movements in the exchange rate, they find that a 
contractionary shock to US monetary policy leads to: (i) a persistent and significant 
appreciation in US nominal and real exchange rates, (ii) persistent decreases in the 
spread between foreign and US interest rates, and (iii) significant and persistent 
deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favour of US investments. 
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Grilli and Roubini (1995), using the Choleski identification to analyse monetary 
policy in the G-7 countries observe initial home currency depreciation in response to 
positive home interest rate innovations for every country except the US. Also Sims 
(1992) finds that for many of the five major industrial countries, positive interest rate 
innovations are associated with an initial depreciation of the home currency (as well 
as increases in home prices). 
 
Arnoštová and Hurník (2005) analyse the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
using VAR models – the most widely used empirical methodology for analysing the 
transmission mechanism in the Czech economy. Using the VAR methodology, their 
paper tries to evaluate the effects of an exogenous shock to monetary policy. The 
first model covers the full data sample from the first quarter of 1994 to the fourth 
quarter of 2004, while the second one covers the period after the regime change only 
(1998 to 2004). The reason for estimating two models was a change in the monetary 
policy regime in the middle of the 1990s. Consequently, the results differ in several 
respects. However, both models are estimated using the same set of variables, 
namely, real GDP, the net inflation price index, the commodity price index, the 
short-term nominal interest rate, the bilateral euro exchange rate, the domestic money 
stock and foreign real GDP as an exogenous variable. The results show that an 
unexpected monetary policy tightening leads to a fall in output, whereas prices 
remain persistent for a certain time. The exchange rate reaction then depends heavily 
on the data sample used. Although it is clear that due to the rather short time span of 
the data, the results should be taken with caution, they at least show that the basic 
framework of how monetary policy affects the economy does not differ significantly 
either from what would be predicted by the theory or from the results obtained for 
more developed economies. 
 
Catao et al (2008) lay out a structural model that incorporates key features of 
monetary transmission in typical emerging-market economies, including a bank-
credit channel and the role of external debt accumulation on country risk premia and 
exchange rate dynamics. They use an SVAR representation of the model to study 
monetary transmission in Brazil, an emerging inflation targeter. They find that 
interest rate changes have swifter effects on output and inflation compared to 
advanced economies and that exchange rate dynamics plays a key role in this 
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connection. Importantly, the results show that the response of inflation to monetary 
policy shocks has grown stronger and the output-inflation trade-off improved since 
the introduction of inflation targeting. 
 
Regarding empirical work on the transmission mechanism in African countries, 
Bleaney and Lisenda (2001) estimate a monetary reaction function for the Bank of 
Botswana for the period 1991-1999. They find that interest rates react significantly to 
private sector credit growth and to recent inflation, but not to the real exchange rate 
or to South African (main trading partner) interest rates. On the transmission of 
monetary policy, they note that the high correlation (0.958) between the Bank rate 
and commercial bank lending rates and the significantly negative correlation between 
growth of bank credit and commercial bank lending rates suggest that channels of 
monetary transmission work.  
 
Smith and Du Plessis (2001) use a simultaneous equation approach (structural vector 
auto regression (SVAR)) to identify the policy maker’s reaction function in South 
Africa. They place a number of restrictions on the VAR, taking into account practical 
policy and institutional changes. A justification for this is that purely statistical 
techniques used to identify the monetary policy transmission mechanism do not take 
into account social constraints on monetary economic analysis. Having identified a 
relationship of the SVAR, an impulse response function is used to trace the effect of 
each shock in the SVAR over a period. This technique allows for a transformation of 
the reduced-form VAR into a system of structural equations. 
 
A starting point of the SVAR analysis is the specification of a set of variables of 
interest to the problem in hand. In this case of monetary policy analysis the list 
typically includes money supply, one or more interest rate, and real output and 
aggregate price level.  
 
Smith and Du Plessis (2001) use real short-term domestic interest rate, monetary 
aggregate, aggregate price level, aggregate output, dollar oil price, international 
interest rate (US fed rate), and exchange rate. They find that innovation from the 
policy instrument leads to a reduction in the price level but does not have a 
significant effect on output. The study further concludes that monetary policy in 
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South Africa is mainly endogenous. In other words, it responds to developments in 
the macro economy instead of independently influencing the course and direction of 
the economy. 
Atingi-Ego (2000) finds that the time lag in the transmission of a policy interest rate 
change to inflation in Uganda is six months - at which point a one percentage point 
rise in the policy interest rate leads to a one percent fall in inflation. Using South 
African data, Stals (1995) finds that the time lag in the transmission of changes in the 
policy interest rate to inflation is four quarters, while Smal and De Jager (2001) 
estimate it at between four and eight quarters. For the lag in the interest rate impact 
on the real economy, Smal and De Jager (2001) find this to be between four and six 
quarters. 
 
Simatele (2004) conducted a similar study for Zambia and found that contractionary 
monetary policy was followed by a fall in both price and output levels. She also 
found evidence of the operation of bank lending and the exchange rate channels, with 
the latter being stronger. 
Cheug (2006) examines the impact of a monetary policy shock on output, prices, and 
the nominal effective exchange rate for Kenya using data covering 1997-2005. Based 
on techniques commonly used in the vector autoregression literature, his main results 
suggest that an exogenous increase in the short-term interest rate tends to be followed 
by a decline in prices and appreciation in the nominal exchange rate, but has an 
insignificant impact on output. Moreover, the paper finds that variations in the short-
term interest rate account for significant fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate 
and prices, while accounting little for output fluctuations. 
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4.4 Summary 
The empirical studies in the literature review show that a contractionary monetary 
policy shock has a number of effects. First, interest rates initially rise and monetary 
aggregates initially fall. The initial rise in interest rates is subsequently reversed, 
probably through deflationary pressure from the monetary contraction. Second, 
usually up to about six months following the monetary contraction, there is an 
absence of effect or, more customarily, an initial rise in output (the output puzzle). 
Output subsequently falls as theory predicts, a fall that remains sustained for about 
two years. Third, the price level declines in line with theoretical predictions, but only 
eventually. There is usually an initial rise (the price puzzle) that lasts for up to about 
two years. Fourth, where a variable that captures future inflation is included in the 
VAR, the price puzzle is eliminated35. 
It appears final demand absorbs the initial impact of a monetary tightening, falling 
relatively quickly after a change in policy for the research that disaggregates 
aggregate demand. This is followed by a reduction in production. The lag in 
production response implies that inventory stocks rise in the short run. Further 
disaggregation of demand shows that residential investment depicts the earliest and 
sharpest decline in final demand, followed by spending on consumer goods. 
Given that the size and speed of transmission of monetary policy impulse to these 
goal and target variables provide information on the effectiveness with which 
monetary policy influences the variables, and that the empirical literature showed 
limited extension to African countries, the estimations of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Ghana, whilst providing information on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, also usefully extends this empirical literature. 
The chapter has presented theory and literature that underlies the empirical analysis 
in the rest of the thesis i.e. the estimation of monetary policy conduct and the 
investigation of monetary policy effectiveness in Ghana. In presenting the theory and 
literature on monetary policy rules, Section 4.1 has demonstrated the superiority of 
monetary policy conducted with feedback rules. Given that the central tenet in 
                                                
35
 Some research, e.g. Cushman and Zha (1997) argues that the puzzles are usually the result of 
identification (usually recursive identification) of monetary policy that is invalid. Thus, as a solution 
to the puzzle, they propose generalised VAR methods in which non-recursive structures are allowed. 
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monetary policy conduct is the use of the policy interest rate to influence commercial 
bank interest rates and in turn spending behaviour, the chapter went on to present the 
literature on the responsiveness of commercial banks retail rates to the policy interest 
rate in Section 4.2. The literature, using mainly industrialised country data, depicts 
long-run pass-through of changes in the policy rate to the lending rate of unity. In the 
short-run, however, there is evidence of sluggishness, albeit of varied degrees. 
Section 4.3 then presented the theory and the literature on the monetary transmission 
mechanism more fully, the summary of which is in the preceding sub-section. 
Given that the methods of monetary policy conduct in Ghana are in line with those of 
industrialised countries upon whom the empirical work has concentrated, the 
empirical analysis that follows in Chapter 5, 6, 7 provide useful extensions to the 
literature following established theory and techniques, but applied to a small, open 
developing economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
Chapter 5 
 
Monetary Policy Reaction Functions Estimates 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter poses and answers two questions. First, how has the central bank in 
Ghana conducted monetary policy since it adopted market-based instruments? 
Second, how effective has the conduct of monetary policy been - effectiveness being 
assessed by the responsiveness of the central bank’s interest rate-setting to inflation, 
real output, and other information variables? 
 
The chapter answers these questions drawing on the literature on the efficient 
conduct of monetary policy that is concisely captured by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992)36. It estimates Taylor-type reaction functions for Ghana, to uncover the best 
empirical characterisation of monetary policy formation in this country. The chapter 
then forms a view on monetary policy effectiveness by relating the size of interest 
rate responses to information variables, with the reference coefficients provided in 
the literature for the attainment of the price stability objective on a sustained basis. 
This type of research is widespread in industrialised economies but is still 
comparatively rare in developing economies. The analysis in this chapter thus 
usefully extends this body of empirical literature.  
 
Section 5.2 revisits the theoretical model and considers necessary modifications to 
the Taylor rule when applied to developing countries. It then specifies the empirical 
model and describes the data. This is followed in sections 5.3.1 - 5.3.4 with estimates 
of monetary policy reaction functions. Section 5.4 ends the chapter with a summary 
of findings. 
 
 
 
                                                
36
 If the policy interest rate is an indicator of the central bank’s policy stance, and if the central bank is 
purposeful and reasonably consistent in policy making, then the policy interest rate should be related 
systematically to important macroeconomic target variables. 
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5.2 The Model and Data 
5.2.1 The Theoretical Model and its Applicability to Developing Countries 
The theoretical foundation for the analysis in this chapter, the Taylor rule, presented 
in Section 4.1.4, is reproduced as Equation (5.1a) below. 
 
it = 0.04 +1.5 (Пt- 0.02)+ 0.5(yt- ỹt)                                   (5.1a) 
 
Where it denotes the central bank’s opening interest rate target (or instrument of 
policy); Пt, the inflation rate; yt, the log of real GDP; and   ỹt, the log of potential 
output identified empirically with a linear trend. The number 0.02 is the 2 per cent 
inflation target, and 0.04 the benchmark recommendation when inflation and output 
are on target. The latter figure is the sum of the 0.02 percent inflation target and the 
assumed 0.02 percent equilibrium real interest rate. 
 
Taylor argued that this rule is as applicable to emerging market economies (EMEs) 
as it is to developed market economies; and it is captured in Taylor (2000) as follows: 
“the use of monetary policy rules in EMEs has many of the same benefits that have 
been found in research and in practice in developed economies.” Taylor, however, 
adds that market conditions in EMEs may require suitable modifications to the 
typical rule recommended for economies with more developed financial markets. 
These conditions, he notes, necessitate consideration of some five issues. First, the 
applicability of inflation forecasting rules; second, the appropriateness of the interest 
rate instrument of the Taylor rule; third, the specificity of the rule; fourth, the 
implications of underdeveloped long-term bond markets; and lastly, the role of the 
exchange rate. Each of these is now considered for the case of Ghana. 
 
(i) Inflation Forecast Targeting 
Laxton and Pesenti (2003) develop a variant of the IMF’s Global Economic Model 
suitable to analyse macroeconomic dynamics in open economies, and use it to assess 
the effectiveness of Taylor rules and inflation-forecast-based (IFB) rules in 
stabilising variability in output and inflation in the Czech Republic. Their findings 
suggest that a simple IFB rule that does not rely upon any direct estimates of the 
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equilibrium real interest rate and places a relatively high weight on the inflation 
forecast may perform better in small open economies than conventional Taylor rules. 
 
However, Taylor recommends rules with current data for EMEs rather then forecast-
based rules. His arguments are threefold. First, there is little difference between an 
inflation-forecast-based rule and a rule with current data, as forecasts are based on 
current data. Second, a rule that performs well in achieving an inflation target is not 
necessarily an inflation forecast-targeting rule. Third, data limitation of EMEs - an 
observation made by others e.g. Plenderleith (2003). This research uses current data 
for the analysis. 
 
(ii) An Appropriate Instrument 
Taylor (2000) contends that for EMEs, there may be a need to consider policy rules 
with a monetary aggregate as an instrument, rather than the interest rate employed in 
the Taylor rule. His reasoning, following Poole (1970), is that even though the use of 
a monetary aggregate or an interest rate as a policy instrument is equivalent, the 
choice between the two may be dictated by the composition of shocks the economy 
faces. 
 
If shocks to investment and/or exports are large relative to velocity shocks, then a 
monetary aggregate is considered a better instrument. On the other hand, if shocks to 
velocity are large relative to shocks to investment and/or exports, then the interest 
rate is the more appropriate instrument. Taylor contends that for EMEs, shocks to 
investment and/or exports relative to velocity shocks are more significant. In addition, 
actual and equilibrium real interest rates for EMEs are measured with greater 
uncertainties37 . From this a monetary aggregate would be considered the better 
                                                
37
 Two methods are commonly used to compute the equilibrium real rate. However, both are 
associated with uncertainties. The more common of the two methods involves estimating the 
equilibrium real rate as the difference between the average interest rate and average inflation rate, both 
averages calculated over a long sample period. The need for a long sample period is because the 
equilibrium real rate, a long run concept, requires that cyclical swings in the real rate are ironed out. 
However, the need for a long sample is associated with disadvantages, particularly for emerging 
economies. For this group of countries there are structural changes over time: the equilibrium real rate 
is likely to change over time, hence there is difficulty in arguing for a simple equilibrium rate over any 
reasonably long period. The second method is the model-based approach. The difficulty with this 
method is that models that are able to generate realistic time series for the equilibrium tend to be large 
and complex systems of equations, and hence difficult to design. Also, the model’s estimate of the 
equilibrium real rate tends only to be as good as the model itself. 
 113 
instrument for Ghana. In contrast, in industrialised economies where velocity shocks 
are relatively higher, the interest rate is the appropriate instrument. Also, money 
velocity has been found to be unstable following financial sector reforms, suggesting 
the inappropriateness of a monetary aggregate as an instrument. Despite these 
arguments, from an economic modelling point of view, we deem the policy interest 
rate the more appropriate instrument for Ghana, following the financial sector 
reforms and given that it is the stated main instrument of policy by the central bank.  
 
(iii) The Degree of Specificity of the Policy Rule 
Taylor (2000) makes three points on the specificity of the rule for EMEs. First, for 
the rule to be useful, discretion is needed to incorporate other relevant variables. 
Second, even as the rule is modified, it ought to be reasonably specific about the 
variables the central bank reacts to and about the sizes of reaction to them. In this 
regard, the more than one-for-one interest rate response to inflation and specific 
response to real GDP and other important variables remains true if the price stability 
objective is to be attained on a sustained basis. Third, the policy interest rate ought to 
react quicker and by a larger amount in EMEs. Taylor’s reasoning is that since 
monetary policy has expectations effects, usually through longer-term markets, but 
that these markets are underdeveloped in EMEs, there is therefore a need for speedier 
and more sizeable response to variables in the policy reaction function, to ensure the 
attainment of the price stability objective. Such a larger and speedier reaction has the 
added advantage of helping build credibility. Taylor’s call for speedier reaction is, 
however, contrasted with Plenderleith (2003), who argues for a cautious response 
with the caution applying more when the direction of adjustment is towards an easing 
in stance. Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) however, see no significant difference 
between the two approaches. On balance therefore, the sizes of interest rate response 
as proposed in the Taylor rule may appear just as appropriate for emerging 
market/developing countries as they are for developed economies. 
 
(iv) The Implications of an Underdeveloped Long-term Bond Market 
For EMEs Taylor recommends the use of variables with good informational content 
for inflationary expectations, given that the usual channel (the long-term bond 
market) for the transmission and reaction to incipient inflation is poorly developed in 
EMEs. Such variables include: the exchange rate, the price of land, wages, and 
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commodity prices (Taylor, 2000; Amato and Gerlach, 2002). The exchange rate, in 
particular, is indicated to have high pass-through to domestic prices in EMEs 
compared with industrialised countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Devereux and 
Lane, 2003). 
 
In addition to its correlation with future inflation, there are further reasons to believe 
that the central banks in EMEs would guard against excessive volatility in the 
exchange rate. These reasons include: their relatively thin foreign exchange markets, 
their susceptibility to pronounced shocks and large capital flows, and the need to 
ward off likely financial crises that could ensue from deterioration in the accounts of 
firms, financial institutions, and government in the event of a large depreciation in 
the exchange rate. This thesis includes exchange rate as one of the information 
variables as its dynamics is very important to the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
(v) A Rendition of the Taylor Rule 
Regarding the Taylor rule stated in (4.1a), this thesis proposes a rendition more 
suited to Ghana as a developing country. This involves amending two aspects of the 
rule: the inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate. 
 
The Taylor rule has 0.02 - the midpoint inflation rate that typifies price stability in 
low inflation countries - as the inflation target. For the reasons outlined in sub-
Section 1.2.2, for emerging/developing economies the inflation rate that typifies 
price stability can be argued to be higher. In May 2007, Ghana formally adopted an 
explicit inflation targeting framework for its monetary policy, after five years of 
implicit inflation targeting38. The numerical target range for inflation is announced in 
the context of the annual budget, and the Bank of Ghana communicates on a regular 
basis with the public and the markets about its goals and decisions. The current 
medium–term target is around 5 percent inflation. South Africa, the only other sub-
Saharan African country with an explicit inflation targeting framework, has a 3-6 
percent target. Thus, the first modification of the Taylor rule replaces 0.02 by 0.05 as 
the appropriate inflation target. Regarding the relevant inflation measure, this thesis 
considers it to be deseasonalised inflation, as its use avoids the problem of generating 
                                                
38
 When a country establishes an inflation target but does not announce this as its primary monetary 
policy objective. 
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a suitable measure of core inflation that excludes supply-induced short-term 
volatility in the CPI, such as that caused by the seasonal price variations in food. 
The second modification involves using a more suitable equilibrium real interest rate. 
The difficulties in computing this by traditional methods (see footnote 37), 
particularly for developing/EMEs, necessitates the use of a rather simplistic measure. 
We approximate the equilibrium real rate by the rate of interest on index-linked 
bonds with long enough maturity periods, but suitably adjusted. The interest rate 
(June, 2006) on a ten-year bond is 4.0 percent in Chile, while a similar instrument 
launched by the World Bank for Columbia with a six-year maturity has a rate of 4.4 
percent. Given that capital is scarcer in African economies than in these two 
countries, it would be expected to command a higher real rate of return. The current 
rate on a five-year Ghanaian bond (Golden Jubilee Saving Bonds) launched in March 
2008 is 16.1 per cent. The annual inflation rate is about 11 percent (BOG, 2007). 
Thus, the appropriate equilibrium real rate is estimated at 5.0 percent. This level of 
equilibrium rate of interest coincides with the approximately 5.0 per cent average 
rate of growth for Sub-African countries (World Bank, 2007). Also Ghana’s GDP 
growth rate has averaged about 5.0 percent in the last five years (BOG, 2007). 
 
The figure 0.05, thus, replaces the 0.02 equilibrium real interest rate of the Taylor 
rule. With these two modifications, the amended Taylor rule that is expected to be 
more suitable for Ghana is shown as Equation (5.1b): 
 
 
it = 0.10 +1.5 (Пt- 0.05)+ 0.5(yt- ỹt)                                   (5.1b) 
 
the constant term, 0.10, being the sum of the estimated equilibrium real interest rate 
and the inflation target. The coefficients indicating the strength of interest rate 
responses to deviations of inflation and output from their respective targets are, 
however, left unchanged39. 
 
 
                                                
39
 As a possible area for future research, the modified rule proposed in this thesis for Ghana can be 
applied to a broad sample of developing countries to determine its fit vis-à-vis countries’ actual 
performance. This would enable it to serve as a bench-mark rule for this group of developing 
countries. 
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5.2.2 The Empirical Model Selection  
5.2.2.1 Background to Empirical Model Selection 
It would be fairly straightforward to estimate a Taylor rule as the empirical model. 
This would involve simply replacing the rule-based recommended nominal funds 
rate with the historical series, adding a residual error term to capture deviations from 
the rule and estimating the coefficients as the weights. With the observation that the 
central bank adjusts interest rates gradually, the rule can be extended by the lagged 
interest rate. Furthermore, the rule can be extended by variables such as those 
discussed in sub-Section 3.1.5.4. Indeed, this has been the approach adopted in a 
number of estimations of central bank policy reaction functions. An example is Aron 
and Muellbauer (2000) who specify and estimate: 
 
і=δ0+δ1іt-1+ δ2∆4LnPFt+k+ δ3xFt+m+ δ4zt+ δ5iUSAt-1+ εt                          (5.2) 
 
where і is the central bank’s short term interest rate; ∆4LnPFt+k is the annual rate of 
change of the consumer price deflator over the horizon of k quarters; xt+m is the 
output gap at t+m quarters, with “F”signifying forecast values using information at t-
1; iUSAt-1 is the short-term foreign interest rate; and εt ,the error term. 
 
In so doing, no explicit consideration has been paid to the stationarity properties of 
the data. Clarida et al. (2000) argue that policy reaction functions of the Taylor 
specification assume stationarity of the data series. While this may be reasonable for 
industrialised countries, for developing countries, particularly those coming from 
economic reform, stationarity of data cannot be taken for granted, at least in the 
initial years following reform. Failing to consider stationarity or otherwise of data 
and simply estimating by OLS will lead to spurious regression problems if the data 
are truly non-stationary (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986). Some 
common techniques for addressing spurious regression problems exist. Hamilton 
(1994 pp.557-562), for example, enumerates three ways: (i) by including lagged 
values of both the dependent and independent variables in the regression, (ii) by 
using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, and (iii) by estimating the variables in 
difference form.  
 
 117 
Each of these methods however, has limitations. Regarding the first solution, when 
lagged values of both the dependent and independent variables are included in the 
regression, OLS estimation yields consistent estimates of all the parameters and the t-
test on the parameters are asymptotically N(0,1). However, F-tests for the joint 
significance of lags on a variable have a non-standard limiting distribution. On the 
subject of the Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment, it only cures first-order, not higher-order 
serial correlation of the residuals. It also requires that the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous. The third solution, differencing of the data prior to estimation, 
yields regressors and error terms that are all I(0) and t and F-tests have the usual 
Gaussian or χ2 distribution. However, valuable information from theory concerning 
the long-run equilibrium properties of the data is lost as a result of the differencing. 
In addition, whilst it avoids spurious regression problems, if the data are not truly 
non-stationary differencing can result in a mis-specified regression. Also, even if the 
dependent and explanatory variables are truly I(1) processes, for cointegrated 
processes the bivariate dynamic relations between the dependent and independent 
variables will be mis-specified if we simply differenced both variables. Error 
correction methodology, which involves mixing the data in levels and in differences 
in the same equation, such that the combined equation captures the extent to which 
the system is out of equilibrium, overcomes this limitation. There are two main 
techniques in this line of research. The first is the two-step residual-based procedure 
for testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987); the 
second is the system-based reduced rank regression approach of Johansen (1991, 
1995). However, as useful as the methods are, they require pre-testing of the data to 
determine if they are I(1). Importantly, their accuracy depends on the validity of the 
I(1) finding. 
 
The thesis considers it undesirable to employ estimation methods that are based on 
the assumption that the variables have a particular order of integration in view of the 
acknowledged low power of stationarity tests, particularly in small samples. For this 
reason, we adopt the conditional equilibrium correction model (ECM) developed by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) (hereafter referred to as “the PSS model”, “the 
equilibrium correction model” or “the modified cointegration and error correction 
model”) that is robust to the stationarity properties of the data. This model nests all 
three proposed solutions to the spurious regression problems (previously discussed) 
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as special cases. Furthermore, PSS argue that their specification is more general than 
the cointegration analysis of partial systems carried out by Boswijk and Franses 
(1992), Boswijk (1995), Johansen (1991, 1995) and Urbain (1992). 
 
5.2.2.2 Assumptions Underlying the Empirical Model 
Underlying the PSS model is the assumption that the time series properties of the 
variables of interest, {zt}∞t=1, a (k+1) vector random process, can be approximated by 
a VAR(p) model augmented with the appropriate deterministic variables such as 
intercept and a time trend as in Equation (5.3): 
 
Ф (L) (zt- µ-γt) = εt                            t =1, 2,...,                                   (5.3) 
 
where L is the lag operator,  µ and γ  are unknown (k+1) vectors of intercept and 
trend  coefficients, Ф (L) =Ik+1 -  Σpi-1 Фi Li    is a (k+1, k+1) matrix of lag 
polynomial; and k the number of regressors. Specific assumptions underlying (5.3) 
are the following:  
 
Assumption One: that the elements of zt  are purely I(1), purely I(0), or cointegrated, 
and excludes the possibility of seasonal unit roots and explosive roots. 
 
Assumption Two: that the (k+1) vector of error process {εt}t∞=1 is IN(0,Ω), Ω is a 
positive definite matrix. 
 
Expressing the lag polynomial Ф (L) in a vector equilibrium correction form, PSS 
rewrite the VAR (p) model (5.3) as: 
 
 
∆zt  =a0  + a1t + Пzt-1 + Σ
p-1
i=1  Гi ∆z t-i  +εt                         t=1,2,...,       (5.4) 
 
where ∆ ≡ 1-L is the difference operator, a0 ≡ - Пµ+ (Г+П)γ,  a1 ≡ -Пγ, and  
Г≡ Im- Σp-1i=1 Гi= -П + Σpi=1 iФi  is the sum of the short-run coefficient matrices. 
П ≡ - (Im- Σpi=1 Фi ) is the long-run multiplier matrix. 
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Partitioning zt into a scalar variable yt and a k-vector xt and partitioning the error term 
εt   conformably with zt = (y’t, x’t)’  as εt = ( εyt, ε’xt)’ and its variance matrix as: 
Ω = 



Ω



xx
yx
xy
yy ω
ω
ω
 
where  εyt is expressed conditionally in terms of  εxt as  
εyt = ωyx Ω
-1
xx εxt +ut                                    (5.5) 
where ut ~IN(0,ωuu ), ωuu ≡ ωyy - ωyx Ω-1xx ωxy,and ut is independent of εxt. 
Substituting (5.5) into (5.4) and together with a similar partitioning of  
a0 = (ay0 , a’x0 )’ , a1 = (ay1 , a’x1 )’,  П = (pi’y, П’x )’ , Г= ( γ’y, Г’x)’, Гi = (γ’yi, Г’xi)’, 
i=1,…, p-1, 
PSS derive the conditional model for ∆yt in terms of zt-1, ∆xt, ∆zt-1,…….; i.e. the 
conditional ECM of the form: 
 
∆yt= c0 +c1t +pi y.x zt-1+ Σp-1i=1 ψ’i ∆zt-i+ ω’ ∆xt +ut                                t =1, 2,…,      (5.6) 
 
where ω ≡ Ω-1xxωxy, c0 ≡ ay0 - ω’ax0, c1≡ ay1- ω’ax1, ψ’i ≡ γyi - ω’ Гxi,  i =1,…..p-1 and  
piyx ≡ piy - ω
’
Пx and the deterministic relations given by: 
 
c0 = - pi y.xµ + (γy.x+ piy.x)γ   c1= - piy.x γ  where  γy.x ≡ γy - ω’ Гx  
Partitioning the long-run multiplier matrix П conformably with zt = (yt , x’t)’  as 
 
П = 



∏



xx
yx
xy
yy pi
pi
pi
 
 
And assuming that the k vector pi xy= 0 (assumption 3) yields: 
 
 ∆xt = ax0 +a x1t + Пxxxt-1 + Σ
p-1
i=1  Гxi  ∆zt-i + εxt                     t=1,2,…,           (5.7)  
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Thus the {xt}∞t=1 process is regarded as long-run forcing for {yt}∞t=1 as there is no 
feedback from the level of yt. 
Assumption 3 restricts consideration to cases in which there exists at most one 
conditional level relationship between yt and xt, irrespective of the level integration 
of the process {x}∞t=1. 
Under assumption 3, the conditional ECM (5.6) becomes: 
 
∆yt = c0 + c1t +pi yy yt-1 + pi yx.x xt-1 + Σp-1i=1 ψ’i ∆zt-i + ω’∆xt + ut                       t =1,2,…, (5.8) 
 
where  c0 = - (pi yy , pi yx.x ) µ + [(γy.x+ ( piyy ,pi yx.x  ) ]γ ,   c1 =  - (piyy, pi yx.x.)γ,  and   
piyx.x ≡  piyx - ω
’
Пxx. 
Provided the maximum order of integration of the variables is unity, there then exists 
a conditional level relationship between yt and xt, defined by: 
yt = θ0 + θ1t + θxt + vt                                       t =1,2,… 
If pi yy ≠ 0 and  pi yx.x  = 0’ , then yt ≈ I(0), and the differenced variable ∆yt  depends 
only on its own lagged-level yt-1 in the conditional ECM shown in Equation (5.8) and 
not the lagged level of xt-1. If pi yy =0 and  pi yx.x ≠ 0’, then yt ≈ I(1), and the differenced 
variable ∆yt depends only on the lagged-level of xt-1 in the conditional error 
conditional ECM shown in Equation (5.8). If pi yy = 0 and piyx.x= 0’, then there are no 
level effects in the conditional level effects in the conditional ECM (5.8). 
5.2.2.3 The Empirical Model 
Equation (5.8) is the empirical model for estimating monetary policy reaction 
functions. The trend term is, however, excluded as we do not expect there to be long-
run linear growth which cannot be accounted for in the model. Re-arranging the term, 
the conditional ECM we estimate is shown as Equation (5.9). 
 
∆i = c0 +b1 it-1 + Σkj=1 dj  Xj(t-1) + Σkj=1 Σpm=0 ψjm ∆Xj(t-m) + Σpm=1δm ∆it-m-1 +ut     (5.9) 
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where c0 ≠ 0; it  is the policy interest rate, Xj(t-m)  the information vector, and ut serially 
uncorrelated errors. As previously elaborated, the model is valid whether the 
underlying regressors are purely I(1), I(0) or mutually cointegrated. 
 
To ensure serially uncorrelated errors sufficiently long lags of the interest rate and 
information variables in differences are taken. At the same time, care is taken to 
balance this need with the need for a sufficiently small lag length to avoid undue 
over-parameterisation. In effect, the research follows Hendry’s general-to-specific 
modelling approach and the AIC which is emphasised by PSS. The model 
specification allows for different lag lengths on the differenced variables without 
affecting the asymptotic results. 
 
An important assumption underlying (5.9) is that there is no feedback from the level 
of it to the equations explaining each of the information variables in the Xj(t-m) vector  
stated in the previous section. Under the assumption that the lagged interest rate, it-1, 
does not enter the sub-VAR model for Xj(t-m), the policy reaction function is 
identified and can be estimated by least squares. This assumption, however, does not 
rule out the inclusion of lagged changes of the interest rate in the equations for the 
variables in the information vector. 
 
This empirical model enables us to work with the central bank policy instrument and 
its information variables in a way that allows the capturing of both short-run and 
long-run effects; and provides a link between the variables and the steady state 
equilibrium. The model says that a change in the policy interest rate depends on 
lagged changes of itself and in the information variables plus an error correction term, 
[b1 it-1 + Σkj=1 dj  Xj(t-1)], reflects reversion towards the equilibrium relationship. The 
speed of adjustment is given by the adjustment parameter, b1. 
 
The testing procedure for finding if a relationship exists between the policy interest 
rate and the information variables, i.e. if the information variables are the 
determinants of central bank interest rate setting, is a two-stage process. The first 
stage involves investigating the existence of a long-run (level) relationship between 
the policy interest rate and the information variable(s) by computing the F-statistic 
associated with the null hypothesis: 
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H0b1 : b1 = 0  ∩  H0d d’= 0’    
 
(d'
  
being the vector of coefficients on the lagged-levels of the variables represented 
in the vector X); 
 
against the alternative hypothesis: 
 
H1b1 : b1 ≠ 0  ∪  H1d d’≠ 0’ .  
 
The alternative hypothesis not only covers the case b1 ≠ 0  ∪  d’≠ 0’, but also permits 
the cases of  b1 = 0  ∪  d’≠ 0’ and b1 ≠ 0  ∪  d’= 0’. 
 
The asymptotic distribution of this test-statistic is non-standard, irrespective of 
whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), thus PSS provide asymptotic critical values. 
Two polar sets of critical values are provided. One set assumes all the regressors are 
purely I(1) and the other that they are purely I(0). For each application the sets 
provide a band covering all possible classifications of the variables into I(0), I(1), or 
fractionally integrated. 
 
 If the computed statistic falls outside the critical value bounds, a conclusive 
inference can be drawn without needing to know the integration/cointegration status 
of the underlying regressors. However, if the F-statistic falls inside the bounds, 
inference is inconclusive and depends on whether the underlying variables are I(0) or 
I(1). 
 
Comparing the F-statistic with the relevant critical value bounds, if the test statistic is 
less than the lower bounds, the null hypothesis is not rejected, signifying the absence 
of level relationship between the policy instrument and the information variable(s). 
In this case, the equation is re-estimated in pure differences. However, if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, we test a second null hypothesis: 
 
H0b1 : b1 = 0  using the bounds procedure based on t-statistic tb1. 
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As with the F-test, asymptotic critical value bounds of this test are provided for cases 
in which all regressors are purely I(1), purely I(0), or mutually co integrated. 
Rejection of   H0b1 : b1 = 0  confirms the existence of a level relationship. On the 
other hand if H0b1  is not rejected, it implies that though a level relationship between 
the policy interest rate and the regressor set exits, the speed of convergence of the 
variables to equilibrium is so slow as not to be significantly different from zero. The 
second stage of the analysis is, then, to estimate the long-run interest rate responses 
to the information variables and make inferences about the size of coefficients. The 
long-run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium, so that Equation (5.9) reduces to: 
 
0 =c0 +b1 i + Σkj=1 dj  Xj + u                                              (5.10) 
 
The constant and level regressors then have their long-run parameters given by:   
 
wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1 
where b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level dependent variable, co is the constant 
term, and dj the coefficient associated with the jth lagged-level regressor in the short-
run model. Therefore equation (5.10) can be re-arranged as: 
 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                                                 (5.11) 
 
The long-run inflation and output gap coefficients are respectively compared with the 
reference values of 1.5 and 0.5 proposed by Taylor (1993), to assess the extent to 
which monetary policy is effective in stabilising inflationary conditions. In addition, 
a view is formed on whether long-run interest rate responses to the other variables 
are appropriately-signed and sizeable enough to facilitate the attainment of the 
inflation objective. 
 
5.2.3 The Data 
 Chapter 3 established that the instrument of monetary policy is the interest rate on 
the 90/91-day Treasury Bill Paper until March 2002, then after, the Prime Rate. In 
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addition, that chapter established the adoption of price stability as the primary 
objective of monetary policy following financial sector reforms. Furthermore, 
evidence was presented that the central bank considered the pace of economic 
activity in policy formulation. Other variables found important for monetary policy 
conduct were monetary and credit aggregates, the exchange rate, foreign exchange 
reserves and, by implication, revenue from the main exports (gold and cocoa) and 
foreign monetary policy. The relevance of these variables for inflation control was 
established in Chapter 4. 
 
In the empirical analysis, the pace of economic activity is measured as the deviation 
from linear trend of the log of real private sector credit40. The monetary aggregates 
(broad money and reserve money) and the credit aggregate (private sector credit) are 
used as the annualised one- and three-month growth of the variables. The exchange 
rate is measured as the log of the real effective exchange rate; and foreign exchange 
reserves are also entered in logs. Given that the quantity of production is fairly stable, 
revenue from primary exports were proxied by the world price of gold and cocoa. 
These prices measured in real US dollar terms are entered in logs. The variables used 
were the Prime Rate, monetary aggregates, credit aggregates, the real exchange rate, 
foreign exchange reserves, world prices for gold and cocoa in US dollars and the US 
Federal Reserve fund rate as a proxy for foreign monetary policy, from 1992M1 to 
2007M1. 
 
The data are all sourced from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS) and the 
Bank of Ghana. The research uses the data in monthly frequency for three reasons: (i) 
to maximise the number of degrees of freedom, (ii) to have enough variation in the 
sample to enable the proper identification of the slope coefficients, (iii) to match the 
approximate frequency of central bank monetary policy formulation. The central 
bank’s monetary policy committee meet every other month to decide the Prime Rate. 
 
                                                
40
 The use of private sector credit as a measure of economic activity is because of the variable’s role 
as a leading indicator of economic activity; an observation made by Khan (2003) for example.  
Additionally, Khan argues that when demand for money is unstable, as it is likely to be when a 
country undergoes a process of financial development, policymakers may get a clearer picture of 
inflation or longer term economic growth by observing credit rather than monetary aggregates. 
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Also given the assumption that a central bank would respond to the underlying 
behaviour of its information variables and not to their seasonal components, we 
consider it important to employ series that are devoid of seasonal variation 41 . 
Furthermore, even as the PSS methodology is robust to the stationarity properties of 
the data provided the data is I(0) or I(1), there is a need to establish that the 
maximum order of integration of the data is indeed one. For these reasons, we 
investigate the seasonality and stationarity properties of the data; and deseasonalise 
where seasonalities are found.  
 
Broad money, reserve money and headline inflation are deseasonalised to measure 
the growth in these variables. This is also because money supply increases 
significantly in the last quarter of every year when government pays cocoa farmers 
and this results in increases in headline inflation. 
 
5.2.4 Testing for Unit Roots 
Economic time series are commonly characterised by strong trend-like behaviour. 
Orthodox methods of estimation and hypothesis-testing assume that all variables are 
stationary (trend-free). Testing for non-stationarity is now a standard pre-test that is 
conducted prior to all regression analysis using time series data. Although the PSS is 
robust regardless of variables being I(0) or I(1), we need to know if the maximum 
order of integration of the data is indeed one. Testing for non-stationarity may be 
grouped into informal and formal methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41
 Seasonal variation is defined as the systemic, though not necessarily regular, intra-year movements 
in economic time series that are often caused by non-economic phenomena (Thomas and Wallis, 
1991). 
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5.2.4.1 Informal test 
First, is a visual inspection of simple plots of the variables in levels and plots of the 
variables in difference. 
 
Figure 5.2.4.1a Plots of Variables in Levels 
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A Plot of the Three Months Time Deposit Rate 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Oil Prices in US Dollars 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Gold Prices in US Dollars 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Reserve Money 
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A Plot of Deseasonalised Headline Inflation 
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Figure 5.2.5.1b Plots of Variables in Difference 
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A Plot of Three Months Time Deposit Rate in Difference 
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A Plot of the Log of Headline Inflation in Difference 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Oil Prices in Difference 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Cocoa Prices in Difference 
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A Plot of the Log of Real Reserve Money in Difference 
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  A Plot of the Log of Total Reserve Money in Difference 
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A Plot of Deseasonalised Broad Money in Difference 
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Figure 5.2.5.1c Autocorrelation functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autocorrelation function of Log of real gold prices in US dollars, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Policy Interest Rate, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log of total reserve minus gold, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log of real output gap, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1
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Autocorrelation function of Log of real cocoa, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log real oil, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of US federal funds rate, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log of headline inflation, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log of real money supply, sample from 1992M1  to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Three months time deposit  rate, sample from 1992M1  to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Log real reserve money, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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Autocorrelation function of Deseasonalised Broad Money, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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The simple plots of the series over the period 1992M1 to 2007M1 in Figure 5.2.5.1a 
suggest that one-month annualised growth in broad money and one-month 
annualised growth in reserve money were the only stationary variables. The 
remaining variables, i.e. the Policy/Prime rate, the output gap proxy, the US federal 
funds rate, total foreign exchange reserves, the real US dollar price of gold, cocoa 
and oil, one-month annualised growth in headline inflation, the real effective 
exchange rate and the three months time deposit rate appeared to be non-stationary. 
Figure 5.2.5.1b suggests they may be I(1) variables. Figure 5.2.5.1c show that the 
plots start with a high autocorrelation, persists over several lags and slowly decline. 
Such a pattern is the autocorrelation plots signature of "strong autocorrelation" and 
suggests the variables are non-stationary, except one-month annualised growth in 
broad money, one-month annualised growth in reserve money and one-month 
annualised growth in headline inflation, which were found to be stationary. In fact, it 
is worth noting that for the stationary variables with the exception of lag 0, which is 
always 1 by definition, almost all of the autocorrelations fall within the 95% 
confidence limits. In addition, there is no apparent pattern (such as the first ten lags 
being positive and the next ten lags being negative). This is the pattern we expect to 
see if the data are in fact random. 
   Autocorrelation function of Deseasonalised Real Reserve Money, sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
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5.2.4.2 Formal test 
Testing for unit roots in autoregressive time series models continues to receive 
considerable attention in the econometrics literature. The formal approaches 
employed in this thesis for testing for stationarity are the Dickey Fuller (DF) and the 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests and the Ng-Perron tests (Details of these tests 
are provided in the Appendix). The Dickey Fuller (DF) and the augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) involves running the regression: 
 
∆Yt =α0 + α1T +  α2Yt-1 +∑
=
m
i 1
βi ∆Yt-i + εt (5.12) 
Where Yt   is the variable of interest and Yt-1 is the period lag of the variable. The 
choice of m depends largely on the number of available observations and is selected 
large enough to render the residual εt white noise.  
 
The second approach we adopted is the Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests. Ng and 
Perron (2001) construct four test statistics that are modified forms of Philips and 
Perron (1988) Zα  and Zt statistics, the Bhargava (1986) R1 statistic, and the Elliot et 
al. (1996) Point Optimal statistic. Ng and Perron (2001) argue that traditional unit 
root tests may suffer from two main problems. First, they may suffer from power 
problems when the autoregressive parameter is close to 1 and, second, when the 
errors of a Moving Average process are close to -1, it is necessary to have a high lag 
length in order to avoid size problems. However, the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) tend to select a low order of the lag 
length. In order to overcome these issues, the authors propose a Modified 
Information Criterion (MIC) that controls for sample size. Additionally they propose 
a method utilising four tests to avoid the power problems associated to traditional 
unit tests: 
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=
−
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−
=
−
∑                                                         (5.14) 
 148 
 
MZt  = MZα * MSB                                                                       (5.15) 
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22 /])1(                  (5.17) 
 
7−=
−
c                           if   p=0  
 
5.13−=
−
c                       if   p=1 
 
 
 
The results from the formal tests for stationarity are shown in tables 5.2.4a and 
5.2.4b below. 
Table 5.2.4a                                                   Tests with Intercept 
                        Ng-Perron 
                                     
Variable 
ADF   
Test 
MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
Policy rate -1.217 -2.229 -1.016 0.456 10.693 
Log of Real 
Effective Exchange 
rate 
-2.162 -1.706 -0.831 0.487 12.953 
Log of Real Output 
gap 
- 0.081 1.809 2.481 1.371 146.409 
Log of Real Gold 
prices 
-2.333 -9.574* -2.183* 0.228* 2.580* 
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Log of Real Cocoa 
prices 
- 0.178 -0.807 -0.519 0.643 22.564 
Log of Real Oil 
prices 
     -0.819      -1.736 -0.666 0.383 10.611 
Log of Real Broad 
Money 
1.109 2.200 3.279 1.490 183.842 
Log of Headline 
Inflation 
-1.909 -0.023 -0.014 0.612 25.223 
Log of Real Reserve 
Money 
0.393 1.740 2.629 1.510 173.993 
Log of  Real Total 
Reserve 
-0.279 -1.959 -0.748 0.382 10.124 
US Federal Funds 
rate 
-1.719 -6.719** -1.799** 0.268** 3.766** 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Headline 
Inflation 
- 1.949 -2.092 -1.019 0.458 11.67 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Broad Money 
-11.877* -0.216 -0.299 1.383 94.947 
Three Months Time 
Deposit rate  
-1.185 -3.387 -1.213 0.358 7.198 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Reserve Money 
-11.469* 0.898 1.029 1.146 87.767 
Note: 
* Significant at 5 per cent significance level 
** Significant at 10 per cent significance level 
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Critical Values (Tests with Intercept) 
 
 
ττ MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
5%   -2.878   -8.100   -1.980   0.233   3.170 
10% -2.575 -5.700 -1.620 0.275 4.450 
 Note:The critical values for the ADF tests have been taken from Fuller (1976, p.373), 
and Dickey and Fuller, (1981, p.1062) and those for the Ng-Perron tests from Ng and 
Perron (2001). 
 
Table 5.2.4b 
Tests with Intercept and Trend 
                        Ng-Perron 
                                                              
Variable 
ADF   
Test 
MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
Policy rate -2.185 -2.589 -1.003 0.387 30.554 
Log of Real Output 
gap 
 
-2.397 -11.698 -2.366 0.202 8.077 
Log of Real Gold 
prices 
 
      -2.377 -11.843 -2.425 0.2048 7.739 
Log of Real Cocoa 
prices 
 
0.481 0.071 0.037 0.520 64.269 
Log of Real Oil 
prices 
 
-2.018 -5.134 -1.554 0.303 17.549 
Log of Real Broad 
Money 
 
-1.866 -10.284 -2.139 0.208 9.475 
Log of Headline 
Inflation 
 
-0.969 -2.658 -0.905 0.340 26.652 
Log of Real Reserve 
Money 
 
-2.291 -4.087 -1.399 0.342 21.971 
Log of  Real Total 
Reserve 
 
-1.152 -3.065 -1.110 0.362 26.739 
US Federal Funds 
rate 
 
-1.715 -6.929 -1.812 0.261 13.217 
 151 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Headline 
Inflation 
 
 
 
- 2.784 -2.782 -1.162 0.418 32.213 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Broad Money 
 
 
    -11.908* -0.196 -0.186 0.948 173.095 
Three Months Time 
Deposit rate 
 
-1.699 -4.069 -1.347 0.331 21.529 
One-Month 
Annualised Growth 
in Reserve Money 
 
 
    -11.441* -0.089 -0.092 1.024 202.702 
Note: 
* Significant at 5 per cent significance level 
** Significant at 10 per cent significance level 
 
 
Critical Values (Tests with Intercept and Trend) 
 
 
ττ MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
5%   -3.435   -17.300   -2.910   0.168   5.480 
10% -3.141 -14.200 -2.620 0.185 6.670 
 Note: The critical values for the ADF tests have been taken from Fuller (1976, 
p.373), and Dickey and Fuller, (1981, p.1062) and those for the Ng-Perron tests from 
Ng and Perron (2001). 
 
Table 5.2.4a shows the log of real gold prices and US federal funds rate were 
significant under the Ng-Perron at 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. The one-
month annualised growth in broad money and the one-month annualised growth in 
reserve money were significant in both tables 5.2.4a and 5.2.4b under the ADF test at 
5 per cent significance level. The remaining variables were difference stationary 
variables i.e. they are I(1) variables. We used the PSS model that is robust to the 
stationarity properties of the data in our analysis.  
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5.2.5 The Estimation Strategy 
The strategy for seeking the best empirical characterisation of monetary policy is to 
investigate the consistency of three hypotheses for the conduct of monetary policy 
with the data. First, that the conduct of monetary policy is one of strict inflation 
targeting: i.e. the central bank moves interest rates solely to inflation, even though 
they may observe trends in other variables. Second, that inflation and the output gap, 
as proposed in the Taylor rule, are the stylised variables to which the central bank 
responds: i.e. the central bank responds, in addition to inflation, to the pace of output 
either independently of its concern for inflation or as a precursor to future inflation. 
Third, the central bank responds to a broader information set that affects the future 
path of inflation or as independent objectives, e.g. the independent objective of 
maintenance of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Consistent with the three hypotheses, the research defines and employ three different 
information sets: X1, X2, and X3 shown as (5.9a), (5.9b), and (5.9c) in the empirical 
model (5.9). 
 
The set X1 is defined to contain only inflation. The set X2 comprises inflation and the 
output gap, while X3 extends X2 by the real effective exchange rate (exrate), foreign 
exchange reserve (reserves), the real US dollar prices of primary exports (Ircp) and 
of oil, one-month annualised broad money growth (BMg) and  the US federal fund 
rate (USFFR). The US federal fund rate is a proxy for foreign interest rate. 
 
X1 = (Inflation)                                                                                                      (5.9a) 
 
X2 = (Inflation, Outputgap)                                                                                   (5.9b) 
 
X3 = (Inflation, Outputgap, exrate, reserves, Ircp, BMg, USFFR)                       (5.9c)                                                   
 
The procedure for assessing monetary policy effectiveness is as follows. Having 
ascertained the existence of a levels (long-run) relationship between the policy 
interest rate and the information variable(s) and computed the long-run interest rate 
response to inflation, output gap, and other variables where relevant, the research 
compares the computed inflation and output gap coefficient with the reference values 
of 1.5 and 0.5 proposed by Taylor (1993). With respect to the other variables, we 
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consider if they are signed as expected and sizeable enough to facilitate the 
attainment of the price stability objective. 
 
5.2.6 Challenges of Interpretation of Coefficient Estimates 
This thesis highlights here four challenges that could impinge on the interpretation of 
the policy rule coefficient to be estimated. The first is the problem of identification. 
Identification problems can be a potential source of illegitimacy in the interpretation 
of the coefficients of the reaction function (Clarida et al., 2000; Nelson, 2000). The 
identification problem could arise if the central bank controls inflation perfectly, 
resulting in its low variability. Such low variability, econometric theory suggests, 
may yield inaccurate estimates of policy response to variables, including inflation, 
which could invalidate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. 
 
Assuming that the interpretation of coefficients of the estimated policy reaction is 
valid, a second issue is their non-automatic link with the underlying preference 
parameters of policy makers (Nelson, 2000). If the aggregate demand relationship in 
the economy changes, so that larger interest rate changes are required to maintain the 
level of inflation variability at its previous level, then a welfare maximising policy-
maker might increase interest rates, even though there has been no change in 
underlying preferences. The estimated coefficient on inflation in the policy reaction 
function would rise, and it would be legitimate to conclude that it indicates a stronger 
reaction to inflation; but it would be invalid to conclude that the weight on inflation 
variability in policy-makers’ welfare has increased. 
 
The third issue relates to the interpretation of the constant term in the regression. A 
common approach in many estimated policy reaction functions is to interpret the 
estimated long-run constant term as composed of the sum of the equilibrium real 
interest rate, i *, and the inflation target, П*. Such analysis (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch, 
1998; Clarida et al., 1998, 2000) of the constant term proceeds along the lines of 
fixing the values of either i *or П* a priori and then deriving the implied i *or П*. 
Unlike these studies, the research estimations do not give such a structural 
interpretation of the constant term. This is because of the difficulties in deriving 
accurate measures of i *and П* from developing country data. Lastly, given that this 
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thesis uses monthly data, the interest rate responses to be estimated are expected to 
be lower than would be the case if data in quarterly frequency were used. 
 
5.2.7 Interest Rate Responses 
Theory suggests that the long-run inflation coefficient in the policy reaction function 
should exceed unity for monetary policy to deliver price stability sustainably. Thus, 
it is expected that a rise in inflation above target would lead to a more than 
proportionate increase in official interest rates. Also, if output exceeds its potential 
i.e. if the output gap is positive, theory suggests a rise in interest rates. The size of 
interest rate change for a percentage point change in the output gap suggested in 
Taylor (1993) is 0.5. Some researchers have proposed higher weights - e. g. Ball 
(1999a) who proposes a weight of at least one. 
 
There have been a number of studies on exchange rates, e.g. Gould and Kamin 
(2000), who argue that generally monetary authorities tighten policy during periods 
of strong downward pressure on the exchange rate and loosen policy as the pressure 
is alleviated. Similarly, Clarida (2001) argues that when a currency depreciates 
(relative to, say, PPP), inflationary expectations tend to rise. As such, even when the 
central bank is not targeting the exchange rate, the bank’s desire to stabilise inflation 
expectations will lead it to raising nominal and real interest rates when the currency 
is weakening and lower the same when the currency is strengthening. This reaction, 
in turn, will tend to appreciate the exchange rate when it is weak and weaken the 
exchange rate when it is strong. Thus in practice, monetary policy aimed at achieving 
only domestic objectives may also serve to stabilise the exchange rate. It is, thus, 
expected that depreciation in the external value of the local currency would lead to 
an increase in interest rates, and vice versa. 
 
It is also expected that increases in foreign exchange reserves and increases in the 
real US dollar price of main exports would lead to a reduction in interest rates and, 
under the opposite scenario, to increases in interest rates for arguments similar to 
those advanced for the exchange rate. It is, however, conceivable that if increases in 
the real dollar price of exports are expected to lead to rises in farm gate prices of 
these products and hence to surge in aggregate demand, interest rates may be raised. 
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5.3 Empirical Results 
This section characterises Ghana’s monetary policy by investigating the consistency 
of three hypotheses for monetary policy conduct. That is, the section investigates the 
representativeness of first, inflation targeting in the strictest sense; second, the 
baseline variable (inflation and output gap); and third, a broader information set 
(shown in (5.9c)) for monetary policy conduct in Ghana. The sample period is 
1992M1 - 2007M1: a period when monetary policy was conducted by indirect 
instruments and price stability was expected to be the prominent policy objective. 
Inflation is measured by headline inflation and output gap by the deviation of real 
private sector credit from linear trend. The policy interest rate is the interest rate on 
the 91-Day Treasury bill paper until March 2002, then the Prime Rate until 
December 2007.  
 
Figure 5.3: A Plot of Policy Rate and Inflation 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the policy rate below inflation over some periods in the dataset. It 
also shows a sharp fall in policy rate in 2002 and continuous fall thereafter, which 
may be a sign of a structural break in the dataset. A dummy variable (takes the value 
0 from 1992M1 - 2002M3 and the value 1 from 2003M4 - 2007M1) is included to 
check for any structural break in the policy rate.  
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The estimation results are presented in Tables 5.3.1, 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b for the first 
hypothesis; 5.3.2 for the second. The third hypothesis is presented in Tables 5.3.3 
and a summary and discussion of the results provided in Section 5.3.5. 
 
5.3.1 Consistency of the Strict Inflation Targeting Assumption with the Data 
Investigating the consistency of the strict inflation targeting hypothesis with the data 
involved the use of inflation as the sole regressor using the PSS methodology. In 
addition, twelve lags of monthly changes of inflation and the policy interest rate are 
included in the model. A binary dummy variable, which is 0 from 1992M1 -2002M3 
and 1 from 2002M4-2007M1, is included to check for structural breaks. 
Following the model selection, the resulting specification is reproduced in Table 
5.3.1 below. 
Table 5.3.1 
The dependent variable is change in the Policy interest rate, DPR 
Sample 1992 M1 to 2007M1 
Regressor Coefficient                      Standard Error               T-Ratio [Prob] 
 C 
 PR(-1) 
 ANF1M(-1) 
 DPR(-1) 
 DPR(-4) 
 DUMM 
      1.2963                      0.48507                           2.6724 [0.008] 
                -0.043788                 0.014146                        -3.0953 [0.002] 
0.0078840                0.0048059                       1.6405 [0.103] 
 0.34313                   0.067228                         5.1041 [0.000] 
 0.16738                   0.066544                         2.5154 [0.013] 
                 -0.60086                  0.27474                           -2.1870[0.030] 
R-Squared                          0.22063             R-Bar-Squared                   0.19836 
S.E. of Regression            1.2751                F-stat.    F( 5, 175)              9.9080[.000] 
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Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=  6.6756[0.878]             F(12, 163)=   0.52016[0.900] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=     0.62280[0.430]           F(1, 174)=     0.60078[0.439] 
Normality                     CHSQ(2)=     189.6001[0.000]          Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(1)=     1.1879[0.276]              F(1, 179)=    1.1826[0.278] 
Note: 
PR                     : Policy Interest Rate 
ANF1M            : The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation  
DUMM             : A Dummy Variable which is 0 from 1992M1 - 2002M3 and 1 from                             
                            2002M4 - 2007M1 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation in levels is insignificant but correctly-signed. The dummy variable is 
significant at 5 percent confirming a structural break in the data set. We therefore 
split the data in two to investigate the consistency of the strict inflation targeting 
hypothesis. Results of the dataset from 1992m1-2002m3 are shown in Table 5.3.1a 
and that of the dataset from 2002M4 – 2007M1 in Table 5.3.1b. 
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Table 5.3.1a 
The dependent variable is change in the Policy Rate, DPR 
Sample 1992M1 to 2002M3 
Regressor Coefficient                      Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 C 
 PR(-1) 
 ANF1M(-1) 
 DPR(-1) 
 1.1848                                 0.58904              2.0113[0.047] 
-0.039941                            0.017289            -2.3101[0.023] 
         0.0072407                           0.0068704           1.0539[0.294] 
         0.41732                               0.081682             5.1091[0.000] 
R-Squared                          0.21759               R-Bar-Squared                 0.19787 
S.E. of Regression            1.4802                  F-stat.    F(3, 119)             11.0316[0.000] 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=  11.1813[0.513]         F(12, 107)=   0.89162[0.558] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=     1.6726[0.196]           F(1, 118)=     1.6268[0.205] 
Normality                     CHSQ(2)=     74.7208[0.000]          Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(1)=     0.045136[0.832]        F(1, 121)=    0.044418[0.833] 
Note: 
PR                    :  Policy Rate 
ANF1M            :  The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation in levels is again insignificant but correctly-signed. Testing for the 
existence of a relationship in levels between the policy interest rate and inflation with 
a constant as the only deterministic variable in the model gives an F-statistic of 11.03. 
The high F-statistic implies a conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to 
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know the integration/cointegration status of the regressors. It indicates the existence 
of a long-term (levels) relationship between the policy interest rate and inflation. 
However, the t-ratio of the lag of policy interest rate (2.31) being less than critical 
value bound of the t-statistic implies that although a level relationship between the 
policy interest rate and inflation exists, the speed of convergence of the variables to 
equilibrium is sufficiently slow as not to be significantly different from zero. 
The long–run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium and given by (Pearson, Shin and Smith, 2001). 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                              (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1 , b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model.
 
Substituting into the above equation with standard error in parentheses gives: 
PR = 29.664 + 0.181 ANF1M 
                                                                    (0.007) 
Therefore, based on the insignificance of inflation, and its low coefficient and 
evidence of model misspecification, it is concluded that an assumption of inflation 
targeting in the strict sense may not be the most appropriate description of Ghana’s 
monetary policy between 1992M1 and 2002M3. 
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Table 5.3.1b 
The dependent variable is change in the Policy Interest Rate, DPR 
Sample 2002M4 to 2007M1 
 Regressor Coefficient                     Standard Error                   T-Ratio [Prob] 
 C 
 PR (-1) 
 ANF1M (-1) 
 DANF1M (-9) 
 DPR (-9) 
            -0.093775                    0.35479                               -0.26431 [0.793] 
-0.021360                     0.017957                             -1.1895 [0.240] 
0.015847                     0.0037474                            4.2287 [0.000] 
0.010143                     0.0033026                            3.0714 [0.003] 
-0.16313                      0.066755                             -2.4438 [0.018] 
R-Squared                          0.36844                       R-Bar-Squared                   0.32077 
S.E. of Regression             0.59307                        F-stat.    F(4,  53)               7.7298[.000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=   15.6036[0.210]          F(12, 41)=   1.2575[0.280] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=      0.030742[0.861]        F(1, 52)=     0.027577[0.869] 
Normality                      CHSQ(2)=     19.8601[0.000]          Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(1)=     1.6344[0.201]             F(1, 56)=     1.6238[0.208] 
Note: 
PR                     : Policy Interest Rate 
ANF1M            : The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation in levels is now significant and correctly-signed. Testing for the existence 
of a relationship in levels between the policy interest rate and inflation with a 
constant as the only deterministic variable in the model gives an F-statistic of 7.73. 
The high F-statistic implies a conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to 
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know the integration/cointegration status of the regressors. It indicates the existence 
of a long-term (levels) relationship between the policy interest rate and inflation. 
However, the t-ratio of the lag of policy interest rate (i.e. 1.19) being less than the 
critical value bound of the t-statistic implies that though a level relationship between 
the policy interest rate and inflation exists, the speed of convergence of the variables 
to equilibrium is slow as not to be significantly different from zero. 
The long–run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium and given by (Pearson, Shin and Smith, 2001). 
 i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u              (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1, b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model. 
Substituting into the above equation with standard error in parentheses gives: 
 
PR = -4.390 + 0.742 ANF1M   
          (0.004) 
A one per cent increase in inflation raises the policy interest rate by 0.74 percentage 
points, which is higher than the 0.18 percentage points witnessed between 1992 M1 
and 2002 M3. The high inflation coefficient may reflect the fact that Ghana’s central 
bank established an implicit inflation targeting framework in 2002. However, the 
value is still lower than the reference value of 1.5 proposed by Taylor (1993). 
Therefore, based on the low inflation coefficient and evidence of model 
misspecification, this investigation again concludes that an assumption of inflation 
targeting in the strict sense may not be the most appropriate description of Ghana’s 
monetary policy between 2002M4 - 2007M1. 
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5.3.2 Baseline Variables Specification 
Extending the information set by output gap, to make the specification consistent 
with the Taylor rule, we began with twelve lags of monthly changes in the policy 
interest rate, inflation, and the output gap. The final form of the model is shown in 
Table 5.3.2 below. 
Table 5.3.2 
The dependent variable is Change in Policy Interest Rate, DPR 
Sample 1992M1 to 2007M1 
 
Regressor Coefficient                    Standard Error         T-Ratio [Prob] 
C 
PR (-1) 
ANF1M (-1) 
LLRCPS (-1) 
DPR (-1) 
       0.56078                           0.34523               1.6244 [0.106] 
      -0.026512                        0.011528             -2.2998 [0.023] 
0.0083759                        0.0049377           1.6963 [0.092] 
       -0.48134                          0.27039               -1.7801 [0.077] 
  0.35908                            0.067858             5.2916 [0.000] 
 R-Squared                          0.18985                 R-Bar-Squared                   0.17144 
 S.E. of Regression             1.2964                   F-stat.    F(4, 176)               10.3112[0.000] 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=   11.3546[0.499]          F(12, 164)=   0.91473[0.534] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=      1.4587[0.227]            F(1, 175)=     1.4218[0.235] 
Normality                     CHSQ(2)=      217.5857[0.000]         Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(1)=      0.46225[0.497]           F(1, 179)=    0.45831[0.499] 
Note: 
PR            : Policy Interest Rate 
ANF1M   : The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation 
LLRCPS: The deviation from trend of the log or real private sector credit (The    
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                  measure of output gap)    
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation and output in levels are both significant at 10 per cent, but while inflation 
remains correctly-signed, output gap is incorrectly-signed. Examining the residuals 
(Appendix III), we find that not only are they smaller in absolute terms but also they 
do not exhibit the pronounced cyclical swings associated with mis-fitted models. 
The computed F-statistic for testing the existence of a level relationship between the 
policy interest rate and inflation and output gap with a constant as the only 
deterministic variable is 10.31. At the 0.01 critical value bounds, the test statistic 
indicates the existence of such a relationship. The bounds t-test, at the 0.05 critical 
value bounds, confirms the existence of a relationship. However, the speed of 
convergence of the variables to equilibrium is sufficiently slow as not to be 
significantly different from zero. The long–run coefficients are derived by assuming 
that all variables are constant in equilibrium and it is given by equation 5.11 below: 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u               (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1, b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model. 
The computed long-run interest rate response to inflation and output gap is, 
respectively, 0.32 and -18.16. 
Substituting into the above equation with standard errors in parentheses gives: 
PR = 21.152 + 0.316 ANF1M – 18.156 LLRCPS 
                                                                      (0.005)              (0.270) 
The coefficients suggest that (i) holding the effect of output gap constant, a one 
percentage point rise in inflation leads to a 0.32 percentage point rise in the policy 
interest rate; and (ii) holding the effect of inflation constant, a one percent rise in 
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output above trend leads to 0.18 percentage points reduction in the policy interest 
rate. 
The incorrectly-signed policy interest rate response to output gap and the minute 
policy interest rate response to inflation suggest an absence of central bank 
commitment to price stability over 1992M1 - 2007M1. In particular, the incorrectly-
signed interest rate response to output gap suggests that the central bank’s monetary 
policy conduct over the period accommodated aggregate demand pressures. Possible 
reasons include the central bank’s actual objective being one of boosting output and 
employment rather than maintaining price stability; and with a belief in the Phillips 
Curve relationship, it may deliberately have aimed to accommodate some level of 
inflation to achieve this objective - a typical dynamic inconsistency problem. 
Another plausible explanation is that, while mindful of the need to respond 
appropriately to aggregate demand pressures, the central bank was unable to because 
of the budgetary implications of rises in the Treasury bill rate, given that sizeable 
issues of Treasury bills are to fund the government budget. As such, large issues over 
and above government budgetary needs further exacerbate the fiscal burden, 
necessitating an accommodative monetary policy stance. 
 
5.3.3 A Generalised Specification 
Estimating with information set X3, and with six lags of the variables in differences, 
the parsimonious representation has headline inflation, US Federal Reserve fund rate, 
and oil prices in US dollars and foreign reserve in US dollars correctly-signed and 
significant in levels. Output gap is significant but incorrectly-signed. In difference 
form, the significant variables are the policy interest rate, oil prices in US dollars, 
and US Federal Reserve fund rate. Broad money is found not to be significant. Table 
5.3.3 shows the results.  
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Table 5.3.3 
The dependent variable is Change in Policy Interest Rate, DPR 
 Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
Regressor       Coefficient       Standard Error           T-Ratio[Prob] 
 C 
 PR (-1) 
 FFR (-1) 
 LLRCPS (-1) 
 LROIL (-1) 
 LTRMG (-1) 
 DFFR 
 DLROIL (-6) 
  DPR (-1) 
        6.4932                 1.8627                     3.4858[0.001] 
       -0.32535              0.014705                -2.2126[0.028] 
    0.13466               0.065573                 2.0536[0.042] 
-0.98973              0.32024                   -3.0906[0.002] 
 1.1308                 0.44394                   2.5472[0.012] 
-0.72673              0.21661                  -3.3550[0.001] 
    1.6329                 0.59821                   2.7297[0.007] 
2.7744                1.3015                     2.1318[0.034] 
   0.26081                0.069224                3.7676[0.000] 
      R-Squared                          0.28266                                  R-Bar-Squared                  0.24930 
      S.E. of Regression             1.2340                                     F-stat.    F(10, 172)          8.4720[.000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=   8.8251[0.718]           F(12, 160)=   0.68342[0.766] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=      0.21698[0.641]         F(1, 171)=     0.20524[0.651] 
Normality                     CHSQ(2)=      144.6391[0.000]       Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(1)=      2.5231[0.112]           F(1, 179)=     2.5304[0.113] 
Note: 
PR        : Policy Interest Rate 
LCPI   : Log of headline inflation 
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FFR     : US Federal Reserve fund rate 
LLRCPS: The deviation from trend of the log or real private sector credit (The    
                 measure of output gap)    
LROIL: Log of Oil prices in US dollars 
LTRMG: Log of foreign reserves in US dollars 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Testing for the existence of a relationship in levels between the policy interest rate 
and inflation, output gap, US Federal Reserve fund rate, and oil prices in US dollars 
and foreign reserve in US dollars, the estimated F-statistic of 8.47 finds such a 
relationship at the 5 per cent level. The finding is confirmed by the bounds t-test, 
suggesting the existence of a level relationship. The long–run coefficients are derived 
by assuming that all variables are constant in equilibrium and it is given by equation 
(5.11) below: 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                     (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1, b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model. 
Substituting into the above equation with standard errors in parentheses gives: 
PR = 19.958 + 0.414FFR – 3.042 LLRCPS + 3.476 LROIL – 2.234 LTRMG 
                                          (0.066)           (0.320)            (0.444)                 (0.217) 
The long-run policy interest rate response output gap is -0.030 suggesting that, 
ceteris paribus, a one per cent rise in output gap leads to a 0.030 percentage point 
fall in the policy interest rate. While the model diagnostics are good, the negative 
long-run response to a rise in output, together with inflation being insignificant, 
suggests that monetary policy was not stabilising over 1992M1 - 2007M1. The long-
run response to US Federal Reserve fund rate, oil prices in US dollars and foreign 
reserves in US dollars are, however, significant. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to find the best empirical characterisation of Ghana’s 
monetary policy conduct over the period 1992M1 - 2007M1, by investigating the 
consistency of three hypotheses for monetary policy with the data. The first 
hypothesis was that while the central bank may observe other variables, it sets 
interest rates in response only to inflation. The second was that inflation and output 
gap are a fair representation of the central bank’s information set for monetary policy 
conduct, as outlined by the Taylor rule. The third hypothesis was that Ghana’s 
monetary policy conduct was better characterised by a broader information set. We 
then determined how stabilising Ghana’s monetary policy was by comparing the 
long-run interest rate responses with the theoretically specified weights.  
Considering the strict inflation targeting hypothesis, inflation is correctly-signed for 
both periods, but only significant for the period 2002M4-2007M1. There is a long-
term relationship in levels between the change in policy interest rate and inflation, 
but the speed of convergence of the variables to equilibrium is sufficiently slow as 
not to be significantly different from zero. Also the residuals suggested possible 
omission of important variable(s). 
Regarding the second hypothesis, inflation and output are both significant only at 10 
per cent, but while inflation remains correctly-signed, output is negatively signed. 
The test statistics indicate and confirm the existence of a relationship but with this 
hypothesis, as in the first, the speed of convergence of the variables to equilibrium is 
sufficiently slow as not to be significantly different from zero. The results of a rival 
model test (McCallum 1995a) which uses money stock as the policy instrument are 
shown in Appendix XA and XB.42  
With the broader information set, inflation is insignificant and output is significant 
but incorrectly-signed. Testing for the existence of a relationship in levels between 
the policy interest rate and inflation, output gap, US Federal Reserve fund rate, oil 
prices and foreign reserve both in US dollars, the estimated F-statistic of 8.47 finds 
such a relationship at the 5 per cent level. The finding is confirmed by the bounds t-
test, suggesting the existence of a relationship in levels. However, with responses to 
                                                
42
 The results appear to perform better and should be an area for future research. 
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inflation and broad money being insignificant, it is right to conclude that the country 
had no stable monetary policy in place over this period. With regards to variable 
significance/insignificance in levels, we find inflation correctly-signed across all 
specifications, and predominantly significant. Output gap is robustly negatively-
signed and usually significant, strongly indicating a destabilising monetary policy. 
Broad money is insignificant over the period, suggesting that the central bank may 
have paid less attention to it than it did to inflation. 
The other two variables expected to be important to the BOG are foreign exchange 
reserves and the exchange rate, as the central bank is charged with the management 
of the country’s foreign exchange reserves and with the protection of the external 
value of the local currency. The estimations found foreign exchange reserves 
consistently correctly (negatively) signed and significant, however, the real effective 
exchange rate is insignificant, suggesting that the central bank raised the policy rate 
with cuts in foreign exchange reserves and vice versa, which is its foreign exchange 
reserves management mandate. Independently, this also suggests an absence of focus 
on the exchange rate, at least in real effective terms.  
The significance of the US federal funds rate and US dollar price of oil suggests that 
the BOG conducts monetary policy taking cognisance of foreign monetary policy 
and international market volatility. 
 
Inflation targeting is intended to provide benefits in terms of a credible commitment 
to controlling inflation along with a more consistent and predictable conduct of 
monetary policy. In order to preserve these benefits, some changes in the targeting 
procedure seem called for. In particular, it would be desirable to make the central 
bank response to inflation, exchange rate, output gap and money supply more 
transparent and allow interest rate increases to levels that are necessary to control 
inflation. 
 
Chapter 6 goes beyond the monetary policy rules approach to evaluating policy 
effectiveness, by assessing the efficiency of policy on the basis of the strength of 
responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates to policy interest rate, which is the 
central tenet of monetary policy. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Commercial Bank Retail Rate Response to Policy Interest 
Rates 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The monetary policy reaction functions estimated in the previous chapter evaluated 
monetary policy effectiveness on the basis of the size and significance of coefficients. 
This chapter looks beyond the monetary policy rules approach to evaluating policy 
effectiveness, assessing the efficiency of policy on the basis of the strength of 
responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates to policy interest rate. This bivariate 
analysis of monetary policy effectiveness serves a second purpose: to broaden the 
empirical literature on the responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates to changes 
in policy interest rates that has hardly been extended to African countries. 
Additionally, the investigation serves as a prelude to fuller investigation of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in the next chapter where the effectiveness with 
which monetary policy achieves some desired combination of goals is evaluated. 
 
According to economic theory a prominent channel of monetary policy transmission 
is the interest rate channel. The mechanics of this channel are that a contraction of 
monetary policy raises the short-term nominal interest rate. Then, through a 
combination of sticky prices and rational expectations, the long-term real interest rate 
rises, at least for a period. The higher real interest rate is argued to reduce business 
investments and consumer durable expenditures, which cause aggregate output and 
employment to shrink. The important underpinning of the interest rate channel is the 
presumption that monetary policy has its strongest influence on short-term interest 
rates (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Notwithstanding this view, a growing body of 
literature (see Section 3.2) has shown that retail bank interest rates respond 
sluggishly to changes in the policy interest rate. The complete pass-through from 
changes in the policy interest rates to retail bank rates, if found, takes several 
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months43. Against this background and the objectives of the chapter, this chapter 
explores five fundamental questions/issues. First is whether there is co-movement 
between commercial bank retail rates and the policy interest rate. Second is the 
strength of short-run response of the commercial banks retail rates to changes in the 
policy interest rate. Third is the extent of long-run response of commercial bank 
retail rates to changes in the policy interest rate and, in particular, whether this is 
unity. Fourth is whether the response of the commercial bank retail rates is 
asymmetric with respect to increases and decreases in the policy rate. Fifth is the 
time profile of the response of retail rates to shocks to the policy interest rate. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. This introduction is followed by an outline of the 
analytical techniques employed for evaluating the five questions enumerated. Results 
from the empirical investigations then follow in Section 6.3. The chapter concludes 
in Section 6.4. 
 
6.2 Empirical Techniques and Data 
In addition to simple plots of the two interest rate series, this thesis employs two 
empirical techniques to investigate the responsiveness of commercial bank retail 
rates to policy interest rates: (i) the PSS modified single equation cointegration and 
error correction estimation method, and (ii) impulse response functions from a 
bivariate vector autoregression model. 
 
6.2.1 Informal Graphical Analysis 
Simple plots of the policy interest rate and commercial bank retail rates enable 
informal inferences on co-movement between the two interest rates and the likely 
speed of adjustment of commercial bank retail rates to the policy interest rate to be 
made. If the speed of adjustment is low, for extended periods of time, the spread 
between the two rates would tend to persist or the variability in the spread would be 
high. In contrast, if the response of the retail rate is rapid, the spread will be 
eliminated quickly, its variability would be low, and its plot would appear stationary. 
 
                                                
43
 If lags between changes in base rate and changes in bank product interest rates do exist, the use of 
interest rates as the key instrument of monetary policy may not be as effective as policy-makers think. 
(Heffernan, 1996). 
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6.2.2 The Single Equation Cointegration and Error Correction Method 
The research uses the modified single equation cointegration and error correction 
estimation method developed by Pesaran et al. (2001), a summary of which is 
provided in sub-Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5 to quantify the short-run and long-run 
responses of commercial bank retail rates to the policy interest rate, and investigate 
asymmetries in pass-through when the policy rate increases compared to when it 
decreases, Specifically, we estimate equation (6.1) below: 
 
∆TMTDRt = c0 + c1TMTDRt-1 +c2PRt-1 + ∑
=
p
m 1
c3m∆TMTDRt-m + ∑
=
p
m 0
c4∆PRt-m 
+ut           …                                                                                                      (6.1) 
 
The dependent variable is the change in commercial bank retail rate, ∆TMTDR; and 
PRt is the central bank policy interest rate. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, this 
representation of the error correction model is superior to the traditional models of its 
kind as it is robust to the stationarity conditions of the data: it is valid whether the 
data are I(1) or I(0). 
 
The statistic underlying the Pesaran et al. (2001) procedure is the F-statistic in a 
generalised Dickey-Fuller type regression. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of 
asymptotic critical values for the two polar cases - one, that all regressors are purely 
I(1); and two, that they are purely I(0). The two sets of asymptotic critical values 
provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors. If the F-statistic 
falls inside these bounds, inference is inconclusive and knowledge of the order of 
integration of the underlying variables is required before conclusive inference is 
made. However, if the computed F-statistic falls outside the critical value bounds, a 
conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to know the integration status of 
the underlying regressors. Where a relationship in levels is found, a related bounds 
test based on the t-statistic associated with the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable is conducted, to confirm the existence of the levels relationship. 
 
Serially uncorrelated errors (ut) are ensured by including sufficiently long lags of 
changes in the interest rates. The problem of over-parameterising is avoided by 
following the general-to-specific modelling strategy, and in particular the AIC that is 
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emphasised by PSS. Having estimated equation (6.1), the test for a relationship in 
levels between TMTDRt and PRt is by the F-test for the joint significance of the 
lagged-level variables, where the null hypothesis is   H0c1 : c1 = 0  ∩  H0c2 c2= 0;  
and the alternative hypothesis is H1c1 : c1 ≠ 0  ∪  H1c2 c2 ≠ 0. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it implies an absence of levels or long-run 
relationship between the lending rate and the policy interest rate, and a specification 
in first differences is estimated to prevent the risk of spurious regression. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, we test the null hypothesis   H0c1 : c1 = 0  using the bounds 
procedure based on the t-statistic tc1. If H0c1 : c1 = 0  is rejected, a large value of the 
statistic testing the null will result, confirming the existence of a levels relationship. 
On the other-hand if the null is not rejected, it implies that although a levels 
relationship between the lending rate and the policy interest rate exists, the speed of 
convergence of the variables to equilibrium is so slow as not to be significantly 
different from zero. We derive the long–run coefficients by assuming that all 
variables are constant in equilibrium, so that Equation (6.1) reduces to: 
0 = c0 + c1 TMTDR +c1 PR                                                             (6.2) 
which can be re-arranged as: 
TMTDR = w0 + w2PR                                                                    (6.3) 
The long-run constant, w0, and the long-run coefficient on the policy interest rate, w2, 
are given by: 
w0 = - c0/c1               and        w2 = - c2/c1 
where, c0 is the constant term, c1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level retail rates, 
and c2 the coefficient associated with the policy interest rate in levels in the short-run 
model. The long-run constant, w0, reflects the mark-up on the policy interest rate, and 
w2 reflects the long-run pass through of the policy interest rate. Under competitive 
market conditions and assuming a credit risk premium, the commercial bank retail 
rate is expected to move one-for-one with the policy interest rate (Borio and Fritz, 
1995). That is, w2 is expected to equal one. 
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Inferences on short-run behaviour are made from coefficients on the terms in 
differences. The coefficient c40 reflects the immediate pass-through of changes in the 
policy rate; c41, the pass-through after one month, etc. Short-run behaviour is also 
inferred from the coefficient on the lagged-level lending rate. This statistic gives the 
extent of error correction in one month. 
To answer the question of whether transmission is faster if the policy rate increases 
than if it decreases, we include interactions of a dummy that takes a value of one if 
the policy rate has risen compared to the month before and zero otherwise with 
changes in the policy interest rate. Where relevant, lags of the interacted dummy are 
included.  
 
6.2.3 Vector Error Correction Analysis 
Although the cointegration and error correction framework would provide 
information on the short and long–run relationships between the policy interest rate 
and commercial bank savings rate, it is important to combine this with additional 
information on the dynamics of this relationship. In particular, we are interested in 
knowing how long, on average, it takes for the retail rate to settle to its long-run 
steady state after being shocked. To shed light on this, this thesis uses impulse 
response functions from a vector error correction (VECM) model. The specification 
of the VECM used is outlined in Section 6.3.3. 
 
 
6.2.4 The Data 
The estimation uses monthly series of the policy interest rate and commercial bank 
savings interest rate, given the emphasis on adjustment path. This is also in line with 
the empirical literature. The research uses savings interest rates as there are no 
reliable data on lending rates over the period.  The policy interest rate is the 90 day 
Treasury bill instrument up to March 2002, then the Prime rate afterwards. The 
policy rate is from the IFS but the retail rate is from BOG database, and is the simple 
average of commercial bank sector savings rates. 
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The sample period remains as in Chapter 5 i.e. 1992M1-2007M12. During this 
period, as argued in Chapter 3, commercial bank interest rates and credits were not 
administratively controlled and in March 2002, BOG became administratively 
independent. 
 
 
6.3 Empirical Results 
This section analyses monetary policy effectiveness, measured by the responsiveness 
of the commercial bank savings rate to changes in the policy interest rate. This 
investigation employs three techniques - graphical analysis, the PSS modified single 
equation cointegration and error correction method, and bivariate VAR/VCEM 
model. The results are presented in this order.  
 
6.3.1 Graphical Analysis 
Figure 6.3.1a plots the levels of the prime rate (PR) and the commercial bank savings 
rate (TMTDR) while Figure 6.3.1b plots the spread between the two rates. Figure 
6.3.1a shows the TMTDR and PR generally moving together, but at varied rates of 
change. Figure 6.3.1b, which shows the spread as trended, reinforces the observed 
varied rates of change of the two interest rates. However, a DF t-statistic (τ µ) of -
3.5744 (see Appendix Table I) indicates stationarity of the spread at the 5 per cent 
significance level and suggests a presence of a levels relationship between the two 
interest rates over the period 1992M1-2007M1.  
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Figure 6.3.1a 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3.1b 
 
 
 
A Graph of Policy Rate (PR) and Savings Rate (TMTDR) 
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6.3.2 The Single Equation Cointegration and Error Correction Method 
Estimating Equation (6.1), the modified single equation cointegration and error 
correction model for the savings rate and the policy interest rate for the period 
1992M1-2007M1, began with 12 lags of monthly changes in the savings rate and in 
the policy interest rate. A dummy variable is included to check for any structural 
breaks in the data. Upon reduction, the preferred specification is shown in Table 
6.3.2a below. 
 
Table 6.3.2a 
Dependent variable is Change in Savings Interest Rate (DTMTDR) 
Sample 1992M1-2007M1 
Regressor Coefficient                Standard Error                           T-Ratio [Prob] 
C 
TMTDR (-1) 
PR (-1) 
DPR (-1) 
DPR (-2) 
   -0.24089                       0.28680                           -0.83991 [.402] 
    -0.058131                      0.027129                         -2.1428 [.034] 
    0.052672                       0 .026174                        2.0124 [.046] 
    0.37665                         0.062015                         6.0735 [.000] 
    0.15678                         0.061536                         2.5477 [.012] 
R-Squared                         0.33032                       R-Bar-Squared                 0.31510 
S.E. of Regression            1.0829                         F-stat.   F(4, 176)              21.7030[0.000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                      LM Version                                         F Version           
Serial Correlation          CHSQ(12)=   13.4625[0.336]          F(12, 164)=   1.0982[0.365] 
Functional Form           CHSQ(1)=      0.053600[0.817]        F(1, 175)=     0.051839[0.820] 
Normality                     CHSQ(2)=      287.2647[0.000]        Not applicable        
  
Heteroscedasticity        CHSQ(4)=      4.5367[0.338]            F(1, 172)=     1.1055[0.356] 
 
Note: 
PR : Policy Interest Rate 
TMTDR: Three Month Time Deposit Rate (The measure of savings interest rate)    
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
 177 
The F-statistic of 21.70 at the 0.01 critical value bounds indicates a levels 
relationship between the two interest rates. However, the t-ratio of the lag of 
commercial bank savings rate (2.14), being less than the critical value bound of the t-
statistic, implies that although a levels relationship between the policy interest rate 
and inflation exists, the speed of convergence of the variables to equilibrium is so 
slow as not to be significantly different from zero. The results thus support the 
inference from the graphical analysis of a possible levels relationship between the 
two interest rates. For this period, the contemporaneous effect of a percentage point 
rise in the policy interest rate is a rise in the savings rate by 0.38, increasing by a 
further 0.16 after the second month. The insignificance of the dummy variable 
indicates that there is no structural break in the data set. 
The long-run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium, with standard error in parentheses are given by: 
 
TMTDR =    -4.144    +    0.906PR 
                                       (0 .026) 
 
A one percent increase in the policy interest rate raises the savings interest rate by 
0.91 percentage points, which indicates a high pass-through rate44. However, the 
value is still lower than the unity reference value. 
 
Testing whether commercial banks’ response to changes in the policy interest rate 
depends on the level of the savings rate in the previous month (i.e. TMTDR (-1)). It is 
found to be significant even at 5 per cent. The results are shown in Table 6.3.2a 
above. 
 
To investigate the existence of asymmetries in the response of commercial bank 
saving rates to the policy interest rate, a dummy (DUM) that takes a value of 1 when 
the policy interest rate increases and zero otherwise is interacted with the 
contemporaneous and first lag of the policy interest rate in differences. As shown in 
Table 6.3.2b, the interactive dummies are not significant, thus failing to provide a 
conclusion on asymmetries for the period 1992M1-2007M1. 
                                                
44
 The diagnostic tests are shown in Table IX in the Appendix. 
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 Table 6.3.2b 
Dependent variable is Change in Savings Interest Rate 
Sample 1992M2 to 2007M1 
Regressor      Coefficient             Standard Error         T-Ratio [Prob] 
C 
TMTDR (-1) 
PR (-1) 
DPR (-1) 
DPR (-2) 
DUMDPR 
DUMDPR(-1) 
         -0.28355                0.28954             -0.97931 [0.329] 
-0.062464              0.027339            -2.2848 [0.024] 
      0.055654               0.026372           2.1103 [0.036] 
   0.33238                 0.086492           3.8430 [0.000] 
   0.15924                 0.062047           2.5665 [0.011] 
           0.13818                 0.093193           1.4827[0.140] 
           0.046523               0.12829             0.36263[0.717] 
 R-Squared                        0.33461                                R-Bar-Squared          0.31153 
 S.E. of Regression            1.0843                                 F-stat.    F(6, 173)     14.4994[0.000] 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
   Test Statistics                  LM Version                             F Version           
Serial Correlation    CHSQ(12)=  13.2304[0.353]          F(12, 161)=   1.0644[0.394] 
Functional Form      CHSQ(1)=    0.38980[0.532]          F(1, 172)=     0.37328[0.542] 
Normality                CHSQ(2)=    290.7027[0.000]         Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity    CHSQ(6)=   5.9111[0.433]            F(6, 167)=     0.94507[0.464] 
 
         
Note: 
PR        : Policy Interest Rate 
TMTDR: Three Month Time Deposit Rate (The measure of savings interest rate)    
 
DUMDPR: Dummy variable is interacted with the contemporaneous policy interest 
rate  
DUMDPR (-1): Dummy variable is interacted with the first lag of the policy interest 
rate in differences  
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
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The hypothesis that policy transmission in Ghana during these periods was through 
moral suasion is also tested. This involves running a regression of the logarithm of 
real private sector credit (LLRCPS) and  the policy interest rate (PR) using the 
modified co-integration and error correction methodology. A binary dummy variable, 
which is 0 from 1992M1 -2002M3 and 1 from 2002M4-2007M1 is included to check 
for structural breaks in the data. Table 6.3.2c shows the preferred specification after 
dropping insignificant terms. 
 
Table 6.3.2c 
Dependent variable is DLLRCPS 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
 
Regressor 
 
Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 C 
  PR (-1) 
 DLLRCPS (-7) 
 DLLRCPS (-12) 
  
   0.015252             0.012283              1.2417[0.216] 
   -0.0002519          0.0004026            -0.62565[0.532] 
   0.18077               0.067354              2.6839[0.008] 
   -0.14999              0.064505            -2.3252[0.021] 
R-Squared                    0.061610               R-Bar-Squared                  0.045705 
S.E. of Regression       0.050583                F-stat.    F(5, 175)             3.8736[0.010]  
 
Diagnostic Tests 
          Test Statistics             LM Version                    F Version          
Serial Correlation  CHSQ(12)=   9.4806[0.661]       F(12, 165)=   0.76002[0.691] 
Functional Form   CHSQ(1)=      1.9598[0.162]       F(1, 176)=     1.9266[0.167] 
Normality            CHSQ(2) =      751.6261[0.000]    Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity  CHSQ(1)=    0.037123[0.847]    F(1, 179)=    0.036721[0.848] 
Note: 
PR        : Policy Interest Rate 
LLRCPS: The deviation from trend of the log or real private sector credit (The 
measure of output gap)    
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Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
 
The table shows that real private sector credit responds negatively and insignificantly 
to the policy stance in levels. The absence of a relationship in levels is interpreted as 
indicating an absence of moral suasion for policy conduct over the period 1992M1-
2007M1. 
 
6.3.3 A VECM Framework. 
To check whether the variables are cointegrated or spuriously related, we need to test 
if they are stationary or of unit roots. The formal approaches employed as in Chapter 
5, for testing for stationarity, are the Dickey Fuller (DF) and the augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) tests and the Ng-Perron tests. The results from the formal tests for 
stationarity are shown in Tables 6.3.3a and 6.3.3b below. 
 
Table 6.3.3a 
Test With Intercept                         Ng-Perron 
                                                              
Variable 
ADF   
Test 
MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
Policy rate -1.217 -2.229 -1.016 0.456 10.693 
Three Months Time 
Deposit Rate 
-1.185 -3.387 -1.213 0.358 7.198 
Test With Intercept and Trend 
 
Policy Rate         -2.185 -2.589 -1.003 0.387 30.554 
Three Months Time 
Deposit Rate 
-1.699 -4.069 -1.347 0.331 21.529 
 
Comparing the values in Table 6.3.3a with the critical values in Table 6.3.3b below 
shows that  the  policy rate and the three months time deposit rate (savings rate) were 
difference stationary variables i.e. they are I(1) variables. 
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Table 6.3.3b 
 
Critical Values (Tests with Intercept) 
 
ττ MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
5%   -2.878   -8.100   -1.980   0.233   3.170 
10%   -2.575   -5.700   -1.620   0.275   4.450 
Critical Values (Tests with Intercept and Trend) 
 
ττ MZa MZt MSB
 
MPT 
5% 
-3.435 -17.300 -2.9100 0.1680 5.480 
10% 
-3.141 -14.200 -2.620 0.185 6.670 
  
 
 
Note: The critical values for the ADF tests have been taken from Fuller (1976, p.373), 
and Dickey and Fuller, (1981, p.1062) and those for the Ng-Perron tests from Ng and 
Perron (2001). 
 
We use the  Johansen cointegration test to determine if the variables are cointegrated. 
The Johansen method, unlike the Engle-Granger approach, allows the testing of 
hypotheses by considering them effectively as restrictions on the cointegrating vector. 
The test developed by Johansen (1991) is given by the VAR equation below: 
 
∆ yt = ∏ yt-k + Γ1 ∆ yt-1 + Γ2 ∆ yt-2+…+ Γk-1 ∆ yt-(k-1) +  υt                   (6.4) 
 
where yt is a p-dimensional vector of the variables. If  ∏  is of zero rank45, there is 
no cointegration, otherwise the rank will give the number of cointegrating vectors. 
 
Starting with VAR (12) of policy interest rate (PR) and commercial bank savings rate 
(TMTDR), the AIC and SBC model selection criteria pointed to VAR(1) as the 
appropriate description of the data (see Appendix Table V). Specifying the 
cointegrating relationship without a time trend, both the trace and maximal eigen 
                                                
45
 That is all the eigenvalues are not significantly different from zero. 
 182 
value tests suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per cent level for 
the period 1992M1-2007M1. The test results are shown in Table 6.3.3c. 
 
Table 6.3.3c 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 TMTDR           PR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.11629   0.0013626 
Null    Alternative    λmax Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0       r = 1            22.3766               14.8800                            12.9800 
 r<= 1      r = 2           0.24681                 8.0700                             6.5000 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 TMTDR           PR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.11629    0.0013626 
Null    Alternative    λtrace Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r>= 1            22.6234               17.8600                      15.7500 
 r<= 1      r = 2            0.24681               8.0700                        6.5000 
 
The long-run relationship between commercial bank savings interest rate and the 
policy rate is given by: 
 
TMTDR = -3.241 + 0.891PR 
                            (0.0249) 
(see Appendix Table VII for the diagnostic tests) 
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The estimates which are similar to the results found in the error correction approach 
suggest that: (i) the policy interest rate is positively correlated with the commercial 
bank savings rate, and (ii) 89 per cent of the shock to the policy interest rate is 
passed-through to the savings rate in the long run. 
 
Having established that the savings interest rate (TMTDR) is cointegrated with the 
policy rate (PR), the short-run dynamics of the model can be exploited using the 
Granger representation theorem. According to this theorem, if a set of variables is 
cointegrated (that is, if there is a long-run relationship between them) then the short-
run dynamics of the long-run relationship can be described by an error-correction 
model as follows: 
 
∑∑
=
−−
=
++++=
n
i
ttiti
n
i
i ECCDTMTDRDPRDTMTDR
1
132
0
10 εββββ                   (6.5) 
 
where EEC is the error correction component and n is set equal to 1, as the AIC and 
SBC model selection criteria point to VAR(1) as the appropriate description of the 
data. The EEC is derived from the long-run relationship and is given by: 
                                     ttt TMTDRTMTDRECC
^
−=                                          (6.6) 
where 
^
tTMTDR is the fitted value of the actual value of TMTDRt. The results are 
showed below in Table 6.3.3d. 
 
Table 6.3.3d 
Error correction model for variable PR estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR (1). Dependent variable is Change in savings rate, DTMTDR 
Sample for estimation from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
 
Regressor Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio [Prob] 
 C 
 DPR(-1) 
 DTMTDR(-1) 
 ECC(-1) 
    -0.012762            0.080372           -0.15878[0.874] 
     0.34974               0.067730           5.1638[0.000] 
     0.40733               0.12459             3.2694[0.001] 
     -0.57651              0.14575             -3.9555[0.000] 
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R-Squared                     0.33827                 R-Bar-Squared            0.32314                
S.E. of Regression        1.0751                    F-stat.    F(4, 175)      22.3643[0.000] 
   
Diagnostic Tests 
    Test Statistics                      LM Version                                   F Version           
Serial Correlation   CHSQ (12) = 11.5900[0.479]      F (12, 163) =  0.93481[0.514] 
Functional Form     CHSQ (1) =   0.14768[0.701]      F (1, 174) =   0.14288[0.706] 
Normality               CHSQ (2) =   248.4794[0.000]     Not applicable        
HeteroscedasticityCHSQ (1) =     0.0064713[0.936]   F (1, 174) =   0.00626[0.937] 
 
Note: 
PR        : Policy Interest Rate 
TMTDR: Three Month Time Deposit Rate (The measure of savings interest rate)    
 
EEC:   Error Correction Term 
 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
 
The inclusion of the error term in the equation allows the integration of short term 
dynamics with the long term equilibria. That is the error correction term represents 
the short-run response necessary to move the system back towards long-run 
equilibrium. The coefficient for EEC (-1) indicates a fairly rapid adjustment of 
savings interest rate towards its equilibrium value. That is, there is a 57.65 per cent 
feedback from the previous period into the short-run dynamics process. 
 
Figures 6.3.3 A and 6.3.3 B below show impulse responses over a sixty month 
horizon. The plot indicates that a one-standard-error shock to the policy interest rate 
(equivalent to a 1.30 percentage point rise) shows no strong sign of convergence over 
the forecast horizon. The contemporaneous response of the savings interest rate is a 
rise of 0.2 percentage points. Over the sixty month horizon, the response of the 
savings rate increases to about six times the magnitude of the impact effect by the 
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first twenty months; but like the policy interest rate it does not show strong evidence 
of convergence. Over the forecast horizon, the two interest rates depict a slowly 
narrowing margin of divergence. 
 
However, the plot indicates that a one-standard-error shock to the savings interest 
rate (equivalent to a 1.10 percentage point rise) shows a fall over the first thirty five 
(35) months period. The contemporaneous response of the policy interest rate is a 
rise of about 0.2 percentage points. 
 
Figure 6.3.3 A 
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Figure 6.3.3 B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The techniques used to analyse the responsiveness of the savings interest rate to the 
policy interest rate showed high responsiveness over the period 1992M1-2007M1. 
Estimating for the sample period showed evidence of level relationship between the 
two interest rates. Both the single equation error correction approach and the pass-
through process within a VECM framework for the savings interest rate and the 
policy interest rate indicate a fairly rapid adjustment of the savings interest rate 
towards its equilibrium value.  
 
The long-run pass-through process shows high responsiveness over the sample 
period. A pass-through value of 0.90 suggests that the policy interest rate is 
positively correlated with the commercial bank savings rate, and about 90 per cent of 
the shock to the policy interest rate is passed-through to the savings rate in the long 
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run. However, this value is lower than unity, which is the reference value in the 
empirical literature. 
 
Assessing the efficiency of monetary policy on the basis of the strength of 
responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates, particularly the saving rate to policy 
interest rates, the research concludes that with a near unity pass-through rate in the 
long-run, monetary policy was largely effective in influencing the savings rate in 
Ghana over the period 1992M1-2007M1. 
 
There was an absence of an asymmetric response over the sample period and there 
was no evidence that commercial banks’ responses to changes in the policy rate 
depended on the level of savings in the previous month. Investigating evidence of the 
use of moral suasion to affect liquidity conditions, none was found.  
 
The results therefore indicate some long-run effectiveness of monetary policy in 
influencing commercial bank retail rates between 1992M1-2007M1 which is the 
initial phase of the transmission process.  
 
Chapter 7 now provides a fuller assessment of monetary policy effectiveness, by the 
transmission mechanism approach, which requires an investigation into how other 
important variables that are either the final objective of policy or the conduit through 
which the final objective of policy is attained, behave in response to monetary policy 
impulses in the transmission mechanism. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism Estimates  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A fuller assessment of the transmission mechanism is the aim of this chapter. 
Chapter 6 assessed Ghana’s monetary policy effectiveness by evaluating the 
responsiveness of the commercial bank retail rates to changes in the policy interest 
rate. While informative, it can be argued that its usefulness is limited because of its 
focus only on the initial phase of the transmission process. A fuller assessment of 
monetary policy effectiveness, by the transmission mechanism approach, would 
require an investigation into how other important variables that are either the final 
objective of policy or the conduit through which the final objective of policy is 
attained, behave in response to monetary policy impulses. This fuller assessment is 
the main objective of this chapter. In meeting this objective, the chapter also provides 
information that holds promise to facilitating the design and implementation of 
monetary policy itself. In particular, it provides a view on the optimal timing of 
policy actions. Furthermore, the chapter cross-references the results it finds with 
those from the single equation models of, first, the monetary policy reaction 
functions of Chapter 5 and, second, the responsiveness of the commercial bank 
savings interest rate to the policy interest rate analysis of Chapter 6. A key 
assumption underlying the estimations in Chapter 5 and 6 is that the information 
variable(s) are at least weakly exogenous (see Appendix Table IX).Chapter 7, which 
relaxes this assumption by recognising the simultaneity amongst the variables, 
should offer a means of establishing the robustness or otherwise of the earlier results. 
 
The earlier review of the literature on the monetary transmission mechanism (in 
Chapter 4) indicated a near consensus on the effect of a contractionary monetary 
policy shock that can be summarised as follows. Interest rates rise initially; and 
monetary aggregates fall. This rise in interest rates is subsequently reversed. Then, 
for up to about six months following the policy tightening, there is an absence of 
effect, or more customarily, an initial rise in output (the output puzzle). Output 
subsequently falls, as theory predicts, a fall that remains sustained for about two 
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years. Prices, usually after some initial rise (the price puzzle) that can extend to two 
years, decline in line with theoretical predictions. 
 
Also the literature holds that where a variable that captures future inflation is 
included in the VAR, the price puzzle is eliminated. These stylised facts are the 
benchmark for analysing the empirical results of this chapter. Following our 
estimations, if the signs and shapes of the impulse responses follow the findings of 
the literature, the faster the speed of transmission of policy impulses to the variables, 
the more effective we deem monetary policy to be. 
 
Beyond this introduction, the chapter consists of two sections and a conclusion. 
Section 7.2 presents the empirical framework. Section 7.3 presents the results of the 
monetary policy transmission and Section 7.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 Empirical Technique and Data 
 
7.2.1 Model Specification  
The analysis in this chapter uses a vector autoregressions and vector error correction 
model (VAR/VECM) as the empirical framework. The advantages of the 
VAR/VECM methodology include: (i) the explicit recognition of simultaneity 
between monetary policy and macroeconomic development, i.e. the dependence of 
monetary policy on macroeconomic variables (the policy reaction function) as well 
as the dependence of economic variables on monetary policy; and (ii) minimal 
restrictions on how shocks affect the economy. We employ a standard VAR model. 
This model arises from a linear, simultaneous equation system between the 
endogenous and exogenous variables of the form in Equation (7.1). 
 
Axt = C (L)xt-1+Dzt                                                                      (7.1) 
 
xt is a vector of endogenous variables and zt a vector of exogenous variables 
(assumed to consist of unobservable variables which are interpreted as disturbances 
to the structural equations). The elements of the matrix A are the structural 
parameters on the contemporaneous endogenous variables and C(L) is the kth degree 
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matrix polynomial in the lag operator L. The matrix D measures the 
contemporaneous response of endogenous variables to exogenous variables. 
 
The reduced form for this system is: 
 
xt = A-1 C (L)xt-1+A-1 Dzt                                                      (7.2) 
 
A particular structural specification of the error term, z, is required to obtain a VAR 
representation. Two alternative and commonly used assumptions are that the shocks 
have temporary or permanent effects. If shocks have temporary effects, zt equals εt, a 
serially uncorrelated vector white noise process. Alternatively, z can be modelled as 
a unit root process. When modelled as a unit root process, z equals past and present 
realisations of ε, hence shocks to z are permanent. 
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter assumes that the exogenous shocks have only 
temporary effects i.e. zt equals εt, a serially uncorrelated vector white noise process. 
For simplicity, it is important that our VAR has a zero mean process for all time, a 
continuous time random process, so that Equation (7.2) is re-written as: 
 
xt = B(L)xt-1+ et                                                      (7.3) 
 
where B(L)= A-1 C (L)  and  et  = A-1 Dεt. The equation system in (7.3), an 
unrestricted VAR in levels, is the VAR representation of the structural model 
employed. The last term in this expression is serially uncorrelated, and each variable 
is a function of lagged values of all the variables. The VAR coefficient matrix, B(L), 
is a function of the contemporaneous and dynamic structural parameters. 
Identification is achieved by a careful Choleski ordering of the variables to conform 
to a likely structural model of the economy. 
 
A monetary policy shock from the estimated recursive VAR is identified with the 
disturbance term of the central bank reaction function equation of the form: 
 
It =f(Ωt) + εit                                                           (7.4) 
 191 
where, It is the monetary policy instrument, f is the linear function, Ωt is the 
information set for the formulation of policy, and  εit  is the serially uncorrelated 
monetary policy shock that is orthogonal to the elements of Ωt. The orthogonality 
restriction on εit is obtained by the order imposed on the variables in the VAR. This 
recursive identification justifies estimating the residual εit as the residual in an 
ordinary least squares regression of It on Ωt . Conditional on the ordering chosen, the 
dynamic response of a variable to a monetary policy shock is measured by the 
coefficients in the regression of the variable on current and lagged values of the fitted 
residuals in Equation (7.4). 
 
The research estimates three specifications of the VAR/VECM due to degrees of 
freedom problems. This is to ensure that inferences on the primary variables of 
interest are not influenced by this problem. The first VAR/VECM specification (the 
base VAR) contains the policy interest rate, output gap, inflation, and the exchange 
rate. The first extension adds the commercial bank savings interest rate. This 
inclusion is to confirm the results from the bivariate analysis of the responsiveness of 
the savings interest rate to the policy interest rate undertaken in Chapter 6, when 
other important variables are controlled for. Given the failure to find the expected 
level of responsiveness of the savings interest rate to the policy interest rate, and 
hypothesising the finding could have been driven by the failure to control for the 
effect of important variables, the inclusion of such variables in the VARs in this 
chapter serves as a check for the robustness of the previous findings. The third VAR 
specification further extends the second by introducing broad money. Given its role 
as an intermediate target of monetary policy, and therefore its primary importance for 
monetary policy conduct in Ghana, this inclusion is to investigate its actual 
importance in the monetary policy process. This is done by first, investigating its 
response to policy interest rate shocks; and, second, investigating the effect of a 
shock to it on the policy interest rate and the other variables in the VAR/VECM. The 
deterministic variables included in the three VAR specifications are a constant and a 
time trend. 
 
In the literature, the usual considerations for variable ordering are assumptions about: 
(i) the relative levels of variable exogeneity/endogeneity, (ii) lags in data generation, 
(iii) the speed with which variables respond to shocks, and/or (iv) the relative ease 
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with which variables can be adjusted. When a variable is ordered first, it is assumed 
that the variable is the most exogenous/least endogenous, least responsive to shocks, 
and any contemporaneous feedback from other variables in the VAR to it is absent. 
For the last ordered variable, it is assumed to be the least exogenous, most responsive, 
and it responds contemporaneously to other variables. 
 
Following the predominant ordering adopted in work in this area, for the base 
VAR/VECM, we order the policy interest rate last i.e. assume the policy interest rate 
is least exogenous. When extended, the policy interest rate is ordered before the 
commercial bank savings interest rate and real broad money. The other consideration 
is the order imposed on the non-policy variables in the VAR. The economic activity 
variable - output gap - is assumed least responsive to shocks, so ordered first. 
Ordered second is inflation. Ordering inflation after output gap is underpinned by the 
Phillips Curve relationship that decreases/increases in output leads to 
decreases/increases in inflation with some lag. The exchange rate is ordered third, 
given the timeliness of its generation and the relative ease with which it adjusts. Thus, 
the base VAR we estimate has its variables ordered as follows: the output gap 
(LLRCPS), inflation (ANF1M), real exchange rate (LREER), and the policy 
instrument (PR). 
 
When the base VAR is extended by the commercial bank savings interest rate, the 
variables are ordered as follows: (LLRCPS), (ANF1M), (LREER), (PR), and 
(TMTDR). Ordering (TMTDR) after (PR) is based on the assumption that the savings 
interest rate responds to the policy interest rate and not vice-versa. When extended 
by broad money (ANRMO21M), the ordering is as follows: (LLRCPS), (ANF1M), 
(LREER), (PR), (TMTDR), and (ANRMO21M). Placing broad money after the policy 
interest instrument is explained by the lag in the generation of broad money data. 
This ordering is consistent with for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Morsink and Bayoumi (2001). 
 
Whilst ordering the variables as discussed, the research recognises that some strands 
of the literature place the policy interest rate first. Given that the issue of ordering is 
still subject to some debate, we present the generalised impulse response functions 
(GIRF), rather than orthogonalised impulse responses (OIRF). The advantage of the 
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GIRF is its generation of impulse response functions that are unique. That is, unlike 
the OIRF counterparts, GIRF are invariant to the ordering of variables.  
 
7.2.2 Sample and Estimation Strategy 
The sample period corresponds to the period of indirect implementation of monetary 
policy: 1992M1- 2007M1. The Treasury bill rate is used as a proxy for the policy 
instrument until March 2002 and then the prime rate for April 2002 - January 2007. 
In March 2002 the Central Bank started using the prime rate as its monetary policy 
instrument. 
 
We are interested in the fine timing of responses to a monetary policy shock; 
therefore, the data used have a monthly frequency. In the VAR/VECM, a policy 
shock in all cases corresponds to a contractionary monetary policy that is measured 
by a positive one-standard error increase in the policy interest rate. Output gap is 
measured by the deviation of real private sector credit from linear trend. Inflation is 
the annualised one-month CPI inflation. The exchange rate is measured by the log of 
the real effective exchange rate (where an increase means an appreciation). Broad 
money is deflated by CPI and the logarithm of the real value taken.  
 
From a VAR (12), the optimal lag using the standard model selection criteria - AIC 
and/or the SBC is selected, while being mindful of the need to avoid serial 
correlation in the residuals (see Appendix Table VI). The optimal lag of the 
unrestricted VAR in levels is chosen following the general-to-specific approach. The 
horizon of the impulse response is set at 60 months. All variables, with the exception 
of the interest rates, are in logs. Furthermore, while the policy interest rate, the 
commercial bank savings interest rate, and inflation are in percentage points and 
annualised, the real exchange rate, real broad money, and output gap are not. For the 
real exchange rate, real broad money, and the output gap, therefore, an impulse 
response value of 0.001 equals 0.1 per cent deviation from the baseline; while for the 
interest rates and inflation, an impulse response coefficient of 0.1 implies a 0.1 
percentage point deviation from the baseline level (already in percentages). 
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7.3 Monetary Policy Transmission 
 
Having found that the variables are I(1) from Chapter 5, impulse response functions 
from three unrestricted vector error correction models (VECM) are estimated in this 
section to deduce the transmission of monetary policy. This section also estimates 
policy interest rate responses to shocks to variables and compares the findings with 
those found from the similar analysis, in Chapter 5, that used single equation models. 
This section also compares the responsiveness of the savings interest rate to the 
policy rate inferred from the analysis in this section with that of Chapter 6. In 
addition, the impacts of shocks to all variables are shown, and the results for key 
variables are discussed. 
 
We use the Johansen cointegration test to determine if the variables are cointegrated. 
The Johansen method, unlike the Engle-Granger approach, allows the testing of 
hypotheses by considering them effectively as restrictions on the cointegrating vector. 
The test developed by Johansen (1991) is given by the VAR equation below: 
 
∆ yt = ∏ yt-k + Γ1 ∆ yt-1 + Γ2 ∆ yt-2+…+ Γk-1 ∆ yt-(k-1) +  υt                   (7.5) 
 
where yt is a p-dimensional vector of the variables. If  ∏  is of zero rank46, there is 
no cointegration; otherwise the rank will give the number of cointegrating vectors. 
 
 
7.3.1 Results from the Base VECM 
Starting with VAR (12) of output gap (LLRCPS), inflation (ANF1M), real exchange 
rate (LREER), and the policy instrument (PR), the AIC and SBC model selection 
criteria point to VAR(2) as the appropriate description of the data (see Appendix 
Table VI A). Specifying the cointegrating relationship without a time trend, both the 
trace and maximal eigen value tests suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector 
at the 5 per cent level for the period 1992M1-2007M1. The test results are shown in 
Table 7.3.1A. 
 
                                                
46
 That is all the eigenvalues are not significantly different from zero. 
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 Tables 7.3.1A 
 
 
Having established that the variables are cointegrated, the short-run dynamics of the 
model can be exploited using the Granger representation theorem. According to this 
theorem, if a set of variables is cointegrated (that is, if there is a long-run relationship 
between them) then the short-run dynamics of the long-run relationship can be 
described by an error-correction model as follows: 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.29970    0.048350    0.014344   0.0013565 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r = 1        64.4807           23.9200                21.5800 
 r<= 1      r = 2         8.9700           17.6800                15.5700 
 r<= 2      r = 3         2.6150           11.0300                 9.2800 
 r<= 3      r = 4         0.24568            4.1600                 3.0400 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.29970    0.048350    0.014344   0.0013565 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r>= 1        76.3114           39.8100                36.6900 
 r<= 1      r>= 2        11.8307           24.0500                21.4600 
 r<= 2      r>= 3         2.8607           12.3600                10.2500 
 r<= 3      r = 4         0.24568            4.1600                 3.0400 
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                  (7.6) 
where ECC is the error correction component and n is set equal to 2 as the AIC and 
SBC model selection criteria pointed to VAR(2) as the appropriate description of the 
data. The EEC is derived from the long-run relationship and is given by: 
                                     ttt PRPRECC
^
−=                                                          (7.7) 
where 
^
tPR is the fitted value of the actual value of PRt. The results are shown below 
in Table 7.3.1A. 
 
Table 7.3.1B 
Error correction model for variable PR estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR (2). Dependent variable is change in policy rate, DPR 
Sample for estimation from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
Regressor              Coefficient          Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
DLLRCPS1              1.0615              1.7729                 0.59873[0.550] 
DANF1M1               -0.0003883      0.0061215            -0.063431[0.949] 
DLREER1                -2.6089            3.8376                  -0.67982[0.498] 
DPR1                        0.33799           0.071088               4.7546[0.000] 
ECC(-1)                   2.4476             1.3160                    1.8599[0.065] 
R-Squared                     0.16511          R-Bar-Squared             0.14613 
S.E. of Regression        1.3160             F-stat.    F(4, 176)        8.7015[0.000] 
DW-statistic                  2.0263    
                                      
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics              LM Version                         F Version           
Serial Correlation   CHSQ(12)= 9.7682[0.636]       F(12, 164)=   0.77964[0.671] 
Functional Form    CHSQ(1)=    0.59355[0.441]     F(1, 175)=     0.57576[0.449] 
Normality               CHSQ(2)=   199.6719[0.000]    Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity CHSQ(1)=    0.30682[0.580]      F(1, 179)=     0.30394[0.582] 
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Note: 
 DPR = PR-PR (-1) 
 DLLRCPS1 = LLRCPS (-1)-LLRCPS (-2) 
 DANF1M1 = ANF1M(-1)-ANF1M(-2) 
 DLREER1 = LREER(-1)-LREER(-2) 
 DPR1 = PR (-1)-PR (-2) 
 ECC:   Error Correction Term 
 
The results show that only the lagged difference in policy rate is significant at 5 per 
cent in the short-run. The error correction term represents the short-run response 
necessary to move the system back towards long-run equilibrium. The positive 
coefficient for EEC (-1) indicates that in the previous period the equilibrium value of 
the policy rate exceeded its actual value or actual policy rate fell short of equilibrium. 
The policy rate should increase towards its equilibrium value. That is, there is a 2.45 
per cent feedback from the previous period into the short-run dynamics process. 
 
Figure 7.3.1A below shows variables’ response from a one-standard-error shock to 
the policy interest rate (equivalent to a 1.4 percentage point rise) from the estimated 
VECM (2) model (see Appendix Table VI A). The impulse indicates that while the 
policy interest rate response throughout the horizon and inflation response in the 
initial fifteen (15) months are significant, those of output gap and real exchange rate 
are insignificant. Inflation falls in the first fifteen (15) months and stabilises in the 
ensuing forty five (45) months. In line with the finding from the single equation 
model of Chapter 5, Figures 7.3.1B, C and D show insignificant interest rate 
responses to real exchange rate, inflation and output gap.  
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Figure 7.3.1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1B 
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Figure 7.3.1C 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1D 
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7.3.2 Results from the Extended VECM 
 
Extending the base VECM by the savings interest rate (TMTDR) and starting with 
VAR (12), the AIC and SBC model selection criteria point to VAR(2) as the 
appropriate description of the data (see Appendix Table VI B). Specifying the 
cointegrating relationship without a time trend, both the trace and maximal eigen 
value tests suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per cent level for 
the period 1992M1-2007M1. The test results are shown in Table 7.3.2A. 
 
Tables 7.3.2A 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.29142    0.072903    0.048630    0.015365   0.0026854 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r = 1         62.3532           29.9500                27.5700 
 r<= 1      r = 2        13.7012           23.9200                21.5800 
 r<= 2      r = 3         9.0232           17.6800                 15.5700 
 r<= 3      r = 4         2.8026           11.0300                 9.2800 
 r<= 4      r = 5         0.48672          4.1600                  3.0400 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.29142    0.072903    0.048630    0.015365   0.0026854 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r>= 1         88.3670           59.3300                55.4200 
 r<= 1      r>= 2        26.0137           39.8100                36.6900 
 r<= 2      r>= 3        12.3126           24.0500                21.4600 
 r<= 3      r>= 4        3.2893             12.3600                10.2500 
 r<= 4      r = 5         0.48672            4.1600                 3.0400 
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Extending equation 7.6 by the commercial bank savings rate, the short-run dynamics 
of the long-run relationship can be described by an error-correction model as follows: 
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                                                                                                                                  (7.8)                 
                                                                                                              
where ECC is the error correction component and n is set equal to 2 as the AIC and 
SBC model selection criteria point to VAR(2) as the appropriate description of the 
data. The results are shown below in Table 7.3.2B. 
 
Table 7.3.2B 
Error correction model for variable PR estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR (2). Dependent variable is Change in policy rate, DPR 
Sample for estimation from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
Regressor              Coefficient          Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
DLLRCPS1                   0.97269              1.7730                0.54862[0.584] 
 DANF1M1                 -0.0000002357     0.0061034          -0.00003862[1.00] 
 DLREER1                   -2.0469                3.8454                -0.53229[0.595] 
 DPR1                           0.31452                0.073297             4.2911[0.000] 
 DTMTDR1                0.10186                 0.078098             1.3042[0.194] 
 ECC(-1)                     2.1569                  1.3139                  1.6416[0.102] 
R-Squared                         0.17247        R-Bar-Squared                   0.14882 
S.E. of Regression            1.3139          F-stat.    F(  5, 175)    7.2944[0.000] 
DW-statistic                     1.9840    
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics              LM Version                         F Version           
Serial Correlation  CHSQ(  12)=   9.0757[0.696]   F(  12, 163)=   0.71705[0.733] 
Functional Form   CHSQ(   1)=   0.84744[0.357]   F(   1, 174)=   0.81849[0.367] 
Normality             CHSQ(   2)= 205.7348[0.000]       Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity CHSQ(   1)=   0.61225[0.434]  F(   1, 179)=   0.60754[0.437] 
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Note: 
 DPR = PR-PR (-1) 
 DLLRCPS1 = LLRCPS (-1)-LLRCPS (-2) 
 DANF1M1 = ANF1M(-1)-ANF1M(-2) 
 DLREER1 = LREER(-1)-LREER(-2) 
 DPR1 = PR (-1)-PR (-2) 
 DTMTDR1 = TMTDR (-1)-TMTDR (-2) 
 ECC:   Error Correction Term 
 
Extending the base VECM by the savings interest rate, the dynamic responses to a 
one-standard-error shock to the policy interest rate from the estimated VECM (2) 
model (see Appendix Table VI B) are shown in Figure 7.3.2A below. The impulse 
response indicates that the addition has no significant impact on the responses of the 
base variables. Regarding the added variable, its dynamic response corresponds well 
with that of the policy interest rate, in shape and significance, suggesting similar 
correspondence with the policy interest rate, when compared with that found from 
the bivariate model in Chapter 6. Figures 7.3.2B, C and D confirm the findings from 
the previous VECM specification and those from the single equation model of 
Chapter 5. This is that excluding the policy rate itself, interest rate responses to 
positive innovations in inflation, output gap, and the real exchange rate are 
insignificant, with the direction of interest rate response for output gap being 
negative in the short to medium term. 
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Figure 7.3.2A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.2B 
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Figure 7.3.2C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.2D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generalised Impulse Response(s) to one S.E shock in 
the equation for ANF1M
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61
Horizon
LLRCPS
ANF1M
LREER
PR
TMTDR
Generalised Impulse Response(s) to one S.E shock in 
the equation for LLRCPS
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61
Horizon
LLRCPS
ANF1M
LREER
PR
TMTDR
 205 
Figure 7.3.2E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.3 Results from the Further Extended VECM 
 
Extending the VECM further by real broad money (ANRMO21M) and starting with 
VAR (12), the AIC and SBC model selection criteria point to VAR(2) as the 
appropriate description of the data (see Appendix Table VI C). Specifying the 
cointegrating relationship without a time trend, both the trace and maximal eigen 
value tests suggest the existence of two cointegrating vectors at the 5 per cent level 
for the period 1992M1-2007M1. The test results are shown in Table 7.3.3A. 
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Tables 7.3.3A 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic 
Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 ANRMO21M 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.46904     0.27438    0.074867    0.052797    0.018451   0.0027177 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r = 1         114.5849           36.2700               33.4800 
 r<= 1      r = 2        58.0531             29.9500               27.5700 
 r<= 2      r = 3        14.0851             23.9200               21.5800 
 r<= 3      r = 4         9.8177             17.6800                15.5700 
 r<= 4      r = 5         3.3708             11.0300                 9.2800 
 r<= 5      r = 6         0.49258            4.1600                  3.0400 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 2. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 ANRMO21M 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.46904     0.27438    0.074867    0.052797    0.018451   0.0027177 
Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r>= 1         200.4041           83.1800                78.4700 
 r<= 1      r>= 2        85.8192             59.3300                55.4200 
 r<= 2      r>= 3        27.7661             39.8100                36.6900 
 r<= 3      r>= 4        13.6811             24.0500                21.4600 
 r<= 4      r>= 5         3.8633             12.3600                10.2500 
 r<= 5      r = 6          0.49258            4.1600                  3.0400 
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Further extending equation 7.8 by broad money, the short-run dynamics of the long-
run relationship can be described by an error-correction model as follows: 
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                                                                                                                                  (7.9)                 
where ECC is the error correction component and n is set equal to 2, as the AIC and 
SBC model selection criteria point to VAR(2) as the appropriate description of the 
data. The results are shown below in Table 7.3.3B. 
 
Table 7.3.3B 
Error correction model for variable PR estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR (2). Dependent variable is Change in policy rate, DPR 
Sample for estimation from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
Regressor              Coefficient          Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
DLLRCPS1                   1.0701             1.7851                  0.59945[0.550] 
DANF1M1                 -0.0011525         0.0068832            -0.16744[0.867] 
DLREER1                   -2.1034             3.8942                   -0.54013[0.590] 
DPR1                           0.31904            0.074209                4.2992[0.000] 
DTMTDR1                 0.10083             0.078442                1.2854[0.200] 
DANRMO21M1        -0.0014024        0.0020785            -0.67473[0.501] 
ECC(-1)                       0.69201            1.3185                   0.52482[0.600] 
ECC(-1)                      1.9739               1.3185                   1.4970[0.136] 
R-Squared                     0.17618          R-Bar-Squared                   0.14284 
S.E. of Regression        1.3185             F-stat.    F(  7, 173)    5.2852[0.000] 
DW-statistic                  1.9874   
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Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics              LM Version                         F Version           
Serial Correlation CHSQ(  12)=   9.0155[.702]    F(  12, 161)=   0.70331[0.747] 
Functional Form   CHSQ(   1)=   1.2411[.265 ]   F(   1, 172)=   1.1875[0.277] 
Normality              CHSQ(   2)= 217.3265[0.000]      Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity CHSQ(   1)=   0.62582[0.429]   F(   1, 179)=   0.62105[0.432] 
 
Note: 
 DPR = PR-PR (-1) 
 DLLRCPS1 = LLRCPS (-1)-LLRCPS (-2) 
 DANF1M1 = ANF1M(-1)-ANF1M(-2) 
 DLREER1 = LREER(-1)-LREER(-2) 
 DPR1 = PR (-1)-PR (-2) 
 DTMTDR1 = TMTDR (-1)-TMTDR (-2) 
 DANRMO21M1 = ANRMO21M (-1)-ANRMO21M (-2) 
 ECC:   Error Correction Term 
 
Extending the VECM further by real broad money, the impulse response from a one 
standard error shock to the policy interest rate from an estimated VECM (2) model 
(see Appendix Table VI C) is shown in Figure 7.3.3A. Figures 7.3.3B, C and D 
indicate that the pattern of responses of the policy interest rate, savings interest rate, 
the real exchange rate, output gap, and inflation remains unchanged. The added 
variable, real broad money is significant to the policy tightening. In the short term, 
there is a significant decline in the first three (3) months. The responses of the policy 
interest rate to shocks to the variables also remain as previously discussed. 
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Figure 7.3.3A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.3B 
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Figure 7.3.3C 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.3D 
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Figure 7.3.3E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.3F 
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7.3.4 The Effects of Shocks  
 
The Effect of a Shock to Real Broad Money 
Figure 7.3.4A shows variables’ response to a one-standard-error (45 percentage point) 
innovation in real broad money. None of the responses are significant, apart from the 
shocked variable’s own response in the first eight months. Real broad money reverts 
to its baseline value fairly rapidly (by the 10th month). Distinctly, the policy rate 
remains unresponsive to the rise in real broad money. The savings interest rate 
response is similarly low and insignificant. Inflation rises but falls back to its base 
level by the eighth month. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.4A 
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The Effect of a Shock to Output 
Figure 7.3.4B shows the effect of a positive shock on the output gap. With the 
exception of inflation and real broad money in the first seven (7) months, when 
inflation rises relative to the base and real broad money falls, variables’ responses are 
insignificant. The patterns of responses of the interest rate variables (the policy rate 
and commercial bank savings rates) is insignificant. This policy rate response to 
output expansion agrees with the results from the single equation model of Chapter 5. 
The savings interest rate response mirrors that of the policy rate.  
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The Effects of a Shock to Inflation 
Figure 7.3.4C shows variables’ impulse responses following an inflation shock. 
While inflation and real broad money responses in the initial months are significant, 
those of the interest rates, the output gap and real exchange rates are insignificant. 
Inflation, following the one-standard-error shock (equivalent to a 16 percentage point 
rise), returns rapidly to its base value, suggesting a fast process of mean reversion. 
The policy interest rate response is weak and insignificant, although there is a 
response after a three month lag, which corresponds with the finding from the single 
equation model in Chapter 5. The savings interest rate follows the pattern of policy 
rate response, showing the same level of insignificance. The exchange rate and 
output gap responses are also insignificant. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.4C 
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7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Results show variables’ impulse responses following an unanticipated monetary 
policy tightening are generally insignificant for output gap and real exchange rate, 
but show the following trends. The impulse indicates that while the policy interest 
rate responds throughout the horizon and inflation response in the initial fifteen 
months is significant, those of output gap and real exchange rate are insignificant. 
The policy interest rate response function shows that the variable follows a slow 
process of mean reversion following the shock. Inflation falls for about 15 months, 
and stabilises in the ensuing 45 months. Also, the savings interest rate shows similar 
co-movement with the policy rate, as found from the bivariate model of Chapter 6. 
 
Following a positive shock to inflation, the policy interest rate rises, but weakly and 
insignificantly. Also, the policy interest rate does not show any significant response 
following a shock to output gap. These results correspond well with the findings in 
Chapter 5, where a weak response of the policy interest rate to inflation and a 
negative response to output gap were found.  
 
Regarding the commercial bank savings interest rate, its dynamic response 
corresponds well with that of the policy interest rate, in shape and significance, 
suggesting similar correspondence of the policy interest rate with that found from the 
bivariate model in Chapter 6. 
 
All together, the pattern of variables’ dynamic responses to policy tightening, and the 
response of the policy instrument to key variables, indicate weak monetary policy 
effectiveness. The drawback of some insignificant dynamic responses 
notwithstanding, the inferred optimal timing of monetary policy is about 15 months 
ahead. It follows that an unanticipated monetary policy tightening effect on inflation, 
the final target of monetary policy, could take up to 15 months.                                                   
 
Chapter 8 provides a concluding summary of the results obtained in chapters 5, 6 and 
7 and also presents policy recommendations for inflation control. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
 
8.1 Introduction 
The empirical literature on monetary policy is currently skewed to industrialised 
countries, despite the convergence in the aims and objectives of monetary policy and 
in the methods for its conduct worldwide. To broaden the field of the literature, 
provide country-specific assessment of monetary policy, and generally contribute to 
the policy advice on inflation control, this thesis has extended the literature to Ghana.  
The literature on the financial sector and monetary management in SSA have tended 
to rank South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana amongst the best performing countries in the 
region, with South Africa and Kenya found to have the most developed financial 
sectors and systems of monetary management. Thus, the financial sector and system 
of monetary management in Ghana is more representative of SSA hence, its study 
may serve a broader purpose in providing a general understanding of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in SSA.  
 
Monetary policy in Ghana has changed considerably since the launch of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, in line with changes in the financial 
system. Whilst the objective aspect of monetary policy – price stability – has 
remained basically unchanged, there have been substantial changes elsewhere, 
especially with regard to the instruments used. The instruments of monetary policy 
have been improved and more indirect and market based instruments have been 
developed. 
 
This final chapter thus aims to present a concluding summary of the results, provide 
policy recommendation towards the attainment of the overriding objective of 
monetary policy-inflation control, and offer some suggestions for future work. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Brief summaries of findings from the empirical 
analysis are presented in Section 8.2 and 8.3. The policy recommendations then 
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follow in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 provides some suggestions on areas for future 
work, while Section 8.6 then ends the chapter. 
 
8.2 Monetary Policy Conduct 
The monetary policy setting in Ghana is typical of a small open developing 
economy. In an open economy, the conventional wisdom is that standard channels 
for the transmission of monetary policy actions are through aggregate demand, 
expectations which affect inflation via price setting behaviour, the exchange rate, via 
the interest parity conditions dependent on the difference between domestic and 
foreign interest rates, and expected future changes in exchange rates. All these work 
in a complex interaction through the system into the price level. 
Estimating monetary policy conduct over the sample period (1992M1-2007M1) has 
involved investigating the consistency of three hypotheses for policy conduct with 
the data, by estimating Taylor-type reactions functions for Ghana to uncover the best 
empirical characterisation of monetary policy formation in the country. First, the 
central bank set interest rates in response solely to inflation, known as inflation 
targeting. Second, the central bank responded only to inflation and output in 
accordance with Taylor’s rule. Third, the central bank responded to a broader 
information set. The first two hypotheses were found inconsistent with the data, but 
the third was consistent.  
The finding on the first hypothesis concludes that an assumption of inflation 
targeting in the strict sense is not an appropriate description of Ghana’s monetary 
policy between 1992M1-2007M1 given a low inflation coefficient and evidence of 
model misspecification. 
With an incorrectly-signed policy interest rate response to output gap and a minute 
policy interest rate response to inflation, the finding on the second hypothesis 
suggests an absence of central bank commitment to price stability over the 1992M1-
2007M1. 
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The equation that best described monetary policy conduct was presented and 
discussed to answer the question on how the central bank conducted monetary policy 
since it adopted market-based instruments in 1992. This equation, a generalised 
specification, shows the significance of foreign monetary policy and international 
market volatility to monetary policy conduct in Ghana. 
 
8.3 Monetary Policy Effectiveness 
Evaluating monetary policy effectiveness47 involved the use of three approaches. 
First, the sizes of the long-run interest rate responses to inflation and output gap 
deduced from the estimated Taylor-type reaction functions were compared with the 
theoretical specifications of at least unity for inflation and about 0.5 for output gap. 
This also involved determining if interest rate responses to the other precursors of 
inflation were correctly-signed, significant, and appropriately sized.  
The results showed that monetary policy was not effective in stabilising inflation, 
based on the low inflation coefficient and evidence of model misspecification. A one 
per cent increase in inflation raised the policy interest rate by 0.74 percentage point 
between 2002M4 and 2007M1, which is higher than the 0.18 percentage point 
witnessed between 1992 M1 and 2002 M3. The high inflation coefficient may reflect 
the fact that Ghana’s central bank established an implicit inflation targeting 
framework in 2002. However, the value is still lower than the reference value 
proposed by Taylor (1993). 
When output is added to the inflation model the coefficients suggest that (i) holding 
the effect of output gap constant, a one percentage point rise in inflation leads to a 
0.35 percentage point rise in the policy interest rate; and (ii) holding the effect of 
inflation constant, a one percent rise in output above trend leads to a 0.18 percentage 
point reduction in the policy interest rate. 
The incorrectly-signed interest rate response to output gap suggests that the central 
bank’s monetary policy conduct over the period accommodated aggregate demand 
                                                
47
 Monetary policy effectiveness as used is the strength of policy interest rate response to inflation and 
other information variables for policy conduct; as well as the extent to which the policy interest rate 
influences market interest rates and macroeconomic aggregates. 
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pressures. Possible reasons include the central bank’s actual objective being one of 
boosting output and employment rather than maintaining price stability; and with a 
belief in the Phillips Curve relationship, it may deliberately have aimed to 
accommodate some level of inflation to achieve this objective - a typical dynamic 
inconsistency problem. Another plausible explanation is that, while mindful of the 
need to respond appropriately to aggregate demand pressures, the central bank was 
unable to because of the budgetary implications of rises in the Treasury bill rate, 
given that sizeable issues of Treasury bills are to fund the government budget. As 
such, large issues over and above government budgetary needs further exacerbate the 
fiscal burden, necessitating an accommodative monetary policy stance. 
Other precursors of inflation expected to be important to the BOG are foreign 
exchange reserves, exchange rate, foreign interest rates and international market 
volatility as the central bank is charged with the management of the country’s foreign 
exchange reserves and with the protection of the external value of the local currency. 
The estimations found foreign exchange reserves consistently correctly (negatively) 
signed and significant; however, the real effective exchange rate is insignificant, 
suggesting that the central bank raised the policy rate with cuts in foreign exchange 
reserves and vice versa, which is its foreign exchange reserves management mandate. 
Independently, this also suggests an absence of focus on the exchange rate, at least in 
real effective terms.  
The significance of the US federal funds rate and US dollar price of oil suggests that 
the BOG conducts monetary policy taking cognisance of foreign monetary policy 
and international market volatility. 
A finding of a full pass-through was interpreted as signifying effectiveness in the 
transmission of monetary policy impulses to the retail savings rate in the second 
approach - an important pre-requisite if policy impulses are to influence the real 
economy. With this approach evaluating policy effectiveness involved investigating 
the responsiveness of commercial bank savings rates to changes in the policy interest 
rate. This was done by testing for the existence of a relationship in levels between the 
two interest rates. The long-run pass-through, monthly disequilibrium correction, as 
well as the short-run pass-through were computed. High short-run pass-through and 
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sizeable monthly disequilibrium correction, we deemed, enhanced policy 
effectiveness.  
 
Both the single equation error correction approach and the pass-through process, 
estimated within a VECM framework for the savings interest rate and the policy 
interest rate, indicate a fairly rapid adjustment of the savings interest rate towards its 
equilibrium value.  
 
The long-run pass-through process shows high responsiveness over the sample 
period. A pass-through value of 0.90 suggests that the policy interest rate is 
positively correlated with the commercial bank savings rate, and about 90 per cent of 
the shock to the policy interest rate is passed-through to the savings rate in the long 
run. However, this value is lower than unity, which is the reference value in the 
empirical literature. The results also show that the contemporaneous effect of a 
percentage point rise in the policy interest rate is a rise in the savings rate of 0.38, 
increasing by a further 0.16 after the second month. 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy on the basis of the strength of 
responsiveness of commercial bank retail rates, particularly the saving rate to policy 
interest rates, the research concludes that with a near unity pass-through rate in the 
long-run, monetary policy was largely effective48 in influencing the savings rate in 
Ghana over the period 1992M1-2007M1. 
The third approach to monetary policy effectiveness evaluation was to investigate 
monetary policy transmission more fully. Policy effectiveness was determined by the 
pattern of variables’ responses to monetary policy shocks.  
 
Variables’ impulse responses following an unanticipated monetary policy tightening 
are generally insignificant for output gap and real exchange rate, but show the 
following trends. The impulse indicates that while the policy interest rate responds 
throughout the horizon and inflation response in the initial 15 months is significant, 
those of output gap and real exchange rate are insignificant. The policy interest rate 
                                                
48Less than full pass-through was interpreted as signifying that the transmission of monetary policy is 
largely effective.  
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response function shows that the variable follows a slow process of mean reversion 
following the shock. Inflation falls for about 15 months, and stabilises in the ensuing 
45 months.  
 
Following a positive shock to inflation, the policy interest rate rises, but weakly and 
insignificantly. Also, the policy interest rate does not show any significant response 
following a shock to output gap. The dynamic response of commercial bank savings 
rate corresponds well with that of the policy interest rate, in shape and significance. 
Again, from the analysis, monetary policy was found to be largely effective in 
influencing saving rate but was not effective in stabilising inflation. 
 
8.4 Policy Recommendations 
Based on the empirical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, the results of Chapter 7 and an 
appeal to the broader literature, we present policy recommendations for sustainable 
inflation control in the section. 
Even as the general empirical evidence on the relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation is mixed (see Chapters 3 and 4), the government accounts 
for a substantial portion of the country’s financial liability in Ghana. The attainment 
of the price stability objective may thus be facilitated by an environment of effective 
central bank independence. Although the central bank has been operationally 
independent since 2002 the need for effective independence is underscored, as 
provisions to guarantee some level of central bank independence have been in place 
since 1992. 
The incorrectly-signed interest rate response to output gap suggests that the central 
bank’s monetary policy conduct over the period accommodated aggregate demand 
pressures. A plausible explanation is that, while mindful of the need to respond 
appropriately to aggregate demand pressures, the central bank was unable to because 
of the budgetary implications of rises in the Treasury bill rate, given that sizeable 
issues of Treasury bills are to fund the government budget. As such, large issues over 
and above government budgetary needs further exacerbate the fiscal burden, 
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necessitating an accommodative monetary policy stance. This suggests that the 
central bank lacked the independence required to control inflation. 
This thesis therefore recommends the enhancement of provisions for independence, 
transparency and accountability of the central bank. Following Khan (2003), 
transparency is used in the following context. First, is the existence of an explicit 
inflation target. Second, is the availability of clear and sufficient information to the 
public for the assessment of the monetary policy stance. Third, in the event of 
changes in monetary policy, a clear explanation of the reasons behind the changes, 
and the expected impact on inflation outlook, should be provided. Fourth, an ante 
indication of possible target breach, its causes and the policy actions to be taken to 
bring inflation back on track should be provided. Finally, there should be an ex-post 
comprehensive analysis of the performance of monetary policy.  
We commend Ghana for adopting an explicit inflation targeting framework in May 
2007. Inflation targeting embraces the advantages of transparency and accountability 
outlined. It further compels policy makers to deepen reforms, provide an operational 
rule for the conduct of monetary policy, improve financial stability and eventually 
converge to international level inflation. It also helps clarify the responsibilities of 
the central bank and other executive branches of government.  
We acknowledge that inflation targeting is not a panacea and that its success is 
dependent on the existence of a stable macroeconomic framework and the 
elimination of debilitating structural bottlenecks. 
To facilitate transparency and accountability, the thesis recommends that the central 
bank publicly declare the benchmark rule that it follows for policy conduct49. In line 
with the advice in the literature (e.g. Taylor 1993, 1999a and McCallum 2000), the 
recommendation for a guideline rule is not to suggest that it be followed 
mechanically, but rather be used only as a guide. This would have the added benefit 
of stabilising inflationary expectations and even breaking inflation psychology. 
Examples of emerging market economies that have used inflation targeting to build 
credibility, bring down inflation expectations, and pursued a path of convergence to 
                                                
49
 An example of such a guideline rule is the inflation targeting already being implemented in South 
Africa. 
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low and stationary inflation are Chile and Israel (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2001).  
Regarding the conduct of monetary policy, results showed that monetary policy was 
not effective in stabilising inflation based on the low inflation coefficient and 
evidence of model misspecification. Possible reasons may include the central bank’s 
inability to control excess liquidity in the economy and the small and narrow size of 
the market for government securities. 
Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, (2007) outline some of the reasons for monetary policy 
ineffectiveness as: (i) excess liquidity in the economy that nullifies the effect of a rise 
in the policy interest rate, (ii) the narrow size of the bill market, (iii) absence of a 
sufficiently large, active, and diversified market for government securities and a 
developed call-loan market that allows commercial banks to maintain low and stable 
cash-deposit ratios, such that central bank open market operations will have an 
immediate effect on them, and (iv) large non-monetised sectors of the economy.  
Ghana, where excess reserves of commercial banks are relatively high, diversified 
markets for government securities are absent, and with weak interbank markets, 
provide support for the arguments of Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, (2007). Under these 
conditions, a policy rate move aimed at signalling tight monetary policy may not 
necessarily lead to the desired rise in market interest rates or the desired reduction in 
credit.  
This thesis suggests that the effectiveness of monetary policy would be enhanced if 
the country took measures to: (i) remove the excess liquidity in the economy; (ii) 
develop a call-loan market that would allow commercial banks to maintain low and 
stable cash-deposit ratios; and (iii) de-emphasise the dependence on primary issues 
of bills for money market interventions in favour of secondary market instruments, 
such as repurchase agreements. Furthermore, it may be prudent for inflation control 
to be facilitated in the interim by other policy tools such as fiscal policy. 
Results suggest an absence of focus on the exchange rate, which has led to an 
unstable exchange rate. The country has a high degree of openness, so an unstable 
exchange rate makes inflation control quite difficult. We recommend exchange rate 
targeting policies to control its volatility. 
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Foreign exchange constraints arising largely from imbalance in import and exports or 
exogenous terms of trade are likely to fuel inflation. On some empirical evidence, 
Loungani and Swagel (2001) find that the most important source of inflation in 
developing countries is the inertial component of inflation, which they interpret to 
mean structural factors including a trade imbalance. The estimations of Kapur et al. 
(1991), of determinants of inflation in Ghana, also found structural variables - food 
supply and supply costs - to be highly significant.  
As such, while monetary policy remains centre stage in inflation control, and 
supported by prudent fiscal policy, the thesis also recommends the adoption of 
measures to eliminate structural impediments to production; and to aim for a balance 
in its trade with the rest of the world. 
 
8.5 Limitations and Areas of Future Research  
The choice of a policy instrument is a limitation in this study. Taylor (2000) contends 
that for developing countries, there may be a need to consider policy rules with a 
monetary aggregate as an instrument, rather than the interest rate employed in the 
Taylor rule. His reasoning, following Poole (1970), is that even though the use of a 
monetary aggregate or an interest rate as a policy instrument is equivalent, the choice 
between the two may be dictated by the composition of shocks the economy faces. 
An alternative model (Appendix XA and XB) that uses monetary aggregates as a 
policy instrument appears to explain monetary policy better. Future study may 
compare the two models in greater detail to determine which model better explains 
monetary policy in Ghana. 
This thesis has proposed a more suitable monetary policy rule for developing 
countries in Chapter 4. Future research may apply this proposed rule to a broad 
sample of developing and emerging country data to establish its robustness. This will 
enable modifications, if necessary, so it usefully serves as a benchmark rule for 
developing countries. 
Also, in the monetary transmission mechanism analysis, future work should 
disaggregate output into its key components to investigate the components most 
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responsive to monetary policy impulses. Given the sizeable informal sector in the 
country, future research should also look into the design of optimal monetary policy 
in the presence of such sizeable informal sectors. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the monetary transmissions mechanism can further 
investigate the credit channel of monetary policy. In particular, the role of credit 
market imperfections and the relative importance of alternative sources of credit (e.g. 
trade credit) in the monetary transmission mechanism should be evaluated. 
The analysis of the responsiveness of market interest rates to changes in the policy 
interest rate proxied market interest rate by commercial bank savings rate. Future 
research should extend this to the commercial bank lending rate and to long-term 
interest rates. 
 
Finally, the thesis considers it undesirable to employ estimation methods that are 
based on the assumption that the variables have a particular order of integration in 
view of the acknowledged low power of stationarity tests, particularly in small 
samples. For this reason, we adopt the conditional equilibrium correction model 
(ECM) developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) that is robust to the stationarity 
properties of the data. However, this model is only as good as the assumptions 
underlying it. A more comparative analysis in Chapter 5 could test the robustness of 
this method. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to estimate empirically monetary policy conduct and investigate 
policy effectiveness in Ghana. Following the theoretical and empirical literature, it 
did so within the framework of monetary policy rules and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Following estimations of extended Taylor type rules, 
using a technique that is robust to the stationarity conditions of the data, the best 
characterisation of monetary policy was obtained. The subsequent analysis of policy 
effectiveness involved comparing the strength of interest rate responses to variables 
with the dictates of literature. The results showed monetary policy was not effective. 
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The first of the two other approaches used to analyse policy effectiveness involved 
estimating the responsiveness of the commercial bank savings rate to changes in the 
policy interest rate; and the second involved estimating the responsiveness of broader 
target and goal variables to monetary policy impulses. Again, the analysis showed 
that monetary policy was only somewhat effective in Ghana.  
Seeking reasons for the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, we concluded that these 
could be attributed to the central bank institutional framework, the monetary policy 
framework, the depth of financial market, and the macroeconomic environment in 
the country. 
From our findings and appealing to broader literature, the thesis has proposed policy 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and facilitate 
inflation control on a sustained basis. Policy measures proposed include central bank 
legal provisions that give it the independence required to control inflation, the 
deepening of the financial market and to improve monetary management generally, 
including exchange rate targeting polices to reduce its volatility and improved 
communication with citizens to influence inflation expectations. Finally the thesis 
also recommends the adoption of measures to eliminate structural impediments to 
production; and aim for a balance in its trade with the rest of the world. The thesis 
provided some suggestions for future research areas to explore the robustness of 
these initial findings and their applicability to other developing and emerging 
economies. 
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Appendix 
Formal Unit Root test 
Testing for unit roots in autoregressive time series models continues to receive 
considerable attention in the econometrics literature. The formal approaches 
employed for testing for stationarity are the Dickey Fuller (DF) and the augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests and the Ng-Perron tests. The Dickey Fuller (DF) and the 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) involves running the regression 
 
∆Yt =α0 + α1T +  α2Yt-1 +∑
=
m
i 1
βi ∆Yt-i + εt (5.12) 
Where Yt   is the variable of interest and Yt-1 is the period lag of the variable. The 
choice of m depends largely on the number of available observations and is selected 
large enough to render the residual εt white noise. Model selection criteria such as  
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and 
Hannan – Quinn Criterion (HQC) are then used to assess the appropriate number of 
lags required. 
 
Different coefficient combinations imply the order of integration of the series Yt : 
If  α1 =  α2 = 0           Yt is a difference-stationary process {integrated of order one 
(i.e.       Yt ~ I(1) } and is thus non-stationary. Since differencing induces stationarity 
then the first difference of Yt is stationary. 
If  α1 ≠ 0, α2 < 0      Yt is stationary. However, in this case Yt is a trend-stationary 
process implying that a deterministic trend must be removed to induce stationarity. 
That is, Yt is stationary about a linear trend. 
If  α1 =0, α2 < 0   Yt is itself stationary {Yt ~ I(0) } and no trend, whether 
deterministic or stochastic, is present. 
 
The t ratio of α1 is compared with the critical value of the τβτ statistic and that of α2 
against the values tabulated for the ττ statistic. The latter, the t ratio on α2, is called 
the ADF test statistic. Both tests are conducted under the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is zero, so that large ‘t ratios’ suggest rejection of null (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981). 
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Ng and Perron (2001) construct four test statistics that are modified forms of Philips 
and Perron (1988) Zα  and Zt statistics, the Bhargava (1986) R1 statistic, and the Elliot 
et al. (1996) Point Optimal statistic. Ng and Perron (2001) argue that traditional unit 
root tests may suffer from two main problems. First, they may suffer from power 
problems when the autoregressive parameter is close to 1 and, second, when the 
errors of a Moving Average process are close to -1, it is necessary to have a high lag 
length in order to avoid size problems. However, the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) tend to select a low order of the lag 
length. In order to overcome these issues, the authors propose a Modified 
Information Criterion (MIC) that controls for sample size. Additionally Ng and 
Perron (2001) propose a method to avoid the power problems associated to 
traditional unit tests. They proposed four tests: 
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MZt  = MZα * MSB                                                                       (5.15) 
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c                           if   p=0  
 
5.13−=
−
c                       if   p=1 
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The tests for p=0 and 1 can be obtained upon replacing yt-1 and yT by the residuals 
obtained from least squares detrending. All the tests are based on sAR
2
, an 
autoregressive estimate of the spectral density at frequency zero of υt. Let 
∑
=
=
k
i
ki
1
2^^^
,)1( δββ  with   i
^β   obtained from equation (5.13) and υt = δ (L) εt .Then 
=sAR
2
.))1(1/( 2
^2^ βδ −k                                                                     (5.18) 
 
Null hypothesis (H0): Variable has unit roots (Ng-Perron Statistic > Ng-Perron 
Critical ) .    sAR
2
 converges to σ2 under the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Alternative hypothesis (H0): Variable is stationary (Ng-Perron Statistic < Ng-Perron 
Critical ).      T sAR
2
 diverges under the alternative of stationarity. 
 
 
Some Plots of Chapter 5
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 Plot of Actual and Fitted Values of Table 5.3.1a
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 Plot of Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands of Table 5.3.1a
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 Plot of Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands of Table 5.3.1b
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 Plot of Actual and Fitted Values of Table 5.3.1b
 DPR          
 Fitted       
Months
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2002M4 2003M2 2003M12 2004M10 2005M8 2006M6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Plot of Actual and Fitted Values of Table 5.3.2
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 Plot of Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands of Table 5.3.2
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 Plot of Actual and Fitted Values of Table 5.3.3
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 Plot of Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands  of Table 5.3.3
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Table I A: Unit root tests for variable SPREAD 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend 
Sample period from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
 
              Test Statistic      LL              AIC              SBC              HQC 
 DF           -3.6205     -341.6477     -343.6477     -346.8406     -344.9423 
 ADF(1)     -3.2759     -341.1728     -344.1728     -348.9622     -346.1147 
 ADF(2)     -3.1614     -341.1635     -345.1635     -351.5494     -347.7527 
 ADF(3)     -3.3555     -340.4185     -345.4185     -353.4008     -348.6550 
 ADF(4)     -3.5650     -339.6150     -345.6150     -355.1938     -349.4988 
 ADF(5)     -3.4306     -339.6150     -346.6150     -357.7903     -351.1461 
 ADF(6)     -3.3243     -339.6129     -347.6129     -360.3847     -352.7913 
 ADF(7)     -3.4357     -339.2094     -348.2094     -362.5778     -354.0352 
 ADF(8)     -3.5072     -338.9175     -348.9175     -364.8823     -355.3905 
 ADF(9)     -3.4163     -338.9040     -349.9040     -367.4652     -357.0243 
 ADF(10)    -2.9189     -337.6556     -349.6556     -368.8133     -357.4232 
 ADF(11)    -3.0266     -337.2900     -350.2900     -371.0442     -358.7050 
 ADF(12)    -3.1351     -335.4431     -349.4431     -371.7938     -358.5054 
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -2.8776 
 LL  = Maximized log-likelihood      AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion    HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
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 Table I B: Unit root tests for variable SPREAD 
   The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend 
   Sample period from 1992M2 to 2007M1 
 
                Test Statistic      LL                 AIC              SBC           HQC 
 DF            -3.5744     -341.5916     -344.5916     -349.3811     -346.5335 
 ADF(1)     -3.2055     -341.1448     -345.1448     -351.5307     -347.7340 
 ADF(2)     -3.0846     -341.1380     -346.1380     -354.1204     -349.3745 
 ADF(3)     -3.2874     -340.3730     -346.3730     -355.9518     -350.2568 
 ADF(4)     -3.5080     -339.5386     -346.5386     -357.7140     -351.0698 
 ADF(5)     -3.3758     -339.5382     -347.5382     -360.3101     -352.7167 
 ADF(6)     -3.2715     -339.5341     -348.5341     -362.9024     -354.3598 
 ADF(7)     -3.3921     -339.1029     -349.1029     -365.0677     -355.5759 
 ADF(8)     -3.4727     -338.7829     -349.7829     -367.3442     -356.9033 
 ADF(9)     -3.3861     -338.7621     -350.7621     -369.9198     -358.5297 
 ADF(10)    -2.8753     -337.5682     -350.5682     -371.3224     -358.9832 
 ADF(11)    -2.9937     -337.1721     -351.1721     -373.5228     -360.2343 
 ADF(12)    -3.0926     -335.3202     -350.3202     -374.2674     -360.0298 
 
Note 
 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.4356 
 LL  = Maximized log-likelihood      AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion    HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
 
 
Table II. Asymptotic critical value bounds for the F-statistic. Testing for the 
existence of a levels relationship 
 
Case III: Unrestricted intercept and no trend 
 
0.100  
 
0.050  
 
0.025  
 
0.010  
 
Mean  
 
Variance 
 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
 
0 6.58 6.58 8.21 8.21 9.80 9.80 11.79 11.79 3.05 3.05 7.07 7.07 
1 4.04 4.78 4.94 5.73 5.77 6.68 6.84 7.84 2.03 2.52 2.28 2.89 
2 3.17 4.14 3.79 4.85 4.41 5.52 5.15 6.36 1.69 2.35 1.23 1.77 
3 2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 3.69 4.89 4.29 5.61 1.51 2.26 0.82 1.27 
4 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.25 4.49 3.74 5.06 1.41 2.21 0.60 0.98 
5 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 2.96 4.18 3.41 4.68 1.34 2.17 0.48 0.79 
6 2.12 3.23 2.45 3.61 2.75 3.99 3.15 4.43 1.29 2.14 0.39 0.66 
7 2.03 3.13 2.32 3.50 2.60 3.84 2.96 4.26 1.26 2.13 0.33 0.58 
8 1.95 3.06 2.22 3.39 2.48 3.70 2.79 4.10 1.23 2.12 0.29 0.51 
9 1.88 2.99 2.14 3.30 2.37 3.60 2.65 3.97 1.21 2.10 0.25 0.45 
10 1.83 2.94 2.06 3.24 2.28 3.50 2.54 3.86 1.19 2.09 0.23 0.41 
                    
Source: Pesaran, H. M.; Shin, Y. and Smith, R. J.; (2001, p. 300) 
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Table III. Asymptotic critical value bounds of the t-statistic. Testing for the 
existence of a levels relationship 
 
Case III: Unrestricted intercept and no trend 
 
0.100  
 
0.050  
 
0.025  
 
0.010  
 
Mean  
 
Variance 
 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
 
0 -2.57 -2.57 -2.86 -2.86 -3.13 -3.13 -3.43 -3.43 -1.53 -1.53 0.72 0.71 
1 -2.57 -2.91 -2.86 -3.22 -3.13 -3.50 -3.43 -3.82 -1.53 -1.80 0.72 0.81 
2 -2.57 -3.21 -2.86 -3.53 -3.13 -3.80 -3.43 -4.10 -1.53 -2.04 0.72 0.86 
3 -2.57 -3.46 -2.86 -3.78 -3.13 -4.05 -3.43 -4.37 -1.53 -2.26 0.72 0.89 
4 -2.57 -3.66 -2.86 -3.99 -3.13 -4.26 -3.43 -4.60 -1.53 -2.47 0.72 0.91 
5 -2.57 -3.86 -2.86 -4.19 -3.13 -4.46 -3.43 -4.79 -1.53 -2.65 0.72 0.92 
6 -2.57 -4.04 -2.86 -4.38 -3.13 -4.66 -3.43 -4.99 -1.53 -2.83 0.72 0.93 
7 -2.57 -4.23 -2.86 -4.57 -3.13 -4.85 -3.43 -5.19 -1.53 -3.00 0.72 0.94 
8 -2.57 -4.40 -2.86 -4.72 -3.13 -5.02 -3.43 -5.37 -1.53 -3.16 0.72 0.96 
9 -2.57 -4.56 -2.86 -4.88 -3.13 -5.18 -3.42 -5.54 -1.53 -3.31 0.72 0.96 
10 -2.57 -4.69 -2.86 -5.03 -3.13 -5.34 -3.43 -5.68 -1.53 -3.46 0.72 0.96 
                   
Source: Pesaran, H. M.; Shin, Y. and Smith, R. J.; (2001, p. 303) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV 
VAR Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations Using Model Selection 
Criteria 
 
 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 TMTDR           PR 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
0.11629   0.0013626 
Rank      Maximized LL        AIC             SBC             HQC 
 r = 0      -618.7647       -620.7647       -623.9632       -622.0615 
 r = 1      -607.5764       -612.5764       -620.5726       -615.8183 
 r = 2      -607.4530       -613.4530       -623.0485       -617.3432 
 
Note: 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood            AIC = Akaike Information Criterion    
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion       HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
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Table V: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR 
Model 
 
Sample from 1992 M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 12 
 List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: 
 TMTDR 
 List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
 C               PR 
Order         LL            AIC          SBC                           LR test         Adjusted LR test 
  12     -282.7609 -296.7609 -319.1504             ------               ------ 
  11     -282.8134 -295.8134 -316.6037   CHSQ(  1)=   0.10511[0.746]   0.096979[0.755]        
  10     -283.9269 -295.9269 -315.1178    CHSQ(  2)=   2.3320[0.312]    2.1516[0.341] 
   9      -283.9269 -294.9269 -312.5186    CHSQ(  3)=   2.3320[0.506]    2.1516[0.542] 
   8      -283.9297 -293.9297 -309.9222    CHSQ(  4)=   2.3377[0.674]    2.1569[0.707] 
   7      -283.9299 -292.9299 -307.3231    CHSQ(  5)=   2.3380[0.801]    2.1572[0.827] 
   6      -283.9491 -291.9491 -304.7431    CHSQ(  6)=   2.3764[0.882]    2.1926[0.901] 
   5      -283.9515 -290.9515 -302.1463    CHSQ(  7)=   2.3813[0.936]    2.1971[0.948] 
   4      -284.7150 -290.7150 -300.3105    CHSQ(  8)=   3.9083[0.865]    3.6060[0.891] 
   3      -286.2386 -291.2386 -299.2349    CHSQ(  9)=   6.9555[0.642]    6.4175[0.698] 
   2    -287.9025 -291.9025 -298.2995     CHSQ( 10)=  10.2832[0.416]    9.4878[0.487] 
   1   -288.7020 -291.7020 -296.4998     CHSQ( 11)=  11.8823[0.373]   10.9632[0.446] 
   0  -464.4053 -466.4053 -469.6038       CHSQ( 12)= 363.2889[0.000]  335.1892[0.000] 
 
Note: 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood           AIC=Akaike Information Criterion      
SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
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Table VIA: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the 
VAR Model 
 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 12 
 List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR 
 List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
 C 
Order    LL        AIC      SBC             LR test         Adjusted LR test 
 
  12  -222.1103 -418.1103 -731.5630             ------               ------ 
  11  -226.9640 -406.9640 -694.8287  CHSQ( 16)=   9.7073[0.881]    7.0793[0.972] 
  10  -231.2047 -395.2047 -657.4815  CHSQ( 32)=  18.1888[0.976]   13.2647[0.999] 
   9  -239.6125 -387.6125 -624.3012  CHSQ( 48)=  35.0043[0.919]   25.5280[0.997] 
   8  -249.0132 -381.0132 -592.1140  CHSQ( 64)=  53.8058[0.814]   39.2396[0.994] 
   7  -259.2910 -375.2910 -560.8039  CHSQ( 80)=  74.3614[0.657]   54.2304[0.988] 
   6  -268.8709 -368.8709 -528.7958  CHSQ( 96)=  93.5212[0.553]   68.2033[0.986] 
   5  -274.2404 -358.2404 -492.5772  CHSQ(112)= 104.2601[0.686]   76.0350[0.996] 
   4  -284.3916 -352.3916 -461.1405  CHSQ(128)= 124.5625[0.569]   90.8412[0.995] 
   3  -298.5971 -350.5971 -433.7580  CHSQ(144)= 152.9735[0.289]  111.5608[0.979] 
   2  -307.0681 -343.0681 -400.6410  CHSQ(160)= 169.9155[0.281]  123.9163[0.984] 
   1  -353.9408 -373.9408 -405.9257  CHSQ(176)= 263.6609[0.000]  192.2831[0.190] 
   0    -1429.0   -1433.0   -1439.4        CHSQ(192)=   2413.7[0.000]    1760.3[0.000] 
  
Note: 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood         AIC=Akaike Information Criterion      
SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
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Table VIB: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the 
VAR Model 
 
Note: 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood         AIC=Akaike Information Criterion      
SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 12 
 List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
 C 
 
Order    LL        AIC      SBC             LR test         Adjusted LR test 
  12  -412.9784 -717.9784   -1205.7             ------               ------ 
  11  -425.5505 -705.5505   -1153.3  CHSQ( 25)=  25.1440[0.454]   16.6701[0.893] 
  10  -436.7978 -691.7978   -1099.6  CHSQ( 50)=  47.6388[0.569]   31.5837[0.981] 
   9  -452.7986 -682.7986   -1050.6  CHSQ( 75)=  79.6403[0.335]   52.8002[0.976] 
   8  -466.8318 -671.8318 -999.6777  CHSQ(100)= 107.7066[0.281]   71.4077[0.986] 
   7  -482.4736 -662.4736 -950.3383  CHSQ(125)= 138.9903[0.185]   92.1483[0.988] 
   6  -495.8507 -650.8507 -898.7342  CHSQ(150)= 165.7444[0.180]  109.8858[0.994] 
   5  -509.0834 -639.0834 -846.9857  CHSQ(175)= 192.2099[0.177]  127.4320[0.997] 
   4  -528.7320 -633.7320 -801.6531  CHSQ(200)= 231.5071[0.063]  153.4854[0.994] 
   3  -548.6067 -628.6067 -756.5466  CHSQ(225)= 271.2566[0.019]  179.8386[0.988] 
   2  -567.0268 -622.0268 -709.9854  CHSQ(250)= 308.0966[0.007]  204.2630[0.984] 
   1  -633.4480 -663.4480 -711.4255  CHSQ(275)= 440.9392[0.000]  292.3354[0.226] 
   0    -1852.5   -1857.5   -1865.5  CHSQ(300)=   2879.1[0.000]    1908.8[0.000] 
 261 
Table VIC: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the 
VAR Model 
 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1. Order of VAR = 12 
 List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: 
 LLRCPS          ANF1M           LREER           PR              TMTDR 
 ANRMO21M 
 List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables:      C 
 
Order       LL        AIC      SBC             LR test          Adjusted LR test 
  12    -1197.9   -1635.9   -2336.4             ------               ------ 
  11    -1230.8   -1632.8   -2275.7  CHSQ( 36)=  65.8064[0.002]   39.2657[0.326] 
  10    -1257.5   -1623.5   -2208.9  CHSQ( 72)= 119.2536[0.000]   71.1569[0.506] 
   9    -1288.1   -1618.1   -2145.8  CHSQ(108)= 180.2961[0.000]  107.5800[0.493] 
   8    -1325.7   -1619.7   -2089.9  CHSQ(144)= 255.5772[0.000]  152.4991[0.298] 
   7    -1349.6   -1607.6   -2020.2  CHSQ(180)= 303.3543[0.000]  181.0070[0.465] 
   6    -1368.7   -1590.7   -1945.7  CHSQ(216)= 341.5407[0.000]  203.7923[0.714] 
   5    -1387.9   -1573.9   -1871.4  CHSQ(252)= 380.0223[0.000]  226.7536[0.872] 
   4    -1414.5   -1564.5   -1804.4  CHSQ(288)= 433.2474[0.000]  258.5122[0.893] 
   3    -1442.0   -1556.0   -1738.3  CHSQ(324)= 488.1919[0.000]  291.2968[0.904] 
   2    -1471.8   -1549.8   -1674.5  CHSQ(360)= 547.7481[0.000]  326.8331[0.895] 
   1    -1555.7   -1597.7   -1664.8  CHSQ(396)= 715.5165[0.000]  426.9380[0.137] 
   0    -2794.9   -2800.9   -2810.5  CHSQ(432)=   3193.9[0.000]    1905.8[0.000] 
 
Note: 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood      AIC=Akaike Information Criterion     
SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
 
Table VII 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 Dependent variable is TMTDR 
 Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
Diagnostic Tests 
R-Squared                     0.98545   R-Bar-Squared                   0.98503 
S.E. of Regression            1.0991   F-stat.    F(  5, 175)    2370.3[0.000] 
  
 
Test Statistics         LM Version               F Version          
Serial Correlation   CHSQ(  12)=  17.1159[0.145]  F(  12, 163)=   1.4186[0.162] 
Functional Form     CHSQ(   1)=  0.011053[0.916] F(   1, 174)=  0.010627[0.918] 
Normality               CHSQ(   2)= 334.4077[0.000]       Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity  CHSQ(   1)=   0.10434[0.747]  F(   1, 179)=   0.10325[0.748] 
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Data and Variables 
Variables 
 
 
 
Date 
 
 Total Reserve 
Minus Gold 
(Millions of 
US $) 
Reserve 
Money 
(Billions of 
Cedis) 
G 
old Prices (US 
$ Per Ounce) 
 Cocoa Prices 
(US $ Per Tonne) 
1992M1     607.034 13.758 1281.570 354.701 
1992M2     591.118 14.475 1191.050 353.780 
1992M3     524.484 12.938 1127.960 344.183 
1992M4     514.851 14.239 1045.480 338.692 
1992M5     518.817 13.852 995.310 337.099 
1992M6     409.505 13.907 962.630 341.022 
1992M7     413.644 13.896 1105.240 352.254 
1992M8     423.773 13.333 1182.110 342.893 
1992M9     399.952 13.974 1118.930 345.007 
1992M10    431.304 16.234 1071.480 344.892 
1992M11    379.187 19.479 1076.380 335.051 
1992M12    319.911 24.584 1034.900 334.807 
1993M1     332.025 25.045 1035.570 329.031 
1993M2     304.733 23.738 990.990 329.300 
1993M3     329.257 19.072 977.320 330.097 
1993M4     278.958 20.714 1010.750 342.057 
1993M5     251.912 20.399 998.070 366.668 
1993M6     219.588 21.629 941.690 371.810 
1993M7     367.657 22.441 1058.640 392.400 
1993M8     349.502 21.857 1087.170 378.700 
1993M9     312.502 21.496 1263.300 354.400 
1993M10    291.852 22.394 1290.470 362.380 
1993M11    323.347 22.135 1321.780 374.168 
1993M12    409.681 25.789 1359.510 383.302 
1994M1     356.041 24.870 1263.630 387.078 
1994M2     345.127 24.321 1226.590 382.305 
1994M3     354.605 25.414 1307.190 383.878 
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1994M4     384.643 25.267 1244.000 377.321 
1994M5     351.360 26.494 1378.690 381.590 
1994M6     443.803 28.018 1458.950 385.743 
1994M7     491.995 29.861 1555.870 385.400 
1994M8     583.632 30.018 1551.170 380.761 
1994M9     569.547 31.019 1486.260 391.928 
1994M10    628.888 33.894 1447.710 389.594 
1994M11    588.059 35.837 1430.620 384.441 
1994M12    583.874 46.128 1397.510 379.400 
1995M1     646.675 43.044 1467.560 378.550 
1995M2     621.995 41.211 1510.630 376.505 
1995M3     653.458 40.941 1484.930 381.662 
1995M4     638.852 41.319 1463.970 391.044 
1995M5     515.384 41.296 1448.410 385.219 
1995M6     451.024 44.966 1437.170 387.490 
1995M7     487.881 42.382 1360.760 386.240 
1995M8     483.353 43.109 1410.490 383.698 
1995M9     654.042 42.021 1395.080 383.217 
1995M10    733.803 51.617 1394.640 383.069 
1995M11    679.908 58.636 1435.900 385.676 
1995M12    697.465 62.314 1380.960 387.558 
1996M1     681.998 59.313 1349.110 400.071 
1996M2     692.606 58.081 1370.550 404.484 
1996M3     713.348 57.959 1338.600 396.326 
1996M4     739.460 58.229 1457.330 393.145 
1996M5     644.368 60.091 1524.440 391.943 
1996M6     714.468 59.828 1537.560 385.272 
1996M7     658.286 62.356 1490.380 383.586 
1996M8     640.146 63.687 1501.720 387.471 
1996M9     656.016 65.145 1475.950 382.965 
1996M10    761.153 79.561 1477.580 381.073 
1996M11    769.786 80.005 1465.540 378.517 
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1996M12    828.725 90.216 1474.230 368.978 
1997M1 597.142 88.560 1428.790 355.200 
1997M2 630.090 90.547 1373.280 346.713 
1997M3 617.088 85.122 1521.880 351.805 
1997M4 627.537 84.709 1570.610 344.583 
1997M5 559.310 86.984 1568.300 343.703 
1997M6 537.716 86.767 1693.620 340.476 
1997M7 483.098 92.818 1677.430 324.089 
1997M8 427.462 92.994 1649.190 324.050 
1997M9 468.067 87.371 1765.580 324.476 
1997M10 499.732 101.846 1741.100 323.883 
1997M11    480.373 108.970 1696.370 305.346 
1997M12    537.824 120.308 1738.750 287.620 
1998M1     502.280 118.538 1670.670 289.500 
1998M2     498.110 115.708 1643.230 297.455 
1998M3     494.177 112.548 1721.060 295.955 
1998M4     493.563 110.194 1720.160 308.285 
1998M5     493.823 108.817 1781.410 298.979 
1998M6     351.650 112.156 1723.350 292.539 
1998M7     364.966 116.433 1712.240 292.752 
1998M8     356.032 112.038 1682.500 284.110 
1998M9     330.695 109.585 1685.860 288.982 
1998M10    327.551 118.713 1647.520 295.715 
1998M11    321.642 128.826 1599.910 293.717 
1998M12    376.980 151.800 1524.120 291.679 
1999M1     384.488 143.509 1455.790 286.937 
1999M2     360.195 137.438 1411.140 287.655 
1999M3     382.541 136.526 1313.890 286.214 
1999M4     396.080 136.092 1177.890 282.618 
1999M5     340.397 133.332 1059.240 276.910 
1999M6     378.748 139.891 1162.910 261.314 
1999M7     385.781 146.178 1113.240 256.693 
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1999M8     344.616 152.962 1003.570 256.905 
1999M9     349.514 143.754 1060.560 264.311 
1999M10    340.557 158.740 1021.540 310.782 
1999M11    435.872 179.822 922.080 293.184 
1999M12    453.774 210.164 918.750 282.953 
2000M1     432.906 206.682 918.480 284.066 
2000M2     420.052 197.791 860.740 299.715 
2000M3     410.751 206.510 925.930 286.924 
2000M4     289.954 219.190 911.950 279.653 
2000M5     342.696 220.631 909.420 276.741 
2000M6     396.300 222.404 948.230 285.732 
2000M7     240.424 238.010 967.110 281.586 
2000M8     224.609 245.497 877.790 274.425 
2000M9     237.232 248.534 882.730 273.530 
2000M10    203.982 268.245 877.720 269.929 
2000M11    210.468 292.177 873.990 266.297 
2000M12    232.055 324.713 892.780 271.450 
2001M1     205.420 354.643 966.390 265.486 
2001M2     143.273 345.111 1157.470 262.089 
2001M3     163.800 323.138 1124.410 263.027 
2001M4     161.316 318.939 1083.660 260.331 
2001M5     120.474 344.500 1077.440 272.093 
2001M6     123.115 349.924 973.290 270.202 
2001M7     174.497 387.730 965.320 267.526 
2001M8     234.444 345.867 1032.480 272.092 
2001M9     230.774 371.538 1026.200 284.472 
2001M10    207.531 373.392 1084.860 282.267 
2001M11    240.002 427.143 1231.550 277.184 
2001M12    298.240 458.001 1337.430 275.836 
2002M1     293.680 446.223 1385.930 281.000 
2002M2     233.537 417.320 1490.390 295.288 
2002M3     289.843 414.128 1592.030 294.048 
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2002M4     256.702 419.981 1568.150 302.683 
2002M5     306.123 424.334 1604.700 314.493 
2002M6     287.331 427.973 1656.460 321.178 
2002M7     291.257 447.205 1872.000 313.291 
2002M8     318.720 464.990 1959.270 310.281 
2002M9     370.021 452.539 2167.410 319.136 
2002M10    484.847 511.868 2201.500 316.557 
2002M11    454.091 565.999 1825.060 320.436 
2002M12    539.747 669.599 2025.610 332.036 
2003M1     529.900 589.063 2190.140 356.859 
2003M2     510.732 567.902 2230.350 358.970 
2003M3     510.199 548.582 1989.840 340.600 
2003M4     529.965 565.485 1932.140 328.200 
2003M5     594.893 587.018 1729.210 355.700 
2003M6     788.340 591.272 1579.110 356.400 
2003M7     786.869 582.664 1556.870 351.000 
2003M8     847.469 602.501 1565.550 359.800 
2003M9     906.186 599.567 1625.390 379.000 
2003M10    1047.220 661.097 1481.680 378.900 
2003M11    1314.940 704.831 1510.010 389.900 
2003M12    1352.810 857.805 1646.580 407.000 
2004M1     1298.680 1011.660 1626.400 413.800 
2004M2     1304.920 765.048 1566.090 404.900 
2004M3     1255.930 748.046 1504.430 406.700 
2004M4     1345.810 817.759 1435.670 403.300 
2004M5     1338.450 790.119 1413.040 383.800 
2004M6     1287.900 790.307 1404.710 392.400 
2004M7     1404.430 790.461 1567.860 398.100 
2004M8     1277.360 788.402 1727.330 400.500 
2004M9     1353.430 787.576 1541.140 405.300 
2004M10    1425.170 822.100 1483.800 420.500 
2004M11    1608.060 897.071 1665.710 439.400 
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2004M12    1626.650 1011.660 1672.750 442.100 
2005M1     1570.180 909.760 1549.890 424.000 
2005M2     1518.960 882.140 1719.460 423.400 
2005M3     1439.780 888.353 1763.910 433.900 
2005M4     1429.220 898.274 1585.950 429.200 
2005M5     1345.320 894.166 1509.460 421.900 
2005M6     1347.780 886.352 1538.630 430.700 
2005M7     1306.680 893.951 1488.320 424.500 
2005M8     1340.520 960.297 1482.230 437.900 
2005M9     1525.400 950.651 1504.160 456.000 
2005M10    1520.170 992.548 1453.830 469.900 
2005M11    1558.450 1050.300 1428.780 476.700 
2005M12    1752.900 1080.380 1511.320 510.100 
2006M1     1789.380 1074.480 1576.230 549.864 
2006M2     1776.250 1034.710 1546.370 555.000 
2006M3     1697.940 1006.730 1545.050 557.100 
2006M4     1759.040 1042.320 1552.340 610.700 
2006M5     1696.010 1084.800 1594.300 675.400 
2006M6     1823.560 1041.530 1605.780 596.100 
2006M7     1879.940 1124.940 1673.210 633.700 
2006M8     1693.380 1086.710 1612.940 632.600 
2006M9     1635.190 1081.200 1566.340 598.200 
2006M10    1963.700 1164.980 1530.170 585.800 
2006M11    1884.070 1279.930 1582.540 627.800 
2006M12    2090.290 1469.100 1702.160 629.800 
2007M1     1924.800 1347.340 1701.930 631.200 
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Data and Variables  
Variables 
 
 
 
 
Date 
 US 
Consumer 
Price  Index 
Broad Money 
(Billions of Cedis) 
 Three Month 
Time  Deposit  
Rate 
Claims On 
Private Sector 
(Billions of 
Cedis) 
1992M1     80.197 36.627 17.480 9.497 
1992M2     80.488 38.622 16.920 9.512 
1992M3     80.894 39.600 16.020 10.070 
1992M4     81.011 40.764 16.230 10.489 
1992M5     81.127 40.386 15.810 10.836 
1992M6     81.417 42.610 15.460 11.310 
1992M7     81.591 43.701 15.420 11.830 
1992M8     81.824 44.526 15.540 12.118 
1992M9     82.056 45.786 15.630 13.111 
1992M10    82.346 47.669 16.580 13.552 
1992M11    82.462 52.731 17.270 13.853 
1992M12    82.404 57.532 17.520 13.852 
1993M1     82.811 61.041 19.650 13.977 
1993M2     83.101 59.614 20.710 14.958 
1993M3     83.391 59.721 19.260 15.745 
1993M4     83.624 59.988 22.900 15.591 
1993M5     83.740 59.428 23.140 16.357 
1993M6     83.856 61.143 25.180 16.247 
1993M7     83.856 62.879 26.250 17.164 
1993M8     84.088 64.592 24.750 17.747 
1993M9     84.263 64.893 24.750 18.597 
1993M10    84.611 66.301 25.250 19.427 
1993M11    84.669 68.249 25.250 19.712 
1993M12    84.669 76.805 26.460 18.734 
1994M1     84.901 76.328 26.150 20.011 
1994M2     85.192 79.343 23.810 21.378 
1994M3     85.482 79.427 22.390 21.571 
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1994M4     85.598 80.902 23.270 22.367 
1994M5     85.656 82.683 23.040 23.064 
1994M6     85.947 87.038 20.620 23.339 
1994M7     86.179 89.460 22.630 24.075 
1994M8     86.527 93.463 22.630 25.469 
1994M9     86.760 95.452 22.760 25.728 
1994M10    86.818 104.324 23.250 26.280 
1994M11    86.934 107.965 23.000 27.884 
1994M12    86.934 117.181 24.210 27.326 
1995M1     87.282 122.878 25.100 29.162 
1995M2     87.631 121.193 26.720 29.197 
1995M3     87.921 122.134 27.960 29.356 
1995M4     88.211 123.976 27.750 30.568 
1995M5     88.386 126.999 27.750 32.595 
1995M6     88.560 132.260 28.040 32.962 
1995M7     88.560 131.773 28.040 33.708 
1995M8     88.792 136.949 28.380 35.357 
1995M9     88.966 140.526 28.380 36.321 
1995M10    89.257 151.475 30.930 37.989 
1995M11    89.199 160.481 32.860 38.068 
1995M12    89.141 167.770 32.900 39.329 
1996M1     89.663 171.199 33.870 42.072 
1996M2     89.954 176.832 34.150 44.718 
1996M3     90.418 181.933 34.150 45.212 
1996M4     90.767 188.762 34.150 47.701 
1996M5     90.941 191.716 34.250 48.960 
1996M6     90.999 195.593 34.320 52.547 
1996M7     91.173 202.627 34.320 54.661 
1996M8     91.347 209.397 34.320 57.489 
1996M9     91.638 210.743 34.320 60.270 
1996M10    91.928 224.132 34.880 63.332 
1996M11    92.102 232.184 35.620 67.196 
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1996M12    92.102 233.533 35.620 68.090 
1997M1     92.393 237.564 35.460 77.874 
1997M2     92.683 245.360 35.680 79.236 
1997M3     92.915 246.624 35.680 80.198 
1997M4     93.031 252.112 35.680 82.656 
1997M5     92.973 260.824 35.680 84.787 
1997M6     93.089 269.763 35.680 92.371 
1997M7     93.206 274.281 35.540 97.298 
1997M8     93.380 279.155 35.710 98.335 
1997M9     93.612 281.205 35.930 101.695 
1997M10    93.844 293.523 35.930 103.847 
1997M11    93.786 303.328 35.930 108.745 
1997M12    93.670 336.491 36.210 115.661 
1998M1     93.844 341.631 36.210 118.663 
1998M2     94.019 338.259 32.000 118.228 
1998M3     94.193 336.477 32.000 123.791 
1998M4     94.367 344.118 32.000 126.725 
1998M5     94.541 343.858 32.000 131.123 
1998M6     94.657 354.184 32.880 138.677 
1998M7     94.774 358.779 32.500 138.994 
1998M8     94.890 357.901 32.500 144.058 
1998M9     95.006 357.096 32.500 149.880 
1998M10    95.238 371.374 31.000 156.414 
1998M11    95.238 385.918 29.500 160.707 
1998M12    95.180 395.341 29.500 159.187 
1999M1     95.412 393.980 29.500 164.133 
1999M2     95.529 387.046 29.500 165.561 
1999M3     95.819 377.704 27.750 165.440 
1999M4     96.516 388.115 27.750 178.206 
1999M5     96.516 388.626 23.250 177.875 
1999M6     96.516 399.424 23.250 191.650 
1999M7     96.806 404.898 22.750 193.409 
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1999M8     97.038 412.289 19.250 196.335 
1999M9     97.503 405.751 19.250 206.688 
1999M10    97.677 424.113 19.250 218.592 
1999M11    97.735 446.036 20.750 240.886 
1999M12    97.735 495.826 20.500 255.301 
2000M1     98.026 484.413 23.000 252.458 
2000M2     98.606 496.550 23.750 237.486 
2000M3     99.419 514.492 23.750 244.600 
2000M4     99.477 553.338 23.000 262.083 
2000M5     99.594 584.018 25.000 283.693 
2000M6     100.116 600.313 26.000 310.980 
2000M7     100.348 582.769 31.250 301.630 
2000M8     100.348 591.225 33.500 335.063 
2000M9     100.871 603.596 33.500 360.119 
2000M10    101.045 645.129 33.500 363.730 
2000M11    101.103 726.772 33.500 376.247 
2000M12    101.045 764.782 33.500 375.112 
2001M1     101.684 757.530 33.500 371.878 
2001M2     102.091 764.243 33.500 403.684 
2001M3     102.323 729.657 33.500 393.909 
2001M4     102.729 766.602 33.500 401.083 
2001M5     103.194 755.433 33.500 410.510 
2001M6     103.368 761.551 32.500 405.263 
2001M7     103.078 782.552 32.500 423.587 
2001M8     103.078 793.546 32.500 465.175 
2001M9     103.542 848.277 31.500 402.998 
2001M10    103.194 872.801 26.000 415.138 
2001M11    103.020 953.543 24.500 441.698 
2001M12    102.613 1007.140 23.250 446.050 
2002M1     102.846 1036.070 22.500 443.698 
2002M2     103.252 1049.470 16.000 457.947 
2002M3     103.833 1057.970 16.000 467.428 
 272 
2002M4     104.413 1051.370 14.750 474.437 
2002M5     104.413 1065.020 14.750 493.686 
2002M6     104.472 1090.140 14.750 500.402 
2002M7     104.588 1134.560 14.750 507.470 
2002M8     104.936 1153.950 15.750 517.431 
2002M9     105.110 1189.050 15.750 537.951 
2002M10    105.285 1323.400 15.750 558.196 
2002M11    105.285 1398.500 15.750 579.049 
2002M12    105.052 1499.130 18.000 581.320 
2003M1     105.517 1517.070 13.750 582.390 
2003M2     106.330 1516.250 13.750 535.496 
2003M3     106.969 1478.500 13.750 560.802 
2003M4     106.736 1474.030 13.750 568.022 
2003M5     106.562 1533.500 14.000 605.749 
2003M6     106.678 1568.950 14.000 620.081 
2003M7     106.794 1531.310 14.250 623.458 
2003M8     107.201 1533.470 15.500 626.010 
2003M9     107.549 1553.040 15.250 679.085 
2003M10    107.433 1677.140 15.250 721.418 
2003M11    107.143 1876.850 14.380 730.852 
2003M12    107.027 2012.300 14.250 775.971 
2004M1     107.549 2196.540 14.250 816.953 
2004M2     108.130 1951.780 14.250 765.726 
2004M3     108.827 1977.520 13.750 760.618 
2004M4     109.175 1996.290 13.750 812.638 
2004M5     109.814 2048.470 13.750 848.786 
2004M6     110.163 2112.590 13.750 783.628 
2004M7     109.988 2090.120 13.750 911.071 
2004M8     110.046 2130.730 13.250 887.106 
2004M9     110.279 2179.390 13.250 953.148 
2004M10    110.859 2315.290 13.250 1037.210 
2004M11    110.918 2438.320 13.250 1016.220 
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2004M12    110.511 2564.470 13.250 1035.770 
2005M1     110.743 2419.900 13.250 1037.350 
2005M2     111.382 2416.730 10.500 1045.100 
2005M3     112.253 2465.630 10.500 1071.420 
2005M4     113.008 2550.870 10.500 1130.280 
2005M5     112.892 2526.870 10.500 1182.030 
2005M6     112.950 2538.960 10.500 1238.230 
2005M7     113.473 2544.790 10.500 1284.280 
2005M8     114.053 2605.430 10.500 1294.490 
2005M9     115.447 2527.230 9.850 1330.730 
2005M10    115.679 2691.760 9.850 1403.890 
2005M11    114.750 2698.370 7.750 1427.200 
2005M12    114.286 2804.180 7.750 1500.690 
2006M1     115.157 2860.960 9.250 1407.490 
2006M2     115.389 2913.960 9.250 1384.070 
2006M3     116.028 2942.870 9.250 1429.500 
2006M4     117.015 3048.540 9.250 1501.130 
2006M5     117.596 3116.570 9.250 1596.140 
2006M6     117.828 2699.790 9.250 1238.230 
2006M7     118.177 2759.950 9.250 1284.280 
2006M8     118.409 3350.150 9.250 1686.940 
2006M9     117.828 3429.210 9.875 1803.770 
2006M10    117.189 3536.350 7.500 1903.550 
2006M11    117.015 3739.600 7.250 1964.130 
2006M12    117.189 4004.930 8.000 2061.230 
2007M1     117.547 4002.370 8.250 2089.760 
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Data and Variables 
Variables 
 
 
 
Date 
 Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
M2 Money Plus Quasi 
Money (Billions of 
Cedis) 
Consumer Price Index 
1992M1     162.530 366.266 12.285 
1992M2     165.220 386.223 12.512 
1992M3     166.570 396.004 12.790 
1992M4     163.800 407.637 13.111 
1992M5     161.980 403.858 13.304 
1992M6     158.240 426.095 13.379 
1992M7     152.690 437.010 13.581 
1992M8     146.560 445.256 13.674 
1992M9     141.480 457.855 13.576 
1992M10    143.980 476.686 13.622 
1992M11    148.960 527.311 13.788 
1992M12    142.860 575.315 13.892 
1993M1     148.830 610.408 14.921 
1993M2     144.110 596.135 15.386 
1993M3     139.050 597.207 15.767 
1993M4     136.000 599.884 16.132 
1993M5     138.090 594.280 16.488 
1993M6     142.770 611.432 16.864 
1993M7     135.690 628.787 17.001 
1993M8     133.360 645.916 17.123 
1993M9     130.530 648.931 17.225 
1993M10    129.020 663.011 17.231 
1993M11    128.370 682.486 17.458 
1993M12    120.110 768.049 17.734 
1994M1     116.950 763.280 18.325 
1994M2     106.680 793.425 18.765 
1994M3     106.080 794.273 19.162 
1994M4     107.100 809.020 19.528 
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1994M5     107.230 826.826 19.949 
1994M6     107.760 870.381 20.388 
1994M7     106.170 894.600 20.796 
1994M8     106.630 934.628 21.178 
1994M9     109.640 954.519 21.721 
1994M10    110.150 1043.240 22.304 
1994M11    111.030 1079.650 22.992 
1994M12    113.730 1171.810 23.795 
1995M1     115.150 1228.780 24.845 
1995M2     116.800 1211.930 25.968 
1995M3     116.130 1221.340 27.514 
1995M4     115.900 1239.760 29.279 
1995M5     121.690 1269.990 31.144 
1995M6     124.790 1322.600 32.998 
1995M7     130.200 1317.730 34.771 
1995M8     135.780 1369.490 35.990 
1995M9     137.600 1405.260 36.883 
1995M10    132.300 1514.750 37.725 
1995M11    132.140 1604.810 39.141 
1995M12    134.000 1677.700 40.646 
1996M1     134.590 1711.990 42.037 
1996M2     134.280 1768.320 43.635 
1996M3     133.520 1819.330 45.340 
1996M4     134.990 1887.620 46.924 
1996M5     135.640 1917.160 48.037 
1996M6     135.120 1955.930 48.976 
1996M7     134.280 2026.270 49.599 
1996M8     134.000 2093.970 50.103 
1996M9     137.320 2107.430 50.350 
1996M10    138.580 2241.320 50.661 
1996M11    141.410 2321.840 52.124 
1996M12    147.270 2335.330 53.921 
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1997M1     150.570 2375.640 55.282 
1997M2     147.530 2453.600 56.969 
1997M3     151.340 2466.240 58.587 
1997M4     149.450 2521.120 60.574 
1997M5     145.320 2608.240 62.243 
1997M6     142.460 2697.630 63.202 
1997M7     142.260 2742.810 64.067 
1997M8     144.600 2791.550 64.241 
1997M9     140.560 2812.050 61.993 
1997M10    137.440 2935.230 61.286 
1997M11    139.250 3033.280 61.708 
1997M12    146.630 3364.910 62.613 
1998M1     150.070 3416.310 63.828 
1998M2     150.840 3382.590 65.694 
1998M3     149.770 3364.770 67.913 
1998M4     154.330 3441.180 71.850 
1998M5     156.580 3438.580 73.759 
1998M6     159.650 3541.840 74.231 
1998M7     158.770 3587.790 73.301 
1998M8     160.480 3579.010 73.418 
1998M9     156.740 3570.960 72.768 
1998M10    152.040 3713.740 71.788 
1998M11    154.010 3859.180 71.683 
1998M12    154.340 3953.410 72.476 
1999M1     157.040 3939.800 73.611 
1999M2     159.110 3870.460 75.576 
1999M3     163.390 3777.040 77.243 
1999M4     161.450 3881.150 79.202 
1999M5     163.810 3886.260 80.690 
1999M6     163.580 3994.240 81.843 
1999M7     162.000 4048.980 82.600 
1999M8     160.120 4122.890 82.234 
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1999M9     156.630 4057.510 81.341 
1999M10    140.470 4241.130 80.845 
1999M11    126.160 4460.360 80.864 
1999M12    121.360 4958.260 82.469 
2000M1     120.090 4844.130 84.125 
2000M2     119.600 4965.500 86.865 
2000M3     112.040 5144.920 89.270 
2000M4     106.040 5533.380 93.070 
2000M5     103.840 5840.180 95.798 
2000M6     95.220 6003.130 98.085 
2000M7     87.440 5827.690 100.826 
2000M8     86.870 5912.250 104.111 
2000M9     90.400 6035.960 107.614 
2000M10    92.680 6451.290 111.067 
2000M11    93.630 7267.720 113.268 
2000M12    92.130 7647.820 115.902 
2001M1     91.950 7575.300 118.549 
2001M2     93.130 7642.430 121.730 
2001M3     95.330 7296.570 126.714 
2001M4     96.870 7666.020 129.826 
2001M5     98.470 7554.330 132.126 
2001M6     101.410 7615.510 134.215 
2001M7     103.380 7825.520 136.007 
2001M8     102.890 7935.460 137.451 
2001M9     104.240 8482.770 138.077 
2001M10    107.130 8728.010 139.503 
2001M11    109.010 9535.430 140.086 
2001M12    108.770 10071.400 140.582 
2002M1     109.430 10360.700 142.101 
2002M2     108.180 10494.700 144.041 
2002M3     106.630 10579.700 147.017 
2002M4     103.070 10513.700 149.155 
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2002M5     99.900 10650.200 151.071 
2002M6     97.120 10901.400 152.577 
2002M7     94.690 11345.600 154.350 
2002M8     96.320 11539.500 155.497 
2002M9     97.420 11890.500 155.857 
2002M10    99.110 13234.000 157.909 
2002M11    98.860 13985.000 159.682 
2002M12    97.310 14991.300 161.907 
2003M1     95.020 15170.700 165.193 
2003M2     103.540 15162.500 186.333 
2003M3     103.550 14785.000 190.939 
2003M4     102.890 14740.300 193.840 
2003M5     99.750 15335.000 196.109 
2003M6     99.610 15689.500 197.665 
2003M7     101.540 15313.100 199.103 
2003M8     103.010 15334.700 198.527 
2003M9     102.730 15530.400 197.553 
2003M10    100.070 16771.400 196.685 
2003M11    100.350 18768.500 197.628 
2003M12    98.350 20123.000 200.052 
2004M1     97.050 21965.400 202.209 
2004M2     96.420 19517.800 207.354 
2004M3     97.140 19775.200 211.024 
2004M4     98.650 19962.900 215.513 
2004M5     100.160 20484.700 218.123 
2004M6     100.120 21125.900 221.284 
2004M7     100.480 20901.200 223.727 
2004M8     102.030 21307.300 224.111 
2004M9     102.590 21793.900 222.413 
2004M10    101.250 23152.900 221.160 
2004M11    100.540 24383.200 221.935 
2004M12    97.750 25644.700 223.615 
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2005M1     99.440 24199.000 225.673 
2005M2     102.020 24167.300 236.448 
2005M3     103.730 24656.300 246.274 
2005M4     105.580 25508.700 251.208 
2005M5     107.430 25268.700 253.744 
2005M6     111.080 25389.600 256.131 
2005M7     112.530 25447.900 256.968 
2005M8     111.680 26054.300 257.228 
2005M9     112.600 25272.300 255.728 
2005M10    115.080 26917.600 255.325 
2005M11    117.600 26983.700 255.907 
2005M12    117.110 28041.800 256.794 
2006M1     115.580 28609.600 258.517 
2006M2     116.320 29139.600 264.940 
2006M3     116.570 29428.700 270.581 
2006M4     114.960 30485.400 274.964 
2006M5     112.880 31165.700 279.651 
2006M6     115.230 26997.900 283.042 
2006M7     116.210 27599.500 286.259 
2006M8     115.790 33501.500 285.980 
2006M9     117.260 34292.100 283.420 
2006M10    118.950 35363.500 282.186 
2006M11    117.420 37396.000 282.316 
2006M12    115.920 40049.300 283.835 
2007M1     116.940 40023.700 286.346 
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Data and Variables 
Variables 
 
Date 
Crude Oil (US $ 
Per Barrel) 
 US Federal Fund Rate 
(Percent Per Annum) 
 Prime Rate 
(Percent Per 
Annum) 
1992M1     17.520 4.030 18.000 
1992M2     17.650 4.060 18.000 
1992M3     17.350 3.980 18.000 
1992M4     18.650 3.730 18.000 
1992M5     19.520 3.820 18.000 
1992M6     20.880 3.760 18.000 
1992M7     20.180 3.250 18.000 
1992M8     19.620 3.300 18.470 
1992M9     20.190 3.220 19.280 
1992M10    20.040 3.100 20.380 
1992M11    18.900 3.090 22.980 
1992M12    17.930 2.920 25.410 
1993M1     17.240 3.020 28.000 
1993M2     18.230 3.030 28.000 
1993M3     18.500 3.070 29.720 
1993M4     18.440 2.960 29.720 
1993M5     18.170 3.000 32.000 
1993M6     17.370 3.040 32.000 
1993M7     16.370 3.060 32.000 
1993M8     16.430 3.030 32.000 
1993M9     15.800 3.090 32.000 
1993M10    16.440 2.990 32.000 
1993M11    15.090 3.020 32.000 
1993M12    13.360 2.960 32.000 
1994M1     14.170 3.050 27.000 
1994M2     13.750 3.250 27.000 
1994M3     13.690 3.340 27.000 
1994M4     15.150 3.560 27.000 
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1994M5     16.430 4.010 27.000 
1994M6     17.230 4.250 27.000 
1994M7     18.040 4.260 27.000 
1994M8     16.980 4.470 27.000 
1994M9     16.130 4.730 28.610 
1994M10    16.480 4.760 28.990 
1994M11    17.200 5.290 29.480 
1994M12    16.130 5.450 29.500 
1995M1     16.880 5.530 33.000 
1995M2     17.440 5.920 33.000 
1995M3     17.350 5.980 33.000 
1995M4     18.770 6.050 33.000 
1995M5     18.430 6.010 33.000 
1995M6     17.330 6.000 33.000 
1995M7     16.060 5.850 33.000 
1995M8     16.490 5.740 33.000 
1995M9     16.770 5.800 39.000 
1995M10    16.180 5.760 40.500 
1995M11    16.820 5.800 40.500 
1995M12    17.930 5.600 40.500 
1996M1     17.790 5.560 40.500 
1996M2     17.690 5.220 40.500 
1996M3     19.460 5.310 40.500 
1996M4     20.780 5.220 41.000 
1996M5     19.120 5.240 41.000 
1996M6     18.560 5.270 41.460 
1996M7     19.560 5.400 41.830 
1996M8     20.190 5.220 42.160 
1996M9     22.140 5.300 42.590 
1996M10    23.430 5.240 42.650 
1996M11    22.250 5.310 42.730 
1996M12    23.510 5.290 42.760 
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1997M1     23.290 5.250 42.800 
1997M2     20.540 5.190 42.800 
1997M3     19.420 5.390 42.800 
1997M4     17.980 5.510 42.800 
1997M5     19.470 5.500 42.800 
1997M6     18.020 5.560 42.800 
1997M7     18.450 5.520 42.800 
1997M8     18.790 5.540 42.800 
1997M9     18.730 5.540 42.800 
1997M10    20.120 5.500 42.800 
1997M11    19.160 5.520 42.800 
1997M12    17.240 5.500 42.480 
1998M1     15.070 5.560 39.900 
1998M2     14.180 5.510 39.500 
1998M3     13.240 5.490 39.500 
1998M4     13.390 5.450 39.500 
1998M5     13.970 5.490 39.500 
1998M6     12.480 5.560 35.240 
1998M7     12.720 5.540 33.550 
1998M8     12.490 5.550 33.500 
1998M9     13.800 5.510 31.330 
1998M10    13.260 5.070 26.810 
1998M11    11.880 4.830 26.910 
1998M12    10.410 4.680 26.750 
1999M1     11.320 4.630 26.780 
1999M2     10.750 4.760 25.810 
1999M3     12.860 4.810 25.830 
1999M4     15.730 4.740 25.700 
1999M5     16.120 4.740 25.080 
1999M6     16.240 4.760 24.450 
1999M7     18.750 4.990 24.480 
1999M8     20.210 5.070 24.500 
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1999M9     22.370 5.220 24.530 
1999M10    22.190 5.200 26.560 
1999M11    24.220 5.420 31.190 
1999M12    25.010 5.300 31.490 
2000M1     25.210 5.450 31.500 
2000M2     27.150 5.730 31.500 
2000M3     27.490 5.850 31.500 
2000M4     23.450 6.020 31.520 
2000M5     27.230 6.270 31.840 
2000M6     29.620 6.530 36.770 
2000M7     28.160 6.540 40.600 
2000M8     29.410 6.500 40.110 
2000M9     32.080 6.520 38.080 
2000M10    31.400 6.510 37.910 
2000M11    32.330 6.510 41.990 
2000M12    25.280 6.400 41.990 
2001M1     25.950 5.980 41.990 
2001M2     27.240 5.490 41.990 
2001M3     25.020 5.310 43.470 
2001M4     25.660 4.800 45.000 
2001M5     27.550 4.210 46.320 
2001M6     26.970 3.970 46.680 
2001M7     24.800 3.770 46.750 
2001M8     25.810 3.650 42.910 
2001M9     25.030 3.070 38.800 
2001M10    20.730 2.490 34.830 
2001M11    18.690 2.090 33.110 
2001M12    18.520 1.820 29.700 
2002M1     19.150 1.730 27.480 
2002M2     19.980 1.740 27.000 
2002M3     23.640 1.730 24.500 
2002M4     25.430 1.750 24.500 
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2002M5     25.690 1.750 24.500 
2002M6     24.490 1.750 24.500 
2002M7     25.750 1.730 24.500 
2002M8     26.780 1.740 24.500 
2002M9     28.280 1.750 24.500 
2002M10    27.530 1.750 24.500 
2002M11    24.790 1.340 24.500 
2002M12    27.890 1.240 24.500 
2003M1     30.770 1.240 25.500 
2003M2     32.880 1.260 25.500 
2003M3     30.360 1.250 27.500 
2003M4     25.490 1.260 27.500 
2003M5     26.060 1.260 27.500 
2003M6     27.910 1.220 27.500 
2003M7     28.590 1.010 26.000 
2003M8     29.680 1.030 26.000 
2003M9     26.880 1.010 26.000 
2003M10    29.010 1.010 24.000 
2003M11    29.120 1.000 24.000 
2003M12    29.950 0.980 21.500 
2004M1     31.400 1.000 21.500 
2004M2     31.320 1.010 20.000 
2004M3     33.670 1.000 20.000 
2004M4     33.710 1.010 20.000 
2004M5     37.630 1.000 18.500 
2004M6     35.540 1.030 18.500 
2004M7     37.930 1.270 18.500 
2004M8     42.080 1.430 18.500 
2004M9     41.650 1.620 18.500 
2004M10    46.870 1.750 18.500 
2004M11    42.230 1.930 18.500 
2004M12    39.090 2.160 18.500 
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2005M1     42.890 2.290 18.500 
2005M2     44.560 2.500 18.500 
2005M3     50.930 2.630 18.500 
2005M4     50.640 2.780 18.500 
2005M5     47.810 3.000 16.500 
2005M6     53.890 3.040 16.500 
2005M7     56.370 3.250 16.500 
2005M8     61.870 3.490 16.500 
2005M9     61.650 3.640 15.500 
2005M10    58.190 3.760 15.500 
2005M11    54.980 4.000 15.500 
2005M12    56.470 4.160 15.500 
2006M1     62.360 4.290 14.500 
2006M2     59.710 4.490 14.500 
2006M3     60.930 4.590 14.500 
2006M4     68.000 4.770 14.500 
2006M5     68.610 4.930 14.500 
2006M6     68.290 5.000 14.500 
2006M7     72.510 5.250 14.500 
2006M8     71.810 5.250 14.500 
2006M9     61.970 5.250 14.500 
2006M10    57.950 5.250 14.500 
2006M11    58.130 5.250 14.500 
2006M12    61.000 5.240 12.500 
2007M1     53.400 5.250 12.500 
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The Empirical Model (Chapter 5)  
The conditional ECM estimated is shown as Equation (5.9). 
 
∆i = c0 +b1 it-1 + Σkj=1 dj  Xj(t-1) + Σkj=1 Σpm=0 ψjm ∆Xj(t-m) + Σpm=1δm ∆it-m-1 +ut     (5.9) 
 
where c0 ≠ 0; it  is the policy interest rate, Xj(t-m)  the information vector, and ut serially 
uncorrelated errors. As previously elaborated, the model is valid whether the 
underlying regressors are purely I(1), I(0) or mutually cointegrated. 
 
To ensure serially uncorrelated errors sufficiently long lags of the interest rate and 
information variables in differences are taken. At the same time, care is taken to 
balance this need with the need for a sufficiently small lag length to avoid undue 
over-parameterisation. In effect, the research follows Hendry’s general-to-specific 
modelling approach and the AIC which is emphasised by PSS. The model 
specification allows for different lag lengths on the differenced variables without 
affecting the asymptotic results. 
 
An important assumption underlying (5.9) is that there is no feedback from the level 
of it to the equations explaining each of the information variables in the Xj(t-m) vector  
stated in the previous section. Under the assumption that the lagged interest rate, it-1, 
does not enter the sub-VAR model for Xj(t-m), the policy reaction function is 
identified and can be estimated by least squares. This assumption, however, does not 
rule out the inclusion of lagged changes of the interest rate in the equations for the 
variables in the information vector. 
 
This empirical model enables us to work with the central bank policy instrument and 
its information variables in a way that allows the capturing of both short-run and 
long-run effects; and provides a link between the variables and the steady state 
equilibrium. The model says that a change in the policy interest rate depends on 
lagged changes of itself and in the information variables plus an error correction term, 
[b1 it-1 + Σkj=1 dj  Xj(t-1)], reflects reversion towards the equilibrium relationship. The 
speed of adjustment is given by the adjustment parameter, b1. 
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The testing procedure for finding if a relationship exists between the policy interest 
rate and the information variables, i.e. if the information variables are the 
determinants of central bank interest rate setting, is a two-stage process. The first 
stage involves investigating the existence of a long-run (level) relationship between 
the policy interest rate and the information variable(s) by computing the F-statistic 
associated with the null hypothesis: 
 
H0b1 : b1 = 0  ∩  H0d d’= 0’    
 
(d'
  
being the vector of coefficients on the lagged-levels of the variables represented 
in the vector X); 
 
against the alternative hypothesis: 
 
H1b1 : b1 ≠ 0  ∪  H1d d’≠ 0’ .  
 
The alternative hypothesis not only covers the case b1 ≠ 0  ∪  d’≠ 0’, but also permits 
the cases of  b1 = 0  ∪  d’≠ 0’ and b1 ≠ 0  ∪  d’= 0’. 
 
The asymptotic distribution of this test-statistic is non-standard, irrespective of 
whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), thus PSS provide asymptotic critical values. 
Two polar sets of critical values are provided. One set assumes all the regressors are 
purely I(1) and the other that they are purely I(0). For each application the sets 
provide a band covering all possible classifications of the variables into I(0), I(1), or 
fractionally integrated. 
 
 If the computed statistic falls outside the critical value bounds, a conclusive 
inference can be drawn without needing to know the integration/cointegration status 
of the underlying regressors. However, if the F-statistic falls inside the bounds, 
inference is inconclusive and depends on whether the underlying variables are I(0) or 
I(1). 
 
Comparing the F-statistic with the relevant critical value bounds, if the test statistic is 
less than the lower bounds, the null hypothesis is not rejected, signifying the absence 
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of level relationship between the policy instrument and the information variable(s). 
In this case, the equation is re-estimated in pure differences. However, if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, we test a second null hypothesis: 
 
H0b1 : b1 = 0  using the bounds procedure based on t-statistic tb1. 
 
As with the F-test, asymptotic critical value bounds of this test are provided for cases 
in which all regressors are purely I(1), purely I(0), or mutually co integrated. 
Rejection of   H0b1 : b1 = 0  confirms the existence of a level relationship. On the 
other hand if H0b1  is not rejected, it implies that though a level relationship between 
the policy interest rate and the regressor set exits, the speed of convergence of the 
variables to equilibrium is so slow as not to be significantly different from zero. The 
second stage of the analysis is, then, to estimate the long-run interest rate responses 
to the information variables and make inferences about the size of coefficients. The 
long-run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium, so that Equation (5.9) reduces to: 
 
0 =c0 +b1 i + Σkj=1 dj  Xj + u                                              (5.10) 
 
The constant and level regressors then have their long-run parameters given by:   
 
wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1 
where b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level dependent variable, co is the constant 
term, and dj the coefficient associated with the jth lagged-level regressor in the short-
run model. Therefore equation (5.10) can be re-arranged as: 
 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                                                 (5.11) 
 
The long-run inflation and output gap coefficients are respectively compared with the 
reference values of 1.5 and 0.5 proposed by Taylor (1993), to assess the extent to 
which monetary policy is effective in stabilising inflationary conditions. In addition, 
a view is formed on whether long-run interest rate responses to the other variables 
 289 
are appropriately-signed and sizeable enough to facilitate the attainment of the 
inflation objective. 
 
The Empirical Model (Chapter 6)  
 
The research uses the modified single equation cointegration and error correction 
estimation method developed by Pesaran et al. (2001), a summary of which is 
provided in sub-Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5 to quantify the short-run and long-run 
responses of commercial bank retail rates to the policy interest rate, and investigate 
asymmetries in pass-through when the policy rate increases compared to when it 
decreases, Specifically, we estimate equation (6.1) below: 
 
∆TMTDRt = c0 + c1TMTDRt-1 +c2PRt-1 + ∑
=
p
m 1
c3m∆TMTDRt-m + ∑
=
p
m 0
c4∆PRt-m 
+ut           …                                                                                                      (6.1) 
 
The dependent variable is the change in commercial bank retail rate, ∆TMTDR; and 
PRt is the central bank policy interest rate. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, this 
representation of the error correction model is superior to the traditional models of its 
kind as it is robust to the stationarity conditions of the data: it is valid whether the 
data are I(1) or I(0). 
 
The statistic underlying the Pesaran et al. (2001) procedure is the F-statistic in a 
generalised Dickey-Fuller type regression. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of 
asymptotic critical values for the two polar cases - one, that all regressors are purely 
I(1); and two, that they are purely I(0). The two sets of asymptotic critical values 
provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors. If the F-statistic 
falls inside these bounds, inference is inconclusive and knowledge of the order of 
integration of the underlying variables is required before conclusive inference is 
made. However, if the computed F-statistic falls outside the critical value bounds, a 
conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to know the integration status of 
the underlying regressors. Where a relationship in levels is found, a related bounds 
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test based on the t-statistic associated with the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable is conducted, to confirm the existence of the levels relationship. 
 
Serially uncorrelated errors (ut) are ensured by including sufficiently long lags of 
changes in the interest rates. The problem of over-parameterising is avoided by 
following the general-to-specific modelling strategy, and in particular the AIC that is 
emphasised by PSS. Having estimated equation (6.1), the test for a relationship in 
levels between TMTDRt and PRt is by the F-test for the joint significance of the 
lagged-level variables, where the null hypothesis is   H0c1 : c1 = 0  ∩  H0c2 c2= 0;  
and the alternative hypothesis is H1c1 : c1 ≠ 0  ∪  H1c2 c2 ≠ 0. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it implies an absence of levels or long-run 
relationship between the lending rate and the policy interest rate, and a specification 
in first differences is estimated to prevent the risk of spurious regression. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, we test the null hypothesis   H0c1 : c1 = 0  using the bounds 
procedure based on the t-statistic tc1. If H0c1 : c1 = 0  is rejected, a large value of the 
statistic testing the null will result, confirming the existence of a levels relationship. 
On the other-hand if the null is not rejected, it implies that although a levels 
relationship between the lending rate and the policy interest rate exists, the speed of 
convergence of the variables to equilibrium is so slow as not to be significantly 
different from zero. We derive the long–run coefficients by assuming that all 
variables are constant in equilibrium, so that Equation (6.1) reduces to: 
0 = c0 + c1 TMTDR +c1 PR                                                             (6.2) 
which can be re-arranged as: 
TMTDR = w0 + w2PR                                                                    (6.3) 
The long-run constant, w0, and the long-run coefficient on the policy interest rate, w2, 
are given by: 
w0 = - c0/c1               and        w2 = - c2/c1 
where, c0 is the constant term, c1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level retail rates, 
and c2 the coefficient associated with the policy interest rate in levels in the short-run 
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model. The long-run constant, w0, reflects the mark-up on the policy interest rate, and 
w2 reflects the long-run pass through of the policy interest rate. Under competitive 
market conditions and assuming a credit risk premium, the commercial bank retail 
rate is expected to move one-for-one with the policy interest rate (Borio and Fritz, 
1995). That is, w2 is expected to equal one. 
Inferences on short-run behaviour are made from coefficients on the terms in 
differences. The coefficient c40 reflects the immediate pass-through of changes in the 
policy rate; c41, the pass-through after one month, etc. Short-run behaviour is also 
inferred from the coefficient on the lagged-level lending rate. This statistic gives the 
extent of error correction in one month. 
Exogenous Test (Table IX) 
Chapter 5 (Strict Inflation Targeting) 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 1)=  23.1196[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 1)=  24.7353[0.000] 
F Statistic                                    F(  1, 176)=  25.7730[0.000] 
F Critical @ 95 per cent = 3.84 
Chapter 5 (Strict Inflation Targeting) 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 2)=  24.2886[0.000] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic        CHSQ( 2)=  26.0805[0.000] 
F Statistic                                 F(  2, 173)=  13.4066[0.000] 
F Critical @ 95 per cent = 3.00 
Chapter 6 
 Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 1)=  19.4004[0.000] 
 Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 1)=  20.5210[0.000] 
 F Statistic                                   F(  1, 176)=  21.1292[0.000] 
F Critical @ 95 per cent = 3.84 
The null hypothesis of endogeneity is rejected in all three tests. 
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Alternative Model (McCallum, 1995a)  
Table XA 
Dependent variable is change in money stock 
Sample from 1992M1 to 2007M1 
Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 C                                  24.7605             6.4762             3.8233[0.000] 
 ANF1M                     -0.99393             0.16015            -6.2061[0.000] 
 ANRMO21M(-1)       -1.0070            0.058348           -17.2583[0.000] 
 ANRMO21M(-9)       -.17018            0.066344            -2.5650[0.011] 
 ANRMO21M(-11)       0.18908            0.069392             2.7248[0.007] 
 ANRMO21M(-12)       0.23766            0.072736             3.2674[0.001] 
 ANF1M(-11)                0.65132             0.19761             3.2960[0.001] 
 ANF1M(-12)                -0.47888             0.20695            -2.3140[0.022] 
  
R-Squared                     0.65529           R-Bar-Squared                   0.64135 
S.E. of Regression           39.4055        F-stat.    F(  7, 173)   46.9823[0.000] 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics                   LM Version                       F Version           
Serial Correlation   CHSQ(  12)=  14.7249[0.257]  F(  12, 161)=   1.1881[0.296] 
Functional Form     CHSQ(   1)=   2.4239[0.119]    F(   1, 172)=   2.3346[0.128] 
Normality               CHSQ(   2)=   466.6275[0.000]        Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity  CHSQ(   1)=  0.054260[0.816]   F(   1, 179)=  0.053676[0.817]    
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Note: 
ANRMO21M                    :  The deseasonalised one-month annualised Money stock 
ANF1M                             :  The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation in levels is significant and correctly-signed. Testing for the existence of a 
relationship in levels between the money stock and inflation with a constant as the 
only deterministic variable in the model gives an F-statistic of 46.98. The high F-
statistic implies a conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to know the 
integration/cointegration status of the regressors. It indicates the existence of a long-
term (levels) relationship between the money stock and inflation. The t-ratio of the 
lag of money stock confirms a level relationship. 
The long–run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium and given by (Pearson, Shin and Smith, 2001). 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                              (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1 , b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model.
 
Substituting into the above equation with standard error in parentheses gives: 
ANRMO21M = -24.558 + 0.816 ANF1M 
                                                                              (0.198) 
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Table XB 
Dependent variable is change in money stock 
 Sample from 2002M3 to 2007M1 
Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 C                                50.0518               9.7502             5.1334[0.000] 
 ANF1M                     -1.2455               0.35532            -3.5053[0.001] 
 ANRMO21M(-1)       -0.96194             0.11249            -8.5516[0.000] 
 ANRMO21M(-9)       -0.30309             0.13356            -2.2694[0.027] 
 ANF1M(-12)              -1.0330               0.34176            -3.0226[0.004] 
 R-Squared                     0.62477             R-Bar-Squared                   0.59698 
 S.E. of Regression           52.1575          F-stat.    F(  4,  54)   22.4780[0.000] 
  
Diagnostic Tests 
   Test Statistics         LM Version                F Version           
 Serial Correlation     CHSQ(  12)=   5.9008[0.921]    F(  12,  42)=   0.38894[0.960] 
 Functional Form      CHSQ(   1)=   0.27626[0.599]    F(   1,  53)=   0.24933[0.620] 
Normality                  CHSQ(   2)= 127.1050[0.000]       Not applicable        
Heteroscedasticity     CHSQ(   1)=   0.45599[0.500]F(   1,  57)=   0.44397[0.508] 
    
Note: 
ANRMO21M                    :  The deseasonalised one-month annualised Money stock 
ANF1M                             :  The deseasonalised one-month annualised inflation 
Variables preceded by D are the one month differences of the respective variable in 
levels. 
Inflation in levels is significant and correctly-signed. Testing for the existence of a 
relationship in levels between the money stock and inflation with a constant as the 
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only deterministic variable in the model gives an F-statistic of 22.48. The high F-
statistic implies a conclusive inference can be drawn without needing to know the 
integration/cointegration status of the regressors. It indicates the existence of a long-
term (levels) relationship between the money stock and inflation. The t-ratio of the 
lag of money stock confirms a level relationship. 
The long–run coefficients are derived by assuming that all variables are constant in 
equilibrium and given by (Pearson, Shin and Smith, 2001). 
i = w0 +  wj Σkj=1 Xj + u                              (5.11) 
where, wo = co/ 
^
b 1 and    wj = 
^
d j/ 
^
b 1 , b1 is the coefficient on the lagged-level 
dependent variable, co is the constant term, and dj the coefficient associated with the 
jth lagged-level regressor in the short-run model.
 
Substituting into the above equation with standard error in parentheses gives: 
ANRMO21M = -52.032 + 1.074 ANF1M 
                                                                                 (0.342) 
 
